JAPA 
GERMA 


ThelnsidcStorj'' 

oftheStmMle 

in  Siberia 


FREDERIC 
COLEMA 


JAPAN  OR  GERMANY 

FBEDERIC     COLEMAN 


JAPAN     OR 
GERMANY 

The  Inside  Story  of  the  Struggle 
in  Siberia 


BY 

FREDERIC  COLEMAN,  F.R.G.S. 

AUTHOR  OF 
"OUR  BOYS  OVER  THERE,"  "FROM  MONS  TO  YPRES  WITH 
GENERAL  FRENCH."  "OPEN  EYES  IN  THE  ORIENT,"  ETC. 


NEW  YORK 
GEORGE  H.  DORAN  COMPANY 


Sv 


C11 


COPYRIGHT.  1918, 
BY  GEORGE  H.  DORAN  CX)MPANT 


'*  A '■'-.'•  *::.,• 


PRINTED  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA 


TO 

LOIS 


383000 


PREFACE 

Should  Japan  go  to  Siberia?  Before  a  sin- 
gle soldier  of  the  Land  of  the  Rising  Sun 
crosses  the  frontier  of  the  Russian  Far  East, 
and  for  many  years  after  the  Great  War  has 
ended,  the  pros  and  cons  of  that  question  will 
be  debated. 

What  will  the  sending  of  the  Japanese  army 
to  the  Northland  mean  toward  the  development 
of  the  Far  Eastern  question  and  the  struggle 
for  the  Mastery  of  the  Pacific? 

How  will  Japan  emerge  from  the  World  War! 

What  effect  will  the  participation  of  Japan 
in  the  solution  of  the  Russian  problem  have  on 
the  Slav  in  Siberia  and  his  ultimate  destinies? 

Some  of  these  queries  must  needs  be  left  to 
Time  himself  for  answer.  A  study  of  condi- 
tions in  the  Russian  Far  East  and  in  Japan,  ex- 
tending over  the  period  immediately  prefacing 
the  date  of  the  proposal  that  Japan  should  send 
troops  to  Russian  territory,  may  assist  to  a  bet- 
ter understanding  of  the  situation,  at  least  so 
far  as  it  can  develop  until  the  march  of  events 
has  carried  it  beyond  its  initial  stages. 

vii 


viii  Preface 

I  have  been  in  Japan  several  times  at  critical 
epochs  in  her  history.  I  saw  Japan  and  Siberia 
in  1916  and  again  in  1917.  In  writing  this  little 
book  I  have  no  other  object  in  view  than  to 
place  before  those  who  are  interested  something 
of  what  I  saw  in  the  Orient  and  the  Far  North- 
east.   I  am  less  of  a  prophet  than  a  witness. 

Should  Japan  go  to  Siberia? 

By  all  means  Yes,  emphatically  Yes,  if  she 
goes  in  the  right  spirit,  and  if  when  she  goes  a 
campaign  of  education  and  explanation  goes 
with  her.  If  Japan  is  merely  to  go  to  guard  a 
pile  of  stores  from  the  Huns,  or  even  to  pre- 
vent Bolshevik!  disruption  along  the  path  of 
the  Trans-Siberian,  and  the  echo  of  the  tramp 
of  her  legions  bears  no  other  significance  than 
these,  then  No,  a  thousand  times  No. 

If  Japan  goes  with  her  eyes  on  the  farther 
West,  and  with  her  goes  a  group  of  educators ; 
sympathetic,  understanding,  earnest  men  with 
hearts  in  their  breasts  and  hands  of  fellowship 
outstretched  to  the  Russian  in  Siberia,  who 
knows  what  may  not  come  from  such  co-opera- 
tion? 

May  the  day  not  dawn  when  the  Russian  who 
cares — and  there  are  tens  of  thousands  of  him 
in  Russia  and  always  will  be — ^will  look  upon 
that  army  of  the  Island  Empire  of  the  East  as 


Preface  ix 

his  own  rallying-point,  his  own  line  of  first  de- 
fence? Head-work  and  heart-work  might  do 
wonders  toward  the  bringing  of  that  day. 

We  are  in  this  war  to  a  finish.  We  mean  to 
stay  in  it  until  we  down  the  Boche  and  all  he 
stands  for.  Shall  we  forever  blunder  on  in 
Russia  with  the  English-speaking  propensity 
for  error?  Shall  the  German  be  the  only  one 
who  acts  with  wisdom — Machiavellian  wisdom 
sometimes,  but  none  the  less  far-seeing — as  to 
the  attributes  of  strange  peoples!  The  Ger- 
man has  made  more  mistakes  as  an  interna- 
tional student  of  racial  psychology  than  we. 
True.  But  in  the  instances  where  he  has  shown 
wisdom  let  us  learn  from  him.  Let  us  teach  the 
Russian.  He  is  eager  to  learn,  really,  and  his 
only  school  is  either  dominated  by  or  whole- 
somely tinctured  with  German  propaganda.  We 
do  not  need  to  stoop  to  methods  of  lying  fraud 
to  compete  with  the  Boche  in  Russia.  The 
truth,  the  whole  truth  and  nothing  but  the  truth 
is  the  finest  basis  in  the  world  for  international 
educational  work. 

Let  Japan  go  to  Siberia — and  let  something 
else  go  with  her. 

Let  us  not  only  save  the  stores  in  Vladivostok, 
the  Trans-Siberian  Railway  Line,  and  the  pro- 
ducts and  territory  of  that  vast  region  from  the 


X  Preface 

Hun.  Let  us  save  the  people  of  Siberia  as  well. 
Perhaps  through  that  work  we  may  gain  ground 
further  to  the  Westward,  who  knows? 

Any  work,  however  arduous,  that  bears  even 
a  remote  promise  of  helping  the  Russian  people 
to  come  into  their  own  a  little  sooner,  to  check 
the  disintegration  of  the  vast  land  a  moment 
earlier,  to  bring  the  dim  light  of  the  dawn  of  a 
newer,  better  day  for  Eussia  nearer,  surer,  is 
worth  our  every  effort. 

Let  Japan  go  to  Siberia.  The  ground  is  fal- 
low. The  seed  of  the  righteousness  of  our  cause 
will  find  sure  root  there.  Let  Japan  go — and 
with  her  send  the  sowers. 

Fredeeic  Coleman. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I    The  New  Japan 15 

II    Japan  and  the  War 27 

III  More  About  Japan 43 

IV  Concerning  Siberia 65 

V    The  Revolution  Comes  to  the  Russian 

Far  East 85 

VI    New  Hands  at  the  Helm  of  Govern- 
ment          .     .  105 


VII    On  Discipline 123 

J 

VIII    Agarev — Mayor  of  Vladivostok     .     .     135 


IX    The    Trans-Siberian    Transportation 

Problem 161 

X    The  Fanatic  Element 183 

XI    German  Propaganda 203 

XII    Back    to    Japan — ^and    Home    to    the 

U.S.A. 219 


THE  NEW  JAPAN 


JAPAN  OR  GERMANY 


CHAPTER  I 

The  New  Japan 

Ninety-nine  per  cent  of  the  Englislimen  and 
Americans  in  the  Orient  have  strong  suspicions 
that  when  Japan  moves  her  troops  to  any  par- 
ticular locality  in  the  Far  East,  Japanese  sol- 
diers, Japanese  influence  and,  very  probably, 
Japanese  jurisdiction  will  be  cemented  to  that 
locality  so  tightly  that  a  temporary  expedient 
will  drift  in  time  into  a  permanent  occupation. 

A  study  of  conditions  in  the  Orient  in  1916 
and  1917  shows  ample  reason  for  an  abandon- 
ment of  such  theories  or  at  least  a  very  whole- 
sale alteration  of  them. 

The  fact  that  the  wars  which  Japan  has 
waged  with  foreign  powers  have  been  for  her 
national  security  rather  than  for  territorial 
aggrandisement,  or  at  least  that  national  se- 
curity has  been  the  leading  factor  in  Japan's 

16 


i6  Japan  or  Germany 

war  policy,  is  a  conclusion  which  clever  students 
of  Oriental  affairs  are  becoming  daily  more 
willing  to  accept. 

Japan's  continual  encroachments  on  the  sov- 
ereignty of  China,  particularly  in  Manchuria, 
have  very  naturally  obscured  the  real  issue  at 
times.  A  man  who  has  seen  and  studied  Ja- 
pan's efforts  to  get  a  commercial  foothold  in 
Eastern  Inner  Mongolia  cannot  be  blamed  if  he 
fails  to  see  wherein  the  security  of  the  Japanese 
Empire  has  necessitated  some  of  the  measures 
which  Japan  has  allowed  her  officials  and  her 
nationals  to  adopt. 

Nevertheless  the  underlying  motive  of  Ja- 
pan's policy  to-day  is  fear.  Japan  is  afraid  of 
isolation.  A  certain  number  of  Japanese  jin- 
goes write  and  talk  continuously  about  Japan's 
greatness  and  her  ability  to  press  military  domi- 
nation. In  no  country  in  the  world  is  there  a 
greater  difference  between  the  loud-mouthed 
jingo  of  the  nation  and  the  sober,  responsible 
statesman.  On  frequent  occasions  a  series  of 
articles  in  some  paper  of  the  comparative  stand- 
ing of  the  Tokio  Yamato  talk  brazenly  about 
the  abrogation  of  the  Anglo- Japanese  treaty, 
or  the  forcing  by  Japan  of  America  and  Aus- 
tralia to  change  their  laws  in  accordance  with 
Japanese  wishes.     One  of  Japan's  publicists 


The  New  Japan  17 

frequently  contributes  an  article  to  some  maga- 
zine or  review  in  Japan  which,  if  taken  serious- 
ly, would  lead  the  reader  to  believe  that  not 
only  was  Japan's  security  thoroughly  estab- 
lished, but  that  she  was  in  a  position  to  dictate 
to  the  other  great  powers  as  to  whatever  policy 
she  decided  to  follow  in  the  Far  East. 

People  who  read  these  things  and  from  them 
judge  Japan  make  a  woful  mistake.  The  most 
long-headed  among  the  Japanese  have  long 
seen  that  Japan's  position  among  the  nations  of 
the  world  required  friendly  co-operation  and 
sympathy  with  some  powers  and  actual  alliance 
with  others. 

Eussia's  encroachments  in  the  Far  East  prior 
to  the  Russo-Japanese  war  were  actually  a  seri- 
ous menace  to  Japan's  security.  Imperial  Rus- 
sia was  a  potential  menace  to  Japan  subse- 
quent to  the  war  which  ended  in  1905. 

When,  in  the  early  part  of  this  century.  Count 
Hayashi  in  London  brought  off  the  Anglo-Jap- 
anese Alliance  and  made  it  the  basis  of  Japan's 
foreign  policy,  he  procured  for  Japan  some- 
thing that  was  so  patent  a  necessity  for  the  Is- 
land Empire  of  the  East  that  it  has  been  held 
by  many  students  of  Oriental  affairs  to  have 
been,  until  the  present  war,  a  one-sided  affair, 
very  much  to  Japan's  benefit. 


i8  Japan  or  Germany 

While  Japan  has  so  arranged  her  railways 
that  they  ring  'round  her  rocky  island  coasts 
and  are  planned  with  every  eye  to  their  strategic 
value  in  time  of  possible  warfare,  the  vital  de- 
fence of  Japan  rests  in  her  ability  to  keep  open 
the  sea  routes  which  allow  her  to  keep  touch 
with  the  outside  world.  The  fact  that  it  is  ex- 
tremely unlikely,  if  not  impossible,  for  any 
power  to  conduct  a  successful  military  opera- 
tion on  Japanese  territory  does  not  alter  the 
fact  that,  should  Japan  be  overwhelmed  at  sea 
and  her  islands  surrounded  by  a  hostile  cordon 
of  battleships  and  cruisers,  her  ultimate  defeat 
would  be  certain. 

In  plain  English,  Japan's  security  has  de- 
manded for  many  years,  and  always  will  de- 
mand, an  alliance  with  a  power  which  is  suffi- 
ciently strong  at  sea  so  that  Japan  will  be  freed 
from  the  danger  of  isolation. 

A  very  brief  study  of  Japan's  history  is  re- 
quired to  show  how  gradually  is  coming  the 
more  general  adoption  in  Japan — an  adoption 
which  is  by  no  means  general  as  yet — or  the 
more  statesmanlike  and  common-sense  view  of 
Japan's  position  internationally  in  contradis- 
tinction to  the  militarist  and  aggressive  policy 
of  those  Japanese  who  have  an  inflated  idea  of 
Japan's  importance  and  capacity. 


The  New  Japan  19 

The  outcry  of  the  Japanese  press  in  1915 
against  England  and  the  ahnost  universal  criti- 
cism by  Japan's  newspapers  of  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  Alliance  was  promulgated  and  fos- 
tered by  the  extreme  militarist  group.  It  was 
one  of  the  signs  in  1915  of  a  last,  dying  effort 
on  the  part  of  the  old  militarist  element  to  as- 
sert itself.  Another  of  its  expiring  struggles 
to  impose  its  policies  on  the  country  was  the 
effort  to  force  on  to  China  the  infamous  Five 
Group  Demands. 

In  those  days  Japan's  foreign  policy  was  in 
the  hands  of  the  Genro,  or  Elder  Statesmen. 
The  Premier,  Count  Okuma,  was  a  mere  tool  in 
their  hands.  He  and  his  Cabinet  had  no  voice 
in  the  foreign  policy  of  Japan.  A  better  ele- 
ment in  Japan  was  coming  to  the  fore.  The 
younger  group  of  Japan's  statesmen  realised 
the  weakness  of  Japan's  position.  The  Genro 
were  aged  men;  their  lives  were  drawing  to  a 
close.  An  increasing  number  of  the  thinkers  of 
Japan  saw  that  when  the  Genro  passed,  a  sys- 
tem and  a  policy  would  pass  with  them. 

As  the  eyes  of  the  Japanese  began  to  open  to 
that  situation,  two  schools  took  definite  form: 
one  was  the  militarist  school,  which  based  its 
ideas  and  theories  upon  German  thought  and 
German  teaching.    As  in  Germany,  the  profes- 


20  Japan  or  Germany 

sor,  scientist  and  publicist  faction  supplied 
many  advocates  to  the  point  of  view  held  by  the 
militarists.  The  opposing  school  represented  a 
more  liberal  line  of  thought.  It  realised  Japan's 
weakness  if  isolation  should  be  its  portion — 
whether  that  isolation  would  be  military  or  eco- 
nomic. It  saw  that  Japan's  commercial  future 
in  China  was  of  vital  necessity  to  Japan's  suc- 
cessful development.  The  raw  materials  of  the 
Asiatic  continent  must  be  procured  by  Japan, 
as  she  has  insufficient  mines  of  her  own.  Ja- 
pan's manufactured  products  must  be  marketed 
in  China  if  she  would  continue  the  development 
of  her  industries  and  commerce.  China  became 
recognised  as  a  necessity  to  Japan.  Moreover, 
the  new  school  of  thought  realised  that  the  only 
possible  method  by  which  Japan's  ideals  could 
be  attained  was  by  gaining  the  friendship  of 
China  rather  than  its  antagonism. 

In  October,  1916,  when  Count  Terauchi  be- 
came Premier,  Japan  was  standing  at  the  cross- 
roads. Already  those  who  had  argued  that  Ja- 
pan should  follow  the  policy  of  Germany,  were 
meeting  more  and  more  opposition.  Terauchi, 
supposed  to  be  militarist,  pure  and  simple, 
showed  that  he  held  many  liberal  ideas.  He 
declared  at  the  outset  that  the  policy  of  his 
Government  would  be  to  cooperate  unequivo- 


The  New  Japan  21 

cally  with  the  Allies.  He  more  than  once  dis- 
played evidences  that  he  conscientiously  desired 
to  live  up  to  his  obligations,  so  far  as  the  war 
was  concerned,  and  that  so  long  as  he  was  at 
the  helm  in  Japan  she  could  be  depended  upon 
to  do  so,  at  least  to  the  extent  of  his  power  to 
guide  his  country  and  his  countrymen. 

Then  came  with  1917  the  entrance  of  the 
United  States  into  the  war.  America  was  no 
longer  the  great  quiescent,  dormant  power  on 
the  other  side  of  the  Pacific,  but  was  taking 
rapid  steps  toward  becoming  one  of  the  strong- 
est naval  and  military  powers  in  the  world. 
That  change  in  Japan's  great  neighbour  to  the 
eastward  put  the  final  nails  in  the  coffin  of  the 
policies  of  aggression  advocated  by  Japan's 
extreme  militarists.  The  only  argument  which 
they  can  bring  to  bear  to-day  against  the  liberal 
policies  of  New  Japan  is  a  croaking  prophecy 
that  Germany  may  be  able  to  emerge  victorious 
from  the  war.  If  Germany  won,  the  element  in 
Japan  which  has  advocated  that  their  country 
should  follow  in  the  footsteps  of  Germany  would 
be  undeniably  strengthened.  But  even  Japan, 
so  far  away  from  the  conflict  in  Europe  and  so 
little  informed  as  to  the  actual  progress  of 
events,  is  beginning  to  realise  that  Germany 
cannot  win  the  war. 


22  Japan  or  Germany 

Japan  is  taking  advantage,  commercially 
and  industrially,  of  the  situation  created  in  the 
Orient  by  the  World  War.  She  is  leaving  no 
stone  unturned  to  gain  a  foothold  wherever  op- 
portunity presents  and  is  developing  situations 
which  she  knows  well  may  not  exist  for  many 
years.  This  is  particularly  true  of  China.  So 
long  as  Japan  conducts  her  negotiations  in  the 
open,  however,  her  crying  need  for  Chinese  raw 
material  and  her  equal  need  of  China  as  a  mar- 
ket for  her  manufactured  products  give  no  little 
excuse  to  her  efforts  in  that  direction.  She  is 
again  spurred  by  fear. 

If  she  failed  to  take  advantage  of  the  ab- 
sence of  many  of  her  competitors,  she  could 
never  hope  to  successfully  compete  with  them 
in  certain  lines  and  in  certain  localities.  The 
desire  on  the  part  of  Japan  to  push  her  com- 
mercial propaganda  during  the  war  almost  as- 
sumes the  character  of  a  fevered  rush  for  some 
newly  discovered  goldfield.  She  wants  all  the 
advantage  she  can  get.  She  knows  she  is  going 
to  need  it  when  the  war  is  over  and  the  great 
commercial  and  industrial  nations  turn  their 
eyes  to  the  Far  East.  She  knows  that  she  will 
need  every  advantage  she  has  gained,  and  more, 
in  the  business  war  that  is  coming  one  day  in 
the  Orient.     The  advanced  Japanese  is  under 


The  New  Japan  23 

little  hallucination  as  to  the  capability  of  most 
Japanese  industrial  concerns  to  hold  their  own 
on  equal  terms  with  the  big  manufacturers  of 
America,  England  and  Germany. 

Just  as  her  need  for  national  security  de- 
mands friendship  and  alliance  with  a  group  of 
great  powers,  so  her  ultimate  industrial  and 
economic  welfare  depends  to  a  considerable  ex- 
tent on  friendly  relations  with  some  of  her  most 
strenuous  competitors. 


JAPAN  AND  THE  WAR 


CHAPTER  n 
Japan  and  the  War 

When  I  go  to  Japan  I  talk  to  many  Japanese 
from  many  walks  of  life. 

A  sojourn  in  Japan  before  I  went  to  Siberia 
and  a  stay  of  some  weeks  in  Tokyo  on  my  re- 
turn journey  filled  my  ears  with  arguments 
from  the  Japanese  standpoint  on  the  question 
of  whether  or  not  Japan  should  send  her  troops 
to  Harbin,  to  Vladivostok,  along  the  Trans- 
Siberian  Railway  as  far  west  as  Irkutsk,  or 
even  farther  to  the  westward. 

As  all  the  world  has  discussed  what  England, 
France,  and  America  think  of  such  action  by 
Japan,  and  the  effect  on  the  mind  and  temper 
of  the  Russian  that  would  be  the  immediate  re- 
sult of  a  Japanese  army  on  Siberian  soil,  the 
opinions  and  ideas  of  the  Japanese  themselves 
should  not  be  left  out  of  consideration. 

I  went  to  Siberia  with  the  full  knowledge  that 
the  Russians  in  the  Pri-Amur  country  held  very 
decided  views  about  Japan.  The  Japanese  were 
unpopular  in  the  Russian  Far  East 

27 


28  Japan  or  Germany 

I  discovered  the  extent  of  the  feeling,  its 
causes  and  how  it  has  been  fostered. 

When  I  returned  to  Japan  I  was  an  advocate 
of  Japanese  troops,  under  certain  circum- 
stances, being  sent  to  Harbin. 

I  lost  no  opportunity  to  get  the  right  per- 
spective in  Tokyo.  I  left  Yokohama  for  Van- 
couver with  the  confirmed  belief  that  before  the 
smart  little  soldiers  of  Japan's  army  were  land- 
ed in  Vladivostok  or  placed  in  the  towns  along 
the  Trans-Siberian  Railway  the  situation  must 
be  so  serious  that  such  action  was  recognised 
as  inevitable.  Conditions  in  Russia  must  needs 
first  be  well-nigh  hopeless. 

Of  that,  however,  more  anon.  First,  what 
did  my  friends  in  Japan  think  of  all  these 
things  ? 

To  begin  with,  my  friends  in  Japan,  with  rare 
exceptions,  were  somewhat  less  interested  in 
the  war  than  you  might  think. 

Japan  went  into  the  war  without  any  rush 
of  fine,  high  enthusiasm.  The  man  in  the  street 
in  Japan  knew  little  about  the  whole  business. 
The  Government  did  it  all.  All  Japan  knew 
that  the  country  had  gone  into  the  war  out  of 
loyalty  to  the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance.  But 
Japan  was  a  long  way  from  the  fighting  in  Eu- 
rope, and  the  fighting  in  the  Orient, — the  fight- 


Japan  and  the  War  29 

ing  with  which  the  Japanese  had  to  do, — was 
of  little  consequence,  after  all,  and  was  soon 
over. 

Japanese  editors,  of  whom  I  know  many,  al- 
ways reminded  me  of  the  restricted  extent  to 
which  Japan  had  pledged  her  help.  '*Our  war 
zone,  it  must  be  remembered,"  they  would  say, 
^4s  bounded  on  the  west  by  the  Indian  Ocean. 
Read  the  terms  of  the  Alliance  and  you  will  see 
that.  Further  to  the  west  the  British  Govern- 
ment does  not  want  us  to  go.  We  have  always 
been  told  that  our  part  in  this  war  is  to  guard 
the  Orient.  We  have  done  that.  The  sending 
of  some  of  our  fleet  to  the  Mediterranean  was  an 
exception,  and  naturally  was  discussed  as  such 
by  Japan.  On  all  sides  was  criticism  of  the 
Government  for  taking  such  a  step — every  one 
wanted  to  know  what  reward  Japan  would  get." 

Sooner  or  later  it  comes  to  that  in  Japan, 
I'm  afraid. 

'^What  will  we  get  out  of  it  I"  That  ques- 
tion is  at  the  back  of  all  the  arguments  about 
the  war.    And  naturally  so,  perhaps,  in  Japan. 

This  is  a  war,  we  say,  for  democracy.  Japan 
is  not  a  democracy.  Count  Terauchi,  the  able 
Premier  of  Japan,  said  not  long  ago  that  democ- 
racy is  one  of  the  gi-eatest  dangers  of  the  age. 
Terauchi,  whom  I  admire  sincerely  and  who  has 


30  Japan  or  Germany 

proved  himself  to  be  a  strong  man  indeed  dur- 
ing the  past  year  and  a  half,  is  no  democrat. 
He  might  be  an  even  stronger  man  if  he  was  a 
democrat,  but  he  could  not,  then,  be  Premier  of 
Japan. 

Thus,  if  Japan  is  not  a  democracy  and  wants 
none  of  democracy,  so  far  as  its  own  Govern- 
ment is  concerned,  why  should  the  Japanese  not 
look  carefully  into  the  possible  gain  that  may- 
come  to  them  before  they  take  a  further  step 
toward  war — real  war,  fighting  and  bloodshed 
and  casualty  and  loss  I 

**  We  took  Kiao-chow  from  the  Germans,  and 
our  fleet  not  only  convoyed  the  Australian 
troop-ships,  but  kept  the  Pacific  clean  of  Ger- 
man raiders.  Germany's  islands  in  the  South- 
em  Seas,  too,  we  occupied,''  said  Mr.  Tsushima 
to  me  one  day.  Mr.  Tsushima  is  the  editor  of 
the  Tokyo  Nichi  Nichi,  which  I  have  heard 
called  the  Daily  Mail  of  Japan. 

*'You  see,  Japan  has  been  doing  everything 
in  her  power,  seen  and  unseen,  to  assist  the 
Allies,"  he  continued.  **Yet  the  Japanese  are 
called  selfish  by  many  of  you,  because  Japan 
has  made  a  great  economic  advancement." 

I  confess  I  had  called  the  Japanese  selfish. 
They  may  have  no  monopoly  of  that  virtue,  but 
they  are  selfish.    I  had  told  Mr.  Tsushima,  fur- 


Japan  and  the  War  31 

ther,  that  I  thought  Japan  too  indifferent  to 
the  war — ^that  Japan  did  not  pay  the  sort  of 
serious  attention  to  the  war  she  should  do. 

**What  would  you  have  Japan  do  I"  queried 
Mr.  Tsushima.  **Are  the  Western  Allies  in  a 
round-ahout  way  urging  Japan  to  mobilise  her 
soldiers  and  send  them  to  Europe!" 

I  admitted  I  could  not  say  that.  Pichon  in 
France  had  long  wanted  the  army  of  Japan  on 
the  Western  Front,  but  few  supporters  of  such 
a  policy  stood  with  him. 

**Only  a  small  section  of  Japanese  favoured 
M.  Pichon 's  proposal,"  continued  Mr.  Tsu- 
shima. *'No  general  interest  was  aroused  in 
Japan  by  it,  but  it  always  crops  up  when  there 
is  a  reverse  for  the  Entente  in  the  war  situa- 
tion. I  think  no  Japanese  statesmen  of  com- 
mon sense  have  considered  the  matter  seriously. 
If  the  Entente  armies  reach  a  point  where  they 
really  require  reenforcement  by  the  Japanese 
army,  Japan  may  not  shirk  her  duty,  but  be- 
fore the  Allies  request  Japan's  mobilisation  let 
them  review  the  reasons  why  Japan  joined  in 
the  war,  and  what  material  assistance  she  has 
rendered.  Then  let  them  make  up  their  minds 
as  to  what  Japan  will  gain. ' ' 

He  had  reached  the  moot  point  at  last.    Most 


32  Japan  or  Germany 

of  them  come  to  it,  in  Japan,  if  you  give  them 
time. 

One  of  the  most  astute  of  Japan's  political 
leaders  became  very  frank  with  me  after  din- 
ner one  evening.  We  were  discussing  the  steel 
embargo.  America  was  stopping  the  shipment 
of  steel  to  Japan  and  Japan  was  very  much 
upset  in  consequence. 

I  held  that  Japan  was  not  pulling  her  fair 
share  of  the  war-load.  She  could  well  release 
much  of  her  shipping  to  assist  the  Atlantic 
freight  fleets.  She  could,  without  entailing  ac- 
tual hardship  in  Japan,  send  ships  where  bot- 
toms were  badly  needed  by  the  Allies, — where 
the  shortage  of  ships  was  the  most  vital  point 
of  weakness  in  the  Allies'  armour. 

My  Japanese  friend  commenced  his  argument 
in  reply  with  the  keynote — ^What  would  Japan 
gain?  He  asked  me  to  put  myself  in  the  place 
of  the  average  Japanese — the  man  of  average 
intelligence.  This  is  how  he  thought  I  would 
then  view  the  proposal  that  Japan  should  make 
further  sacrifice  in  the  war:  The  Japanese 
are  not  a  popular  race.  If  they  are  to  believe 
what  they  hear  and  what  they  read,  Canadians, 
Americans  of  the  Pacific  Coast,  Australians, 
and  the  English  and  Americans  in  the  Far  East 
^n  short,  those  of  the  English-speaking  races 


Japan  and  the  War  33 

with  whom  they  are  in  a  sense  neighbours  and 
with  whom  they  sometimes  come  in  touch,  are 
not  imbued  with  love  for  the  Japanese.  Quite 
the  contrary.  Russians  do  not  love  the  Japa- 
nese. 

When  the  war  ends,  all  agree  that  a  great 
commercial  struggle  will  commence  in  the 
Orient.  A  combination  of  interests  may  or 
may  not  be  made  between  nations,  but  who  will 
look  after  the  interests  of  Japan  I  Who  beside 
herself?  Will  friendly  hands  be  stretched  out 
to  her  to  assist  her  industrially  and  commer- 
cially? Never.  If  combinations  are  made,  they 
will  not  include  Japan.  She  will  have  to  fight 
alone.  She  is  less  powerful  financially  than  her 
big  competitors,  too.  She  has  less  wealth,  less 
industrial  capacity  as  yet,  less  commercial  abil- 
ity. She  is  a  baby  in  business  with  few  years 
of  experience  of  organised  business  effort  or 
combined  commercial  action  behind  her. 

What  is  her  wisest  course  ?  To  keep  her  ships 
and  foster  her  growing  industries  ?  To  increase 
as  best  she  may  and  while  she  may  her  grow- 
ing hold  on  the  commerce  of  China,  taking  ad- 
vantage of  the  absence  of  her  competitors  from 
many  a  field  in  which  she  has  none  too  much 
time  to  gain  great  advantage  before  they  re- 
turn to  fight  her  with  better  weapons  and  un- 


34  Japan  or  Germany 

deniable  inherent  advantages  of  more  than  one 
kind?  Or  slionld  Japan  give  freely  her  help 
to  the  Allies,  reduce  her  shipping  fleets,  ham- 
per her  export  trade,  cut  down  the  raw  material 
that  is  coming  in  to  feed  her  mills  and  factories  ? 
For  what!  To  beat  Germany?  Then  what? 
What  of  the  aftermath?  Will  her  sacrifice  be 
rewarded  ?    How  ? 

Do  you  catch  the  drift?  Do  you  see  the  point 
of  view  from  the  Japanese  side  ?  I  did.  I  not 
only  saw  it  then,  but  I  kept  rubbing  shoulders 
with  it  all  the  time  I  was  in  Japan.  The  Oriental 
is  not  usually  so  outspoken  as  my  friend  the 
political  leader.  He  camouflages.  But  he  is  no 
more  inscrutable  than  are  many  Western  men. 
When  he  has  an  idea  in  the  back  of  his  head, 
a  fundamental  idea  that  sticks  there  and  on 
which  his  theories  are  based  and  his  house  of 
argument  and  reasoning  is  built,  it  can  be 
found,  usually,  if  one  gets  xmder  the  surface. 

The  same  thing  applied  with  relation  to  talk 
about  sending  Japanese  soldiers  away  from 
Japan  to  fight  for  the  Allied  Cause.  Japan  has 
had  a  habit  of  getting  some  quid  pro  quo  when 
she  fights.  Her  war  with  China  in  1894  found 
her  too  young  and  weak  to  insist  on  the  benefits 
she  craved.  In  1900  she  lost  nothing  in  the 
Peace  Negotiations  that  followed  the  Boxer 


Japan  and  the  War  35 

Trouble  in  China.  In  1904,  when  she"  defeated 
Eussia,  her  ambitions  were  clipped  somewhat 
by  watchful  Powers.  Still,  Japan  has  been 
gaining,  gaining  gradually.  Formosa,  Korea, 
the  railway  zone  in  Manchuria,  and  now  Kiao- 
chow  (not  to  mention  other  parts  of  China 
where  she  is  gaining  gradually,  too),  have  fallen 
under  her  protecting  mantle. 

There  is  another  small  prospective  gain  that 
comes  to  mind  in  these  days  of  tortured,  dis- 
integrated, groaning  Russia.  Before  the  Great 
War,  Manchuria,  that  province  of  China  in 
which  China  has  so  little  authority,  was  under 
a  sort  of  dual  protection.  At  the  end  of  the 
Russo-Japanese  war  the  Russians  administered 
the  Chinese  Eastern  Railway  zone  from  Harbin 
south  to  Chang-chun.  There  Japanese  admin- 
istration commenced,  and  ran  down  the  railway 
to  Mukden,  then  south  to  Port  Arthur  and  Dai- 
ren,  as  well  as  eastward  to  Antung,  on  the  road 
to  Korea.  The  Japanese  had  worked  hard  to 
make  the  district  along  the  railway  productive. 
From  Mukden  north  to  Chang-chun  the  soya 
bean  was  being  grown  in  increasing  quantities. 
On  to  the  north,  from  Chang-chun  to  Harbin, 
lay  the  most  fertile  lands  of  all.  Not  only  along 
the  railway  but  beside  the  River  Sungari  was 
untouched,  virgin  soil  that  Russian  supervision 


36  Japan  or  Germany 

bade  fair  to  leave  untouched  for  all  time.  So 
Japan  began  negotiations  with  Russia  to  ex- 
tend her  sphere  of  influence  to  Harbin,  and 
take  over  the  administration  of  the  railway 
zone  from  Harbin  south.  The  rights  of  navi- 
gation on  the  upper  reaches  of  the  Sungari, 
hitherto  exclusively  Russian,  were  also  to  go  to 
Japan. 

I  was  in  Tokyo  in  1916  when  Viscount  Mo- 
tono,  now  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  in  the 
Terauchi  Government,  came  back  from  his  posi- 
tion as  Ambassador  to  Petrograd  to  take  his 
new  folio.  Before  he  left  Russia  he  had  tried 
a  diplomatic  fall  with  his  friends  there.  He 
had  won  out.  The  bit  of  railway  south  of  Har- 
bin was  to  go  to  Japan.  It  was  settled.  Just 
when  the  change  was  to  be  made  I  could  not  dis- 
cover. After  the  war,  surely,  but  possibly  be- 
fore. I  imagined  that  the  chaotic  state  of  af- 
fairs in  Russia  toward  the  end  of  1917  would 
shelve  all  such  deals  indefinitely,  but  not  long 
ago  in  Peking,  Baron  Hayashi,  Japan's  able 
Minister  to  China,  told  me  he  hoped  the  final 
steps  would  shortly  be  taken  whereby  the  trans- 
fer would  be  consummated. 

Russian  maladministration  in  Manchuria 
will  bear  one  sure  result.  Wherever  Japan  may 
send  her  soldiers  before  the  war  is  done,  what- 


Japan  and  the  War  37 

ever  reward  she  may  expect  or  gain  for  the  part 
she  plays,  her  coveted  line  to  Harbin  will  be  hers 
inevitably  and  irrevocably.  That  will  put  her 
soldiers  in  Harbin,  as  railway  guards,  in  such 
numbers  as  she  deems  necessary. 

En  passant,  it  won't  be  such  a  bad  thing  for 
the  Manchurian  farmer,  after  all.  He  will  bene- 
fit all  along  that  strip  of  railway  from  Harbin 
to  Chang-chun,  just  as  his  brother  agricultural- 
ist has  benefited  further  south.  The  Japanese 
farmer  cannot  compete  with  him.  He  is  one  of 
the  best  intensive  farmers  going,  is  the  Man- 
churian. He  can  do  more  work  and  live  more 
cheaply  than  any  Japanese  immigrant  who  may 
be  induced  to  brave  the  rigours  of  the  Man- 
churian climate.  Few  Japanese  will  come,  and 
those  who  come  will  either  drift  back  to  the 
towns  or  go  away.  The  Manchurian  farmer  is 
safe.  It's  disappointing  in  some  ways,  to  some 
Japanese,  but  it  can't  be  helped.  The  overflow 
population  of  Japan,  if  it  fimds  it  has  to  move 
out  to  make  room  for  more  overflow  population 
some  day,  will  not  come  to  Manchuria^ — ^not  in 
sufficient  numbers  to  cut  much  figure. 

While  on  the  subject  of  the  way  Japan  looks 
upon  rewards  for  effort,  I  frequently  discussed 
the  question  of  the  future  of  Tsing-tau. 

The  rights  Germany  enjoyed  in  Shan-tung 


38  Japan  or  Germany 

and  her  towns  of  Tsing-tau  and  Kiao-cliow  were 
appropriated  by  the  Japanese  when  they  de- 
feated the  Boche  in  China  in  1914.  Japan  made 
a  sort  of  an  agreement  to  evacuate  Tsing-tau 
and  go  home  one  day,  but  the  document  is  open 
to  many  an  interpretation  and  the  man  who 
hopes  to  live  until  Shan-tung  is  free  of  Japa- 
nese control  is  planning  a  longevity  which  would 
be  as  extraordinary  as  the  evacuation  itself. 

Not  long  ago  I  probed  into  this  subject  with 
a  Japanese  gentleman  of  sufficiently  high  offi- 
cial standing  so  that  I  was  placed  under  a  prom- 
ise not  to  give  his  name.  He  said  that  the  dec- 
laration of  war  by  China  against  Germany  and 
the  cancellation  of  all  the  treaties  and  agree- 
ments with  Germany  left  China  and  Japan  free 
to  discuss  the  disposition  of  the  rights  Ger- 
many had  enjoyed  in  Shan-tung  until  Japan 
took  them  over. 

After  Japan  had  taken  possession  of  Tsing- 
tau  and  ousted  the  Germans,  she  made  a  treaty 
with  China  in  which  she  agreed  to  take  the  ques- 
tion up  with  Germany  at  the  Peace  Conference 
which  would  follow  the  Great  War,  and  subse- 
quently tell  China  all  about  it.  That  is  not  the 
phraseology  used,  but  a  study  of  the  documents 
brings  one  to  that  sort  of  feeling.  China  *s  dec- 
laration of  war  against  Germany,  then,  accord- 


Japan  and  the  War  39 

ing  to  my  official  Japanese  friend,  rendered  that 
Chino-Japanese  agreement  null  and  void. 

**What  is  going  to  happen  f  I  asked. 

**  We  will  make  an  altogether  new  treaty  with 
China  about  Shan-tung/'  was  the  reply. 

**Will  Japan  leave  Shan-tung?" 

*'I  think  not/*  he  said  frankly. 

We  smiled. 

I  knew,  and  he  knew  that  I  knew.  So  why  not 
be  franki 


\ 


MORE  ABOUT  JAPAN 


CHAPTER  in 

MoBE  About  Japan 

In  trying  to  get  an  idea  of  what  the  Japan- 
ese think  of  sending  an  army  to  Siberia,  we 
must  be  fair  to  the  hustling,  clever  little  Ori- 
ental folk.  It  is  easy  to  get  the  wrong  impres- 
sion of  a  nation,  especially  when  the  medium  of 
conversation  is  so  difficult  as  that  between  a 
Japanese  and  an  American.  Few  people  real- 
ise how  hard  it  is  to  express  our  ideas  in  Japan- 
ese. If  the  best  scholar  in  Japan  translated  an 
English  article  into  Japanese  and  later  the 
next-best  scholar  translated  the  same  article 
back  into  English,  the  differences  between  the 
result  and  the  original  text  would  be  many  and 
probably  vital. 

The  Japanese  does  not  think  as  the  West- 
erner does,  of  course.  He  not  only  has  a  differ- 
ent way  of  thinking,  but  his  mental  process 
halts  frequently  when  he  is  considering  big, 
outside  questions. 

In  1911  Prince  Katsura  started  for  Russia 

43 


44  Japan  or  Germany 

on  a  world-tour.  In  Manchuria  he  was  met  by 
Hsu-Shi-Chang,  one  of  the  most  astute  of  Chi- 
nese politicians.  Hsu-Shi-Chang  asked  the 
Prince  what  he  thought  of  the  political  outlook 
in  the  Orient. 

Prince  Katsura  is  reported  to  have  replied 
laconically  and  with  a  shrug  of  his  shoulders, 
^* Japan  is  no  longer  Japan  of  the  Orient;  she 
is  now  concerned  with  world  politics." 

I  think  that  is  true — ^more  true  to-day  than 
ever  before,  but  it  does  not  mean  that  the  people 
of  Japan  have  kept  pace  with  her  Government. 
Maybe  that  is  not  necessary,  but  in  the  end  the 
people  have  to  be  considered  a  bit,  even  in 
Japan.  Public  opinion  does  not  cut  much  figure 
in  the  Orient  yet,  but  one  or  two  instances  have 
been  seen  of  new  influences  at  work,  and  work- 
ing effectually,  at  that. 

In  a  country  where  over  seventy  per  cent  of 
the  schools  are  primary  schools,  and  where  the 
boys  and  girls  spend  several  years  mastering 
the  alphabet,  or  what  stands  for  it,  a  mental 
equipment  which  gives  full  equality  with  his 
prototype  in  America  can  hardly  be  asked  fairly 
of  the  Japanese.  He  is  no  fool,  mind  you.  But 
his  education  is,  on  some  counts,  weird.  It's 
very  Japanese. 

Ask  a  Japanese  school-boy  who  invented  the 


More  about  Japan  45 

telegraph,  the  telephone,  or  the  gramophone. 
Ask  him  who  discovered  electricity.  He  will 
answer,  if  he  thinks  he  knows,  in  ninety-nine 
cases  out  of  a  hundred  by  naming  some  Japan- 
ese. His  idea  of  foreign  countries  is  vague. 
Japan  sees  to  it  that  her  sons  think  a  lot  of 
Japan.  There  is  good  in  that  idea,  but  there 
may  be  some  bad  if  it  is  carried  too  far. 

In  a  country  which  has  a  constitution  of  a 
sort,  the  preamble  of  which  says  it  is  to  be  ruled 
by  a  line  of  Emperors  unbroken,  eternal, 
descended  from  Heaven,  and  that  no  power  on 
earth  is  to  change  one  minute  phrase  or  clause 
of  that  constitution  except  the  Emperor  him- 
self— a  constitution  that  makes  the  Ministers 
of  the  Crown  responsible  solely  to  the  Emperor, 
who  appoints  them  and  dismisses  them  at  will 
— its  world  politics  depend  little  on  the  ideas 
and  opinions  of  the  man  in  the  street. 

The  voter  in  Japan  is  not  much  in  evidence. 
Less  than  five  per  cent  of  the  population  have 
the  franchise,  though  any  man  who  pays  taxes 
in  a  sum  which  is  the  equivalent  of  five  dollars 
or  thereabouts  per  year  has  a  vote.  A  poor 
country?  Yes.  And  at  the  same  time  the 
most  heavily  taxed  people  in  proportion  to  their 
earned  incomes  of  any  people  in  the  world.  So 
it  is  natural  enough  that  the  Japanese  should 


46  Japan  or  Germany 

have  a  view  of  outside  lands  that  is  not  always 
in  the  right  perspective. 

The  people  of  Japan  will  learn.  They  have 
learned  much  in  a  short  cycle.  They  are  always 
learning.  But  democracy  and  anti-materialism 
do  not  mean  much  to  them  yet. 

One  of  the  editors  of  the  AsaJii  called  on 
me  in  Tokyo  not  long  ago  and  we  indulged  in 
a  lengthy  chat  about  the  fight  for  Constitution- 
alism in  Japan.  I  had  not  many  days  before, 
in  Karazawa,  seen  Mr.  Ozaki,  Ex-Minister  of 
Justice  in  the  Okuma  Cabinet,  who,  with  Vis- 
count Kato,  leader  of  what  terms  itself  the  Con- 
stitutionalist Party  in  Japan,  heads  the  fight 
for  Constitutionalism. 

**Ozaki  is  no  further  along  the  road  than 
when  I  saw  him  in  1916,"  I  remarked.  '^What 
are  you  doing,  you  Constitutionalists!  What 
chance  have  you  to  make  headway!  Are  you 
getting  anywhere?  Do  you  see  any  hope  for 
your  projects!'' 

He  talked  long  and  earnestly.  Boiled  down, 
his  remarks  held  nothing  but  this:  One  day, 
some  day,  they  hoped  to  make  the  Emperor  see 
that  certain  changes  in  the  Constitution  were  of 
vital  interest  to  Japan  and  for  Japan's  welfare. 
Then  they  might  enlist  the  Emperor's  sympathy 
in  their  cause,  and  gain  his  support  for  their 


More  about  Japan  47 

proposals.    A  campaign  of  education — the  pro- 
letariat educating  the  Crown.    Interesting. 

Mr.  Tukotomy  of  the  Tokyo  KoUumin  Shim- 
bun  is  a  live  man.  He  is  a  wise  man,  on  some 
counts,  though  his  contemporaries  will  not 
agree  to  that.  His  was  the  only  paper  in  Japan 
of  any  weight  or  standing  that  was  behind 
Count  Terauchi  when  he  was  made  Premier  in 
October,  1916.  A  conversation  with  Mr.  Tuko- 
tomy is  always  bright.  He  represents  a  certain 
line  of  thought  in  Japan  that  has  some  influ- 
ence. Tukotomy 's  idea  in  the  latter  part  of 
1917  was  that  Japan  and  America  should  help 
Eussia  only  on  condition  that  the  great,  strug- 
gling Slav  nation  put  its  house  in  order.  If 
Eussia  adopted  a  Constitution  and  proceeded 
under  some  stable  form  of  government,  Japan 
and  America  should  join  hands  and  give  what 
succour  they  could;  but  for  either  country  to 
try  to  assist  Eussia  until  the  internal  complica- 
tions were  in  better  shape,  would  be,  he  thought, 
interfering  with  Eussia 's  domestic  affairs. 
Tokotomy  has  travelled  extensively  on  the 
Asiatic  Continent,  and  knows  well  the  anti- 
Japanese  feeling  in  certain  breasts  in  Siberia. 
He  knows  equally  well  what  a  hornet's  nest 
would  be  raised  in  the  Eussian  Far  East  if 


48  Japan  or  Germany 

Japanese  interference  with  Russian  affairs  had 
the  appearance  of  being  forced. 

To  send  troops  to  Siberia,  unless  there  was 
no  other  way  out,  seemed  to  Tokotomy,  to  judge 
from  his  editorials  and  remarks,  to  risk  no  in- 
considerable asset  in  a  growing  feeling  of 
friendship  for  Japan  among  the  Russians. 

The  most  influential  paper  in  the  commercial 
world  in  Tokyo  is  the  Chugwai  Shogyo.  Its 
editor  is  Mr.  Yanada.  I  had  more  than  one  talk 
with  him,  and  found  him  most  keen  to  help 
Russia,  but  anxious  that  no  mistaken  policy 
would  undermine  the  commercial  structure 
Japan  had  already  begun  to  build  in  the  way  of 
increased  trade  with  Siberia. 

Suggestions  along  that  line  started  me  off 
among  Japan's  shipping  magnates,  several  of 
whom  I  had  met.  Every  one  of  them  to  whom 
I  talked  referred  to  the  great  danger  of  in- 
curring Russian  enmity. 

**It  is  the  Chinese  question  all  over  again,'' 
said  one.  **Our  politicians  make  some  move 
that  seems  to  them  to  be  a  gain  to  us  and  we 
lose  the  sympathy  and  friendship  of  the  Chi- 
nese. Boycotts  of  Japanese  goods  follow.  The 
Chinese  refuse  or  hesitate  to  buy  anything  that 
comes  from  Japan.  Hatred  of  us  and  rancour 
against  us  are  fomented  on  all  sides,  and  it 


More  about  Japan  49 

takes  years  of  quiet  spade-work  to  get  back  the 
ground  we  have  lost. 

*^The  best  thing  about  the  present  Govern- 
ment is  that  it  is  trying  hard  to  make  good 
friends  of  the  Chinese.  If  you  want  to  sell 
goods  to  a  man  you  are  careful  not  to  antago- 
nise him.  It's  the  same  way  in  Russia,  or  in  Si- 
beria. If  we  send  troops  there  it  may  cause 
us  a  set-back  for  years  in  building  up  a  market 
there.  It's  a  very  good  potential  market,  too, 
is  Russia,  and  we  are  sure'  to  reap  much  good 
from  it.  I  hope  nothing  happens  to  make  the 
Russians  feel  bitter  against  us.  There  is  too 
much  of  that  now. ' ' 

The  war!  Oh,  yes,  there  IS  a  war.  But  my 
friend  the  Japanese  shipping  magnate  was  not 
thinking  so  much  of  the  war  just  then  as  of 
** Business  as  Usual,"  and  more  particularly, 
business  rather  more  than  usual  after  the  war. 
But  he  is  no  exception  as  Japanese  business 
men  go.  They  never  take  the  war  into  consid- 
eration when  they  start  movements,  or  try  to 
do  so. 

I  was  in  Osaka  in  1916  when  the  outcry  was 
raised  in  the  cotton  industrial  world  of  Japan 
at  the  British  Embargo  against  the  entry  of 
Japanese  cotton  goods  into  Great  Britain  dur- 
ing the  war.    I  heard  the  same  sort  of  outcry 


50  Japan  or  Germany 

in  1917  in  Japan  at  the  time  of  the  American 
Steel  Embargo.  There  was  less  outcry  when 
the  Japanese  Government  tried  to  get  ships 
for  the  Allies,  but  though  less  noise  was  heard 
more  pressure  was  brought  to  bear.  Terauchi 
was  powerless  against  the  big  shipping  inter- 
ests. How  far  he  really  wanted  to  go  no  man 
may  know,  but  certain  it  is  that  he  would  have 
liked  to  have  come  much  nearer  meeting  the 
requests  of  the  Allies  than  he  could  do. 

Big  business  is  supposed  to  be  very  material. 
Big  business  in  Japan  lives  up  to  its  bad  name 
in  that  regard.    It  is  all  material,  every  bit. 

Dr.  Soyeda  of  the  Hochi,  one  of  the  most 
widely-read  and  influential  daily  newspapers  in 
Tokyo,  was  very  much  against  all  suggestions 
that  an  armed  Japanese  force  should  be  sent 
to  Europe,  when  that  proposal  was  made,  for 
the  very  reason  that  he  thought  it  quite  pos- 
sible that  the  day  might  come  when  Japan's 
army  would  have  to  check  Germany's  encroach- 
ment on  the  Orient  by  way  of  Siberia.  He  held 
that  view  strongly  and  for  months  elaborated 
it — although  he,  too,  was  chary  of  hurting  the 
feelings  of  the  Russians.  He  thought  Japan 
should  play  her  part,  however,  and  give  all  as- 
sistance demanded  of  her,  even  to  the  despatch 
of  troops  to  Siberia. 


More  about  Japan  51 

While  I  was  in  Japan  an  article  that  attracted 
some  general  attention  was  published  over  the 
signature  of  Dr.  Takahashi  Sakuye,  who  was 
formerly  a  director  of  the  Legislative  Bureau. 
A  well-known  reviewer  in  Japan  described  Dr. 
Takahashi  as  a  representative  Japanese,  a 
scholar  of  wide  knowledge,  who  had  held  one 
of  the  most  important  positions  in  the  whole 
Japanese  official  hierarchy.  *^Dr.  Takahashi 's 
views  were,''  said  an  authority  on  things  Jap- 
anese, ^ '  expressed  with  an  ability  that  was  rare, 
and  displayed  a  wide  knowledge  of  affairs.'* 
His  views  gave  an  interesting  insight  into  the 
not  uncommon  combination  in  Japan  of  extreme 
insularity  with  unbounded  Imperialism. 

As  I  met  more  than  one  publicist,  professor 
or  soldier  in  Japan  who  held  the  views — or  most 
of  them — that  were  put  forward  in  Dr.  Taka- 
hashi's  symposium,  the  following  summary  of 
its  salient  features  will  give  the  concrete  ideas 
of  many  prominent  thinkers  in  Japan : 

No  disarmament  scheme,  even  should  a  world 
concert  of  the  Powers  endorse  it,  would  be  ac- 
ceptable to  Japan.  The  peace  of  the  Far  East 
is  in  Japan's  keeping,  and  she  can  only  be  sure 
of  herself  as  custodian  of  and  guardian  over  it 
so  long  as  she  keeps  her  sword  bright  and  loose 
in  the  scabbard.     Japan  should  have  a  place 


52  Japan  or  Germany 

among  the  world  Powers,  a  voice  at  the  Peace 
Conference  when  it  comes.  More,  Japan's  voice 
should,  at  that  conference,  be  an  equal  one  with 
that  of  any  great  Power.  In  the  settlement  of 
questions  relating  to  the  Far  East  and  the 
mastery  of  the  Pacific,  Japan's  voice  should  not 
only  be  equal,  but  predominant — should  be 
heard  above  that  of  her  partners.  Japan's  part 
in  the  war  is  by  no  means  negligible.  She  is 
keeping  guard  over  the  whole  of  the  Pacific  and 
Indian  Oceans  and  a  large  part  of  the  continent 
of  Asia,  so  as  to  leave  the  Allies  free  to  fight 
the  enemy  elsewhere.  Her  fleet  is  in  the  Medi- 
teranean.  Japan  should,  the  war  over,  keep 
Kiao-chow  and  all  Germany's  possessions 
among  the  Islands  of  the  Pacific.  That  Japan 
should  have  an  entirely  undisputed  hegemony  of 
Eastern  Asia  and  the  Pacific  Islands  is  an  essen- 
tial to  that  keeping  the  peace  in  the  Orient 
which  is  Japan's  high  mission  among  nations. 
China  must  be  protected.  Japan  may  take  over 
Germany's  rights  there,  but  otherwise  no  en- 
croachments on  Chinese  soil  must  be  permitted, 
least  of  all  by  Germany.  If  Germany  obtained  a 
new  port  in  China  it  would  *^make  the  present 
war  meaningless."  For  that  matter,  no  country 
should  obtain  any  fresh  hold  on  China,  except 
that  Japan  should  hold  what  she  won  from  the 


More  about  Japan  53 

enemy — that  it  happens  to  be  on  Chinese  soil 
is  a  mere  circumstance.  China's  affairs  would 
be  settled  at  the  Peace  Conference,  but  China's 
voice  there  would  be  a  minor  quantity.  Always 
in  the  foreground  is  the  thought  of  Japan's 
great  sacrifices  for  China — her  sacrifice  in  Man- 
churia when  she  fought  Russia,  her  sacrifice  in 
Kiao-chow  when  she  fought  Germany.  That 
China  did  not  ask  Japan  to  fight  in  either  in- 
stance, and  that  Japan,  in  each  case,  held  what 
she  had  won,  or  hopes  to  do  so,  makes  her  ef- 
forts no  less  a  sacrifice.  She  paid  a  price  to 
free  parts  of  China  from  the  foreigner,  and 
though  China  has  just  as  little,  or  less,  to  say 
about  these  localities,  and  Japan's  voice  there 
has  drowned  out  all  other  voices,  that  is  all  part 
of  her  great  policy  of  keeping  the  peace  of  the 
Far  East.  It  is  the  realisation  of  her  duty, 
her  mission  as  a  nation,  that  leads  Japan  along 
such  roads. 

So  much  for  Dr.  Takahashi  and  his  theories. 
Many  a  Japanese  publicist  stands  with  him  on 
that  platform.  Many  an  influential,  thinking 
Japanese  considered  in  1918  that  should 
Japan's  soldiers  go  to  Siberia  or  to  Russia  to 
fight  for  the  Allies,  the  peace  of  the  Far  East 
would  demand  many  things  which  we  Western- 
ers would  not  connect  with  it.    With  the  Taka- 


54  Japan  or  Germany 

hashis  to  the  fore,  it  would  be  easier  to  get  the 
Japanese  army  into  occupation  of  Far  Eastern 
territory  than  out  of  it.  And  the  Takahashis 
are  not  so  negligible  a  quantity  in  Japanese  life 
that  we  can  afford  to  altogether  forget  them. 

Among  the  army  men  in  Japan  the  mere  men- 
tion of  the  possibility  that  they  might  take  part 
in  the  actual  fighting  was  a  tonic.  They  are 
more  than  keen  to  get  into  the  war  in  real 
earnest. 

A  Japanese  officer  of  high  rank  told  me  that 
he  considered  Japan's  sending  an  army  to  Si- 
beria would  be  the  finest  thing  that  could  pos- 
sibly happen  to  Japan,  as  he  thought  that  such 
a  step  would  be  sure  to  eventually  lead  to  the 
Japanese  forces  engaging  the  German  army 
** somewhere  further  to  the  West." 

**The  other  nations  are  becoming  stronger, 
not  weaker,  by  participation  in  the  war,"  he 
said.  *  *  Only  Eussia  is  weaker,  and  she  has  lost 
her  strength  through  abandoning  the  struggle. 
Japan  will  be  stronger  for  fighting.  Japan 
must,  too,  ever  bear  in  mind  that  a  maintenance 
of  her  military  strength  is  as  necessary  to  her 
as  the  breath  of  life  to  her  people.  What  would 
Japan  be  without  armies  and  armaments? 

**Ours  is  an  Island  Empire.  Do  not  forget 
that.    We  have  too  little  raw  material  to  suit 


More  about  Japan  55 

us.  To  us,  command  of  the  sea  is  vital.  If  we 
should  lose  that  to  an  enemy,  our  days  as  a 
Power  would  be  numbered.  We  must  not  only 
maintain  a  strong  navy,  but  we  must  continue 
to  be  allied  to  the  strongest  naval  Power. 

**  Sea-control  must  be  our  first  thought. 
America,  Russia,  even  China,  are  stronger  than 
we  from  the  standpoint  of  actual  territory  and 
resources.  We  have  beaten  China.  We  have 
beaten  Russia.  We  proved  the  value  of  our 
army.  Had  we  not  done  so  we  could  not  have 
made  the  Alliance  with  Great  Britain  which  is 
the  rock  on  which  the  whole  structure  of  our 
security  is  built.  England  would  not  have  given 
us  an  Alliance  which  promised  us  the  aid  of  the 
most  powerful  navy  on  the  seas  unless  we  had 
something  to  offer  in  return.  We  had  our 
army.  We  could  look  after  matters  here  in 
the  Orient. 

*'We  proved  that,  to  some  extent,  at  Kiao- 
chow.  We  must  prove  it  further  in  Siberia,  and 
in  Russia,  if  necessary.  Many  Japanese  talk 
about  our  trade  with  this  country  and  with  that 
as  though  it  is  a  matter  of  life  or  death.  So  it 
may  be.  Much  more  serious  to  Japan  than  to 
other  countries  is  the  necessity  of  keeping  open 
the  lines  over  which  must  come  to  us  those  raw 


56  Japan  or  Germany 

materials  without  which  we  could  not  wage 
war. ' ' 

The  General  took  a  book  from  his  library 
shelf  and  read  to  me  a  few  paragraphs  from  the 
pen  of  a  noted  publicist  of  the  Japan  of  half  a 
hundred  years  ago,  one  Hashimoto. 

Hashimoto's  argument  was  that  Japan  was 
too  weak  to  stand  by  herself  as  an  independent 
nation.  He  declared  that  Japan  must  develop 
herself  in  Korea,  in  Manchuria,  in  California 
and  in  some  parts  of  China.  The  Ching  Dy- 
nasty had  such  strength  at  that  time  in  China 
that  the  Japanese  expansion  in  that  direction 
seemed  blocked,  so  Hashimoto  advised  his 
country  to  look  further  west,  toward  India. 
Until  the  day  Japan  had,  by  permeating  into 
such  other  lands,  gained  the  benefit  of  trade  and 
the  supply  of  raw  materials  from  them,  Japan, 
Hashimoto  averred,  would  never  be  really  in- 
dependent. In  addition  to  this  advice,  Hashi- 
moto advocated  an  Alliance  with  either  England 
or  Russia. 

**That  man  was  a  seer,*'  said  the  General. 
**What  he  said  fifty  years  ago  holds  good  to- 
day. Japan  must  be  friendly — ^must  have  Al- 
lies. Without  them  she  is  in  a  precarious  posi- 
tion at  once.  We  could  always  defend  Japan 
from  invasion,  but  oversea  commerce  is  as  nee- 


More  about  Japan  57 

essary  to  our  business  life  as  the  import  of  sup- 
plies is  necessary  to  our  military  operations.  Of 
what  use  would  it  be  to  us  to  be  impregnable  if 
we  were  stifled  by  some  sea-power's  hand  on  our 
trade  arteries  *  It  is  plain  we  must  have  Allies. 
It  is  equally  plain  we  must  possess  some  asset 
to  give  them  in  return.  We  are  that  asset,"  he 
said,  rising  and  striking  his  breast.  ^  *  We — the 
army.  We  are  strong  and  ready  to  fight.  Eus- 
sia  is  done.  Germany  will  press  for  the  Rus- 
sian Far  East,  maybe,  or  at  least  she  will  strive 
to  get  the  stores  gathered  there.  We  will  keep 
Siberia  from  the  Germans.  We  will  keep  the 
stores  from  the  Germans.  We  want  to  do  it. 
It  is  the  justification  of  our  very  existence  that 
we  do  it.  It  is  vital  that  we  play  some  part — 
something  more,  something  greater  than  we 
have  yet  done.  A  blow  struck  by  us  at  Ger- 
many in  this  war,  is  a  blow  struck  for  our  own 
national  security.  My  countrymen  don't  all  see 
it  that  way,  but  it's  plain  enough,  if  you  have 
your  eyes  open.    I  can  see  it." 

So  could  I. 

He  was  right — ^the  General.  And  further, 
Count  Terauchi  himself  would  agree  with  every 
word  the  General  had  spoken. 

Security.  Japan  fought  two  wars  for  it.  Did 
she  get  it?    She  obtained  temporary  security. 


58  Japan  or  Germany 

Permanent  security  she  can  never  have,  except 
at  the  cost  of  constant  vigilance.  Her  policies 
must  be  determined  by  that  necessity  for  se- 
curity. Never  did  Japan  have  a  better  chance 
to  cement  her  security  a  bit  tighter  than  she 
has  to-day.  I  believe  she  sees  that — her  leaders 
see  it.  She  will  act  accordingly.  Not  for  busi- 
ness and  commercial  gain  only.  Not  for  money, 
though  she  is  too  poor  a  nation  to  leave  pay- 
ment of  the  bill  out  of  account.  But  for  secur- 
ity, first,  last  and  all  the  time—that  is  the 
motive  that  will  drive  Japan  and  is  equally  the 
motive  that  will  ensure  that  Japan  will  play 
the  game,  cleanly,  in  the  manner  of  a  truly  great 
little  Power. 

Before  I  left  Tokyo,  I  spoke,  on  Sunday  af- 
ternoon, to  several  hundred  Japanese  students 
at  the  Young  Men's  Christian  Association.  I 
talked  to  them  about  the  war,  what  it  had  meant 
to  the  boys  of  France  and  of  England,  what  it 
was  to  mean  in  the  very  near  future  to  hundreds 
and  thousands,  one  day  to  millions,  of  the  boys 
of  America. 

^*I  am  genuinely  sorry  for  the  boys  of  Ja- 
pan," I  told  them,  ** because  Japan's  armies  are 
not  in  the  field.  All  the  wonderful  development 
of  character,  all  the  splendid  opportunities  for 
self-sacrifice,  that  the  young  manhood  of  the 


More  about  Japan  59 

Western  world  is  reaping  from  the  war-game 
is  going  to  be  missed  by  Japan,  it  seems  Japan's 
boys  would  ripen  and  become  men  nnder  that 
terrible  test  of  fire  through  which  the  flower  of 
the  youth  of  France  and  England  have  passed. 
The  old  spirit  of  Bushido,  the  fierce  loyalty  to 
Emperor  and  country,  the  Spartan  simplicity 
and  clean,  high  spirit  of  the  days  of  Old  Japan 
would  shine  out  in  the  young  Japan  of  to-day, 
mellowed  and  enriched  by  something  higher, 
something  better,  that  comes  sometimes  to 
brave,  young  hearts  fighting  for  a  cause  that 
contains  no  selfishness,  no  desire  for  gain  or 
plunder  or  reward. ' ' 

**This  is  a  day  of  high  ideals  and  clean  in- 
tent," I  told  them.    **The  bigness  of  the  game 
is  beyond  conception.    It  is  so  big  it  takes  a 
boy  and  wraps  him  round  until  a  light  comes 
to  his  eyes,  humble  unit  of  the  great  whole  that 
he  feels  himself  to  be,  that  is  like  the  light  that 
has  shone  in  the  eyes  of  crusaders  and  martyrs 
and  patriots  and  heroes  since  the  world  began. 
It  is  only  sacrifice  and  forgetfulness  of  self 
can  put  it  there.     The  boys  of  the  Western     4^^ 
World  are  fighting  for  Humanity,  for  the  Eight     0      / 
and  for  God.    It  filters  through  careless  young     ^^  " 
minds,  filled  with  all  the  zest  and  fire  of  youth     ^^ 
and  gives  them  the  touch  that  makes  them  great.  ' 

6  s  ^ 


6o  Japan  or  Germany 

They  all  become  heroes.  They  all  become  great. 
Would  to  God  Japan's  young  manhood  could 
feel  the  touch  of  that  master-hand — ^what  a  day 
it  would  be  for  Japan." 

When  I  had  finished  I  went  among  the  stu- 
dents, and  chatted  with  some  of  them.  One  af- 
ter another  came  to  me,  there  and  afterwards 
at  my  hotel  and  said  that  they  felt  the  truth  of 
what  I  had  told  them. 

Sometimes  a  sudden  hand  clasp,  sometimes 
the  glint  of  a  tear  showed  depth  of  emotion  that 
words  could  not  express.  The  boys  of  Japan, 
student  boys,  think  deeply  on  such  subjects, 
more  deeply,  perhaps,  than  most  Japanese  peo- 
ple realize. 

One  fine  young  fellow  who  talked  long  with 
me  about  the  war  said,  ^*We  are  beginning  to 
see  that  Japan  has  more  at  stake  in  this  world- 
war  than  we  knew.  Japan  has  never  really  been 
in  the  war.  We  can  learn  enough  from  what 
we  read  about  France  and  England  to  get  that 
idea.  Japan's  heart  is  not  in  the  war, — ^not  yet. 
But  is  it  not  possible  that  the  day  may  come 
when  Japan  will  play  a  bigger  part?  Believe 
me,  we  boys  would  welcome  it.  We  can  see  that 
the  outcome  of  this  war  means  all  the  difference 
to  Japan — all  the  difference  between  going 
ahead  and  going  back.     Japan  to-day  stands 


More  about  Japan  6i 

divided  between  two  schools.  Years  ago  the  old 
civilisation  of  Japan  was  condemned  by  the 
advanced  school  and  a  stampede  was  made  to 
throw  out  things  Japanese  and  adopt  things 
Western  in  their  stead.  Naturally,  materialism 
from  the  West  came  to  us  with  the  better  ele- 
ments of  the  new  civilisation  Japan  was  trying 
to  absorb.  The  pendulum  swung  far,  only  to 
start  back.  A  cult  sprung  up  to  save  the  old 
Japanese  fashions  and  institutions.  To-day 
Japan  is  puzzled.  Her  daily  life  is  in  a  chaotic 
state.  She  is  Japanese  here  and  foreign  there 
and  often  in  a  sad  jumble  in  between.  Her 
adoption  of  Western  Civilisation  has  had  a 
check.  The  war  is  on.  It's  a  war  between  Lib- 
eralism and  Militarism.  In  Japan  there  are 
Liberals  and  Militarists  watching.  The  winning 
of  the  war  by  the  Allies  will  mean  almost  as 
much  to  Japan  and  Japan's  future  progress  as 
to  that  of  any  nation — perhaps  more  than  to 
some.  Western  Civilisation,  Japan  thinks,  is 
being  tried,  sorely  tried.  Will  it  stand  the  test? 
You  can  see,  then,  what  it  means  to  those  of  us 
who  are  sure  Liberalism  is  right  and  Militarism 
is  wrong.  We  are  worried  about  the  outcome. 
It  means  much  to  us.  If  we  could  only  take  a 
hand.    If  we  could  only  help." 


62  Japan  or  Germany 

Splendid  boy!  His  words  came  from  his  heart. 
Who  would  not  be  glad,  for  the  sake  of  him  and 
his  fellows,  to  see  the  Smi-Flag  in  the  forefront 
of  the  fighting! 


CONCERNING  SIBERIA 


CHAPTER  IV 

Concerning  Siberia 

What  has  Japan  done  to  better  herself  in 
Korea  and  Manchuria?  She  has  developed  Ko- 
rea and  worked  great  good  there.  She  has 
brought  no  little  agricultural  prosperity  to 
Manchuria.  She  has  reached  out  to  the  North 
and  practically  concluded  a  deal  with  Russia, 
whereby  her  influence  in  Manchuria  will  shortly 
extend  to  Harbin,  and  include  the  finest  dis- 
trict for  the  growing  of  the  soya  bean,  the  basis 
of  the  greatest  industry  in  all  Manchuria. 

But  while  Japan  is  slowly  developing  Korea 
and  Manchuria,  a  larger  potential  market  lies 
in  Siberia.  Harbin,  too,  offers  possibilities  in 
itself.  That  the  Japanese  realise  this  can  be 
judged  from  the  fact  that  before  the  war  there 
were  very  few  Japanese  in  Harbin,  but  at  the 
present  time  they  are  there  in  continually  in- 
creasing numbers. 

Japan's  eyes  have  long  been  on  the  Russian 
Far  East  as  a  possible  sphere  of  commercial 

65 


66  Japan  or  Germany 

development.  Every  opportunity  was  taken 
during  the  past  few  years  to  ship  Japanese 
goods  into  Russia.  Only  Russia's  dire  neces- 
sity, however,  ever  allowed  her  to  deal  exten- 
sively with  her  former  antagonist.  The  War 
of  1904-1905  was  fought  too  far  distant  from 
Russia  proper  to  take  hold  on  the  minds  and 
imagination  of  the  people  of  Western  Russia 
to  the  extent  to  which  it  did  among  the  Russian 
population  in  Siberia.  The  Japanese,  since  the 
Russo-Japanese  War,  have  been  feared  and 
hated  strenuously  in  the  Russian  Far  East.  Not 
one  overt  act  can  be  laid  to  Japan's  door  dur- 
ing the  present  war  which  would  in  any  way 
justify  the  feeling  that  permeates  Siberia  to 
the  effect  that  Japan  wishes  to  snap  up  the 
Pri-Amur. 

That  the  Japanese  would  come  to  Siberia,  ag- 
gressively, some  day,  was  a  statement  I  heard 
from  many  quarters  in  the  Pri-Amur  district. 
Up  to  the  time  of  the  revolution  in  Russia,  and 
for  many  months  afterwards,  there  was  a  com- 
paratively satisfactory  state  of  affairs  existing 
throughout  Siberia.  The  explanation  of  the 
more  favourable  conditions  which  prevailed  in 
that  region  might  be  sought  in  Siberia's  favour- 
able economic  position.  There  was  no  food 
shortage  in  Siberia  worth  taking  into  account. 


Concerning  Siberia  67 

Sugar  had  been  hard  to  obtain  at  times,  but 
otherwise  no  staple  commodity  had  given  out. 
Flour,  vegetables  and  meat  had  always  been 
fairly  plentiful.  Prices  had  risen  very  consid- 
erably. It  was  probably  fair  to  say  that  the 
cost  of  living  in  some  of  the  towns  in  Siberia 
was  approximately  double  what  it  was  before 
the  war.  On  the  other  hand,  wages  had  been 
generally  higher  and  the  working  people  had 
therefore  never  been  seriously  affected  by  the 
rise  in  the  price  of  foodstuffs.  The  peasantry 
had  pleanty  of  means  of  subsistence  at  hand 
and  felt  the  war  less  than  might  have  been 
thought.  This  condition  of  comparative  se- 
curity and  prosperity  had  much  to  do  with  the 
failure  of  the  extreme  Socialist  group  to  arouse 
full  sympathy  in  the  Russian  Far  East,  when 
they  came  from  Petrograd  with  their  ultra- 
radical ideas  and  tried  to  implant  them  in  Si- 
beria. A  population  which  is  prosperous  or 
which,  at  least,  is  not  dogged  by  famine,  is 
hardly  likely  to  have  any  violent  desire  to  upset 
the  existing  order  of  things.  The  Siberians 
seemed  to  me  to  be  content  with  an  orderly 
method  of  existence. 

Siberia  is  a  long  way  from  Petrograd  and 
Moscow.  Its  people  are  more  independent  and 
more  developed  politically  than  the  people  of 


68  Japan  or  Germany 

European  Eussia.  Men  in  Eastern  Siberia 
could  always  be  found  who  could  look  upon  the 
war  dispassionately.  They  were  far  removed 
from  it.  They  could,  being  used  to  greater  free- 
dom and  a  broader  outlook,  reason  better  for 
themselves  and  offer  a  firmer  resistance  to  per- 
nicious doctrines. 

But  to  a  man,  they  held  that  obsession  about 
Japan.  To  understand  it  and  appreciate  it, 
one  had  to  go  into  the  history  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  Siberia  before  the  present  war. 

When  the  news  of  the  revolution  in  Petro- 
grad  in  1917  was  flashed  over  the  long  line  of 
wires  that  stretched  across  Siberia,  to  far  Vlad- 
ivostok and  the  seat  of  Government  in  Haba- 
rovsk,  the  Governor-General  of  the  Pri-Amur 
was  Nikolai  LVovitch  Gondatti. 

A  study  of  this  man  and  his  influence  as 
Governor-General  of  the  Eastern  part  of  Si- 
beria throws  many  side-lights  on  the  condi- 
tions that  existed  in  the  Far  Northeast  when 
the  rule  of  the  Romanoffs  ended. 

Nikolai  Gondatti  was  a  native  of  Moscow. 
Little  is  known  of  his  parentage.  He  came  of 
humble  people — peasantry.  Adopted  in  his 
early  youth  by  a  rich  man,  fortune  favoured 
Gondatti  with  an  education.  From  the  outset  he 
showed  remarkable  ability  as  a  student.    His 


Concerning  Siberia  69 

school  days  finished,  he  embarked  on  a  career 
as  a  teacher  under  the  employment  of  the  Im- 
migration Department. 

It  was  in  this  capacity  that  he  first  came  to 
Siberia. 

He  had  not  long  been  in  the  Far  Northeast 
before  his  ability  allowed  him  to  push  his  way 
through  the  lower  strata  of  officials.  He  was 
an  indefatigable  worker  and  climbed  rapidly. 

Stolypin  marked  Gondatti  as  a  useful  subor- 
dinate and  later  the  young  official  became  an  un- 
doubted favourite  of  Stolypin.  To  that  astute 
politician  Gondatti  owed  much  of  his  success  in 
official  life. 

As  the  years  passed  one  rise  after  another 
culminated  in  Gondatti 's  appointment  to  the 
Governorship  of  Tomsk.  This  post  suited  him 
and  gave  him  opportunity  for  showing  his  grow- 
ing capacity  as  an  administrator.  He  became 
noted  for  holding  views  of  marked  democratic 
tendency,  and  as  a  politician  gained  followers 
from  the  broad-minded  standpoint  with  which 
he  viewed  local  and  national  affairs. 

Then  came  the  appointment  of  the  Inter-de- 
partmental commission,  known  as  the  Amur 
Expedition.  This  was  in  1910.  This  commis- 
sion was  composed  of  able  men  and  much  im- 
portance was  placed  upon  its  prospective  work. 


70  Japan  or  Germany 

Gondatti  was  chosen  as  its  president.  This 
meant  a  year  or  two  of  work,  in  which  he  could 
show  to  the  full  advantage  his  knowledge  of  the 
Far  Northeast  and  which,  in  turn,  gave  him  op- 
portunity for  investigation  which  would  make 
him  the  best-informed  man  in  the  world  on  the 
subject  of  Siberia. 

The  primary  importance  of  the  Amur  Ex- 
pedition was  that  the  spirit  behind  it  and  the 
real  object  for  which  it  was  created  were  to  lay 
the  foundations  for  a  fight  in  the  Far  East 
against  Japan.  This  fight  was  to  be  a  bloodless 
campaign,  but  was  none  the  less  carefully 
planned,  nor  was  its  importance  to  the  Russians 
more  negligible  on  that  account. 

Stolypin  had  always  realised  the  fact  that 
the  only  way  that  Russia  could  offset  the  de- 
velopment of  Japan  in  Manchuria  and  prevent 
Japan's  commercial  encroachment  north  of 
Harbin,  was  to  build  up  a  solid  Russian  com- 
munity in  the  Pri-Amur  district.  The  power  of 
Russia  in  the  Far  Northeast  depended  upon  the 
success  of  Russia's  colonisation  schemes  and 
projects  for  development  in  that  part  of  the 
world. 

The  extent  of  the  work  of  the  Amur  Ex- 
pedition, which  was  guided  by  Gondatti 's  capa- 
ble hand,  covered  every  subject  which  could 


Concerning  Siberia  71 

have  a  remote  bearing  on  Russian  progress.  Not 
only  questions  of  immigration  and  land  settle- 
ment, but  details  as  to  agriculture  and  stock- 
raising  occupied  much  of  the  time  of  the  com- 
mission. Every  possible  phase  of  prospective 
industries,  a  careful  study  of  the  geology  of 
the  district,  as  well  as  its  botany,  went  hand  in 
hand  with  investigations  as  to  the  development 
of  transportation  on  land  and  water.  The  edu- 
cation and  enlightenment  of  the  people  by  means 
of  schools  and  newspapers  were  given  careful 
consideration.  The  subjects  of  shipping  and 
fisheries  were  not  forgotten. 

The  report  of  the  Amur  Expedition,  in  short, 
covers  exhaustively  and  in  detail  practically 
every  subject  in  which  any  one  interested  in 
Siberia  might  Avish  to  delve. 

Gondatti's  personal  characteristics  were  well 
suited  to  such  work.  He  had  a  charming  per- 
sonality and  carried  himself  with  a  simplicity 
that  won  those  with  whom  he  came  into  contact. 
His  views  became  increasingly  democratic,  as 
he  came  into  closer  touch  with  the  people,  and 
there  was  no  section  of  the  population  which 
he  did  not  have  an  opportunity  of  studying  at 
first  hand. 

At  that  time  the  Governor-General  of  the 
Pri-Amur  was  General  Unterberger  who  had 


72  Japan  or  Germany 

been  either  Governor  or  Governor-General  of 
the  district  for  more  than  a  score  of  years.  As 
might  be  imagined,  General  Unterberger  was 
wedded  to  the  old  regime  and  was  just  pure 
bureaucrat  to  his  finger-tips. 

Before  Gondatti's  work  on  the  Amur  Expe- 
dition was  concluded  the  more  important  men 
in  the  Far  Northeast  began  to  express  the  hope 
that  he  might  be  appointed  successor  to  Unter- 
berger, who  had  reached  an  age  which  made 
it  sure  that  he  would  drift  out  of  office  not  long 
thereafter. 

Toward  the  end  of  1911,  Unterberger  retired 
and  the  news  came  to  Siberia  that  Gondatti  had 
been  made  Governor-General  in  his  place.  There 
was  universal  rejoicing  at  this  appointment.  A 
positive  enthusiasm  swept  over  those  whose 
hearts  were  in  the  work  of  developing  the  Rus- 
sian Far  East.  These  men  felt  that  they  were 
on  the  threshold  of  a  new  era.  At  last  the  old 
bureaucratic  chains  were  to  be  knocked  from 
the  limbs  of  the  strong  young  country  and 
progress  was  to  be  assured.  There  was  a  uni- 
versal confidence  that  under  Gondatti 's  Gov- 
ernor-Generalship industries  would  be  estab- 
lished, mining  would  be  developed,  railways 
would  be  built,  waterways  improved,  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  country  would  be  better  organ- 


\  Concerning  Siberia  73 

ised,  and  the  old  faults  of  administration  wonld 
be  wiped  out.  New  vigour  and  new  life  were  in- 
fused into  the  community.  Men  who  had  strug- 
gled along  under  the  impossible  conditions 
which  had  obtained  for  so  many  years  felt  that 
a  man  who  recognised  the  human  element — a 
man  who  had  himself  come  from  the  people — 
a  man  of  marked  democratic  tendencies  and  of 
broad,  sympathetic  viewpoint — ^had  come  into 
power  and  that  his  very  presence  in  the  seat  of 
authority  gave  sure  promise  of  reform. 

Alas  for  such  hopes !  In  Gondatti's  six  years 
of  office  not  one  of  them  was  realised.  The  day 
that  saw  the  news  reach  Siberia  of  the  over- 
throw of  the  Romanoffs  in  Petrograd  found  the 
Russian  Far  East  in  worse  case  than  the  day 
that  marked  the  appointment  of  Gondatti  as 
Governor-General.  The  story  of  that  six  years 
is  one  of  those  disappointing  human  documents 
which  sometimes  follow  the  placing  of  power  in 
the  hands  of  a  promising  but  untried  adminis- 
trator. The  job  was  too  big  for  Gondatti.  As 
Governor-General  of  the  Pri-Amur  he  was  a 
dismal,  tragic  failure. 

For  the  first  two  or  three  years  the  better  ele- 
ments among  the  people  in  Siberia  watched 
Gondatti 's  administration  with  amazement.  He 
was  always  a  hard  worker  and  took  the  greatest 


/ 


74  Japan  or  Germany 

interest  in  his  duties.  He  seemed  to  be  genuine- 
ly devoted  to  the  real  progress  of  the  country 
and  his  personal  ability  showed  itself  unmis- 
takably to  those  with  whom  he  came  into  per- 
sonal contact.  No  phase  of  the  political  situa- 
tion, no  detail  as  to  the  possible  resources  of 
the  country  itself,  no  bit  of  information  that 
might  give  him  a  better  ins^ht  into  and  grasp 
of  the  problems  with  which  he  was  confronted 
could  have  been  asked  from  him.  He  was  a 
storehouse  of  information  and  had  a  wonderful 
memory.  His  charm  of  manner  never  failed 
him,  and  he  was  always  ready  on  public  occa- 
sions as  a  speaker  of  marked  ability.  No  one 
came  to  him  with  a  project  into  which  he  would 
not  go,  and  he  was  easy  of  access.  With  all 
this,  Gondatti  was  inherently  a  politician  and 
an  office-seeker.  He  had  been  so  from  youth  and 
certain  characteristics  had  moulded  themselves 
into  his  character  in  such  a  way  as  to  detract 
from  his  sincerity.  Beneath  all  the  smiling  ex- 
terior, in  spite  of  the  keen  intellect  with  which 
he  had  been  endowed,  he  was  a  time-server  and 
given  to  using  tools  which  were  unworthy  of 
him. 

During  the  latter  part  of  his  administration 
his  popularity  waned;  in  fact,  the  pendulum 
swung  the  other  way.    He  became  known  as  a 


Concerning  Siberia  75 

man  who  would  promise  anything,  whether  or 
not  he  had  the  intention  of  fulfilling  his  prom- 
ise. He  gained  the  name  of  a  hypocrite.  Peo- 
ple who  found  no  difficulty  in  reaching  him  and 
who  were  treated  most  charmingly  by  him,  came 
away  dissatisfied.  He  was  looked  upon  with  a 
general  feeling  of  distrust.  While  he  would  talk 
democracy  at  length  and  with  great  freedom, 
his  actions  were  declared  to  be  undemocratic. 
Many  of  the  old  bureaucratic  faults  were  al- 
lowed to  remain  in  the  administration.  He  was 
not  above  personal  petty  feuds.  Here  and  there 
he  showed  spite  in  his  dealings  with  those  whom 
he  did  not  like.  Above  all  that  led  to  the 
eventual  dislike  in  which  he  was  held  by  the 
people  was  the  fact  that  his  subordinates  and 
mercenaries  were  the  last  class  with  whom  he 
should  have  surrounded  himself.  Any  means 
to  obtain  his  ends  seemed  to  be  excused  to  him 
if  he  thought  them  the  best  medium  toward  a 
successful  prosecution  of  his  desires. 

Stupid  and  dishonest  officials  thrived  in 
some  quarters  under  him.  Never  in  the 
history  of  the  Pri-Amur  had  the  police  been  so 
utterly  corrupt  and  so  absolutely  incompetent. 

Thus  his  star,  which  had  risen  so  rapidly  and 
so  brilliantly,  began  to  wane  as  he  was  tried 
and  found  wanting.     The  pity  of  it  was  that 


76  Japan  or  Germany 

that  star  was,  too,  the  star  of  the  Eussian  Far 
East.  The  precious  years  went  by.  Opportun- 
ities that  were  never  to  be  regained  were  lost. 
The  genuine  spirit  of  desire  for  co-operation 
and  reorganisation  of  the  great  Far  Northeast 
by  Eussia  was  sacrificed  on  the  altar  of  Gon- 
datti's  personal  ambition  and  mistaken  poli- 
cies.   The  man  was  too  small  for  bis  task. 

The  peculiarity  of  this  situation  was  rendered 
the  more  great  from  the  fact  that  Gondatti 
started  out  in  his  career  as  Governor-General 
immensely  popular  with  every  class,  and  though 
his  object  in  view  was  one  with  which  all  those 
about  him  were  in  sympathy — for  all  the  people 
recognised  Eussia 's  necessities  in  this  regard 
— ^he  roused  the  actual  antagonism  of  the  vast 
majority  of  the  people  in  the  region. 

The  real  root  of  the  trouble,  to  be  as  chari- 
table to  Gondatti  as  possible,  probably  lay  in 
the  fact  that  he  was  incapable  of  realising  that 
many  of  the  reforms  which  he  would  have  liked 
to  effect  could  not  be  brought  about  so  quickly 
as  he  wished.  He  moved  too  rapidly  along  cer- 
tain lines,  where  the*  revolutionary  character 
of  his  efforts  proved  their  own  undoing  and  at 
the  same  time  failed  signally  to  move  with  suf- 
ficient rapidity  along  many  minor  lines  of  re- 
form, which  his  time-serving    tendencies    ap- 


Concerning  Siberia  77 

parently  prevented  him  from  handling  without 
gloves. 

One  attribute  possessed  by  Gondatti  has  never 
been  disputed.  He  was  rabidly  anti-Japanese. 
He  left  no  stone  unturned  to  block  the  Japanese 
wherever  he  could,  and  was  ever  fearful  of  their 
progress  and  advancement  in  the  Far  East.  He 
resented  bitterly  any  efforts  of  the  Japanese  to 
penetrate  commercially  into  Siberia,  and  was 
ever  at  loggerheads  with  Japan  over  what  he 
termed  its  unwarrantable  interference  with  and 
encroachment  upon  Russian  fishing  interests. 

A  study  of  Gondatti 's  three  pet  projects,  none 
of  which  were  brought  to  a  successful  consum- 
mation, shows  the  general  trend  of  Eussian  ef- 
fort in  the  Far  Northeast,  and  from  them  may 
be  gained  valuable  lessons  as  regards  the  fu- 
ture of  Siberia. 

Gondatti 's  three  attempted  achievements 
were  his  effort  to  eliminate  alien  labour — ^with 
particular  reference  to  the  Chinese — ^his  scheme 
for  the  deepening  of  the  Amur  Estuary,  and  his 
project  for  the  imposition  of  a  duty  on  imported 
wheat. 

Gondatti  was  obsessed  with  the  idea  that  the 
best  way  to  develop  Siberia  was  to  shut  out 
alien  labour  and  thus  increase  the  numbers  of 
the  Russian  labouring  population  the  more  rap- 


78  Japan  or  Germany 

idly.  Had  Gondatti  been  somewhat  more  broad- 
minded  in  his  handling  of  this  subject,  he  would 
have  realized  that  during  the  few  years  of  his 
Governor-Generalship  he  could  do  little  more 
than  to  start  the  elimination  of  alien  labour  and 
that  the  continuation  of  such  process  must  of 
necessity  go  hand  in  hand  with  the  growth  of 
the  Russian  population.  To  rob  a  community  of 
the  great  blessing  of  cheap  and  efficient  labour, 
particularly  when  no  other  sort  of  labour  is  at 
hand  to  take  its  place,  can  have  little  other  ef- 
fect on  the  employer  class  throughout  the  com- 
munity than  to  arouse  in  it  a  very  deep  sense 
of  antagonism.  Throughout  Siberia  there  is 
hardly  a  class  which  did  not  view  with  suspicion 
and  disapproval  Gondatti 's  plans  to  exclude 
Chinese  labour  from  the  Pri-Amur  district. 
The  exclusion  was  to  apply  to  the  Koreans  as 
well.  That  the  employers  of  labour  in  the  com- 
mercial community,  and  particularly  the  mine 
owners,  should  be  inconvenienced  by  this  was 
inevitable.  Gondatti  undoubtedly  expected  their 
opposition.  Curiously,  however,  the  one  class 
of  people  with  whom  the  scheme  might  have 
been  expected  to  have  found  favour  was  equally 
opposed  to  it.  The  tillers  of  the  soil  through- 
out the  Russian  Far  East,  never  very  indus- 
trious themselves,  had  found  they  could  use 


Concerning  Siberia  79 

Chinese  and  Koreans  in  cultivating  the  land, 
and  while  so  doing  gain  a  respite  from  many 
of  the  more  arduous  phases  of  agricultural  in- 
dustry, and  yet  make  both  ends  meet.  To  take 
from  them  the  cheap  labour  which  allowed  them 
to  indulge  a  natural  propensity  for  an  easy- 
going life,  was  to  them  anathema.  Thus  Gon- 
datti  found  no  sympathisers  for  the  exclusion 
of  Chinese  and  Korean  labour,  and  his  insis- 
tence upon  it  created  a  great  deal  of  animosity 
against  his  administration.  When  the  war  broke 
out  in  1914  the  machinery  for  the  exclusion  of 
alien  labour  in  Siberia  had  not  been  completed 
and  Gondatti  apparently  decided  to  mark  time, 
so  far  as  that  project  was  concerned,  until  peace 
had  come  again. 

A  large  amount  of  Gondatti 's  time  and  en- 
ergy was  devoted  to  the  most  ambitious  of  his 
proposed  public  works — the  deepening  of  the 
Tartar  Straits.  The  town  and  Port  of  Niko- 
laievsk  would  have  undoubtedly  benefitted  had 
Gondatti 's  scheme  for  the  deepening  of  the 
Straits  been  carried  through,  but  such  benefit 
would  have  been  obtained  at  a  cost  which  was 
out  of  all  proportion.  The  credits  that  Gon- 
datti obtained  and  the  amount  of  money  that 
he  wasted  in  this  connection  aroused  much  con- 
demnation   from    engineering    and    business 


8o  Japan  or  Germany 

sources,  and  some  general  suspicion  as  to 
whether  or  not  the  money  expended  was  being 
done  so  without  some  ulterior  reason  behind  the 
expenditure.  It  might  be  noted  in  passing  that 
a  practical  way  exists  of  utilising  the  Amur 
Eiver  as  a  waterway  and  connecting  it  with  a 
seaport.  This  would  embody  the  consideration 
of  de  Castries  Bay  as  a  port  instead  of  Niko- 
laievsk,  thus  avoiding  the  Straits  of  Tartary 
and  the  lower  Amur.  A  canal  through  the 
Zizzi  Lakes  prevents  no  engineering  difficul- 
ties which  are  in  the  least  insurmountable. 

The  third  one  of  Gondatti's  pet  schemes  was 
never  put  into  operation.  Had  the  European 
war  not  taken  place  Gondatti  would  undoubt- 
edly have  forced  it  through.  This  scheme  was  a 
proposed  duty  to  be  levied  on  all  wheat  im- 
ported into  Eussia.  The  exact  amount  of  the 
duty  which  Gondatti  wished  to  impose  was 
thirty  kopecs  per  pood.  The  primary  and  fun- 
damental reason  for  this  duty  was  stated  by 
Gondatti  to  be  the  encouragement  of  agricul- 
ture in  the  Pri-Amur.  It  is  difficult  to  find  two 
men  in  Siberia  who  agree  on  the  various  phases 
of  this  question.  The  general  division  of  the 
community  for  and  against  this  measure  was 
the  adhesion  to  it  and  support  of  it  by  the  agri- 
culturists and  the  venomous  and  bitter  antag- 


Concerning  Siberia  8i 

onism  to  it  on  the  part  of  the  milling  interests. 
The  exclusion  of  Manchurian  grain  from  Si- 
beria spelled  ruin  to  some  of  the  milling  com- 
panies which  had  been  formed  for  the  express 
purpose  of  handling  that  particular  trade.  The 
milling  industry  is  the  foremost  industry,  and 
practically  the  sole  extensive  one,  in  Siberia. 

Some  people  consider  that  the  Pri-Amur 
would  be  a  splendid  place  for  the  extensive  rais- 
ing of  wheat ;  others  condemn  the  country  as  be- 
ing anything  but  rich  from  an  agricultural 
standpoint  and  argue  that  crops  are  particu- 
larly liable  to  disease  and  to  damage  by  flood. 
Be  that  as  it  may,  the  proposal  seemed  to  create 
a  greater  measure  of  opposition  among  those 
who  were  antagonistic  to  it  than  the  relative 
support  it  had  gained  from  those  with  whom 
it  found  favour.  It  certainly  added  to  Gondatti^s 
unpopularity,  and  the  distrust  in  which  the 
Governor-General  was  held. 

Such,  then,  was  the  general  political  condi- 
tion in  Far  Eastern  Russia  when  the  news  came 
to  Siberia  of  the  revolution  in  Petrograd. 

Gondatti  was  in  Vladivostok  with  General 
Nischenkoff,  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
Russian  forces  in  the  Far  East. 


THE  REVOLUTION  COMES  TO 
THE  RUSSIAN  FAR  EAST 


CHAPTEE  V 

The  Revolution  Comes  to  the  Russian  Fae 

East 

News  of  the  revolution  in  Petrograd  could 
hardly  have  been  a  great  shock  to  any  Russian. 
The  Revolution  of  1905  had  followed  the  realis- 
ation on  the  part  of  the  great  mass  of  the  Rus- 
sian people  that  they  had  been  betrayed  by  the 
manner  in  which  the  Russian-Japanese  War 
had  been  waged  and  ended.  It  was  only  lack 
of  cohesion  and  organisation,  as  well  as  lack  of 
competent  leaders,  that  prevented  the  Revolu- 
tion in  1905  from  developing  into  a  much  more 
serious  affair  for  the  Romanoff  regime  than  it 
proved  to  be.  Those  who  knew  Russia  well 
saw  this  and  felt  that  another  great  betrayal 
had  only  to  be  followed  by  a  national  realisation 
of  it,  in  order  to  start  the  fires  of  revolution 
afresh. 

The  day  the  message  came  to  Vladivostok  to 
the  effect  that  the  revolution  had  taken  place, 
Gondatti  called  a  council  of  the  higher  officials. 

85 


86  Japan  or  Germany 

It  was  there  decided  to  give  the  news  to  the 
public  without  delay.  It  was,  perhaps,  unfor- 
tunate for  Gondatti  that  at  the  psychological 
moment  he  was  absent  from  the  seat  of  govern- 
ment in  Habarovsk.  He  lost  no  time  returning 
from  Vladivostok,  but  before  he  could  reach 
Habarovsk,  mischief  had  been  set  afoot. 

In  the  absence  of  both  the  Governor-General 
and  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  forces,  the 
extreme  radical  element  in  Habarovsk  was 
given  an  opportunity  to  form  a  committee  and 
assume  authority. 

Therefore,  when  Gondatti  and  General  Nisch- 
enkoff  reached  Habarovsk  they  were  at  once 
arrested  by  the  Revolutionary  Conunittee  and 
placed  in  the  military  prison.  Gondatti 's  house 
was  searched  and  every  document  and  paper 
therein  was  subjected  to  a  minute  examination. 
All  sorts  of  stories  were  spread  about  Siberia 
as  to  what  was  found  in  Gondatti 's  house.  One 
report  said  that  eleven  poods  of  gold  were  se- 
creted there.  The  basis  for  this  story  was  that 
Gondatti 's  visits  to  the  various  mines  in  the 
district  frequently  resulted  in  his  receipt  of 
presents  of  specimen  nuggets.  The  rumour 
started  with  some  casual  remark  about  these 
sample  bits  of  the  products  of  Siberian  gold 
mines  and  grew  into  a  weird  story,  from  which 


Revolution  Comes  to  Russia      87 

one  might  gather  that  a  huge  store  of  gold  had 
been  found  in  Gondatti's  house. 

Another  tale  which  was  widely  circulated  was 
to  the  effect  that  a  large  amount  of  opium  was 
found  concealed  on  Gondatti's  premises.  This 
started  tongues  a-wagging  everywhere.  Some 
opium  had  been  confiscated  from  smugglers  a 
short  time  before  the  revolution  and  Gondatti 
was  taking  charge  of  it  until  it  could  be  for- 
warded for  the  needs  of  the  Russian  Red  Cross, 
but  this  fact  was  unknown  to  the  average  man 
in  the  community.  Hundreds  of  other  rumours, 
many  of  them  absolutely  groundless,  flew  from 
lip  to  lip,  until  the  animosity  toward  Gondatti 
had  become  universal. 

Petrograd,  as  soon  as  it  learned  that  the  Gov- 
ernor-General had  been  placed  in  prison,  im- 
mediately ordered  his  release.  The  committee 
treated  this  communication  from  the  revolu- 
tionary government  with  complete  defiance.  In- 
stead of  being  released,  Gondatti  was  trans- 
ferred to  the  municipal  jail  and  there  given 
the  treatment  of  a  common  criminal.  All  the 
time  orders  were  coming  from  the  new  revolu- 
tionary government  to  Gondatti,  directing  him 
to  remain  at  his  post.  The  Habarovsk  commit- 
tee consigned  such  orders  to  the  waste  basket 
and  Gondatti  remained  in  jail.    Such  a  condi- 


88  Japan  or  Germany 

tion  of  things  existed  for  more  tlian  two  months. 
At  last  Petrograd  commenced  demanding  Gon- 
datti's  presence  at  the  Capitol.  These  demands 
became  insistent  and  the  committee  ultimately- 
decided  to  despatch  Gondatti  to  Petrograd.  The 
manner  of  his  going  was  in  sad  contrast  to  the 
way  he  had  been  welcomed  as  Governor-General 
so  few  years  previously.  The  Habarovsk  com- 
mittee compelled  him  to  go  on  foot  to  the  rail- 
way station,  and  all  the  way  from  the  jail  the 
people  crowded  the  streets  and  jeered  at  the 
former  Governor-General  and  heaped  insults 
upon  him.  The  very  men  who  should  have  felt 
the  greatest  sympathy  for  and  gratitude  to  Gon- 
datti, engineered  the  storm  of  passion  that  rose 
against  him  among  the  worst  elements  of  the 
community.  They  even  went  so  far  as  to  gather 
together  a  mob  of  low  moral  and  intellectual 
calibre  to  insure  ill-treatment  for  the  depart- 
ing Governor-General,  who  was  sent  from  Ha- 
barovsk under  an  armed  guard  and  in  a  third- 
class  compartment.  He  escaped  with  his  life 
and  with  little  else. 

Little  good  did  Gondatti  ever  do  in  Siberia, 
but  he  left  behind  him  a  deex)-rooted  suspicion 
of  the  Japanese  and  a  well-fostered  spirit  of 
anta2:onism  and  dislike  toward  them.    He  had 


Revolution  Comes  to  Russia      89 

been  most  strongly  opposed  to  the  Japanese 
during  his  term  of  office  and  never  lost  an  op- 
portunity to  thwart  them.  He  frequently  spoke 
publicly  in  an  apprehensive  vein  of  the  results 
of  the  constant  encroachments  made  by  the 
Japanese  upon  the  trade  of  the  country. 

It  is  astonishing  how  deep-rooted  a  feeling 
like  the  anti-Japanese  sentiment  in  Siberia  can 
become.  The  Eussian  is  so  quiet  and  peaceable, 
so  little  inclined  to  bother  his  head  particularly 
about  affairs  which  do  not  immediately  concern 
him,  that  one  hardly  expects  his  likes  and  dis- 
likes of  a  people  outside  his  own  environment 
to  sway  him.  But  the  Japanese  menace  is  very 
real  to  the  people  of  the  Pri-Amur.  It  is  a 
country  of  rumour.  Every  day  news  would  be 
spread  of  Japanese  troops  being  in  occupation 
at  Harbin,  or  having  been  landed  at  Vladivos- 
tok. The  most  visionary  sort  of  stories  were 
always  in  the  air.  A  Russian  from  Irkutsk 
told  me  his  wife  used  the  threat  of  a  Japanese 
invasion  to  quiet  the  children. 

That  the  revolutionary  element,  particularly 
the  extreme  radicals,  were  always  suspicious 
of  some  encroachment  on  Siberian  territory 
might  be  gathered  from  the  fact  that  when  Ad- 
miral Knight  went  to  Vladivostok  on  the  Flag- 
ship Broohlyny  a  rumour  was  started  that  the 


90  Japan  or  Germany 

American  Government  was  going  to  take  over 
the  Trans-Siberian  Eailway.  The  most  power- 
ful and  prominent  Bolsheviki  in  Vladivostok 
told  more  than  one  of  us  that  he  not  only  held 
this  opinion,  but  intended  to  promulgate  it. 
An  astute  member  of  the  English-speaking  com- 
munity arranged  that  this  firebrand  should  go 
to  lunch  with  Admiral  Knight  on  board  the 
Brooklyn,  The  Eussian  had  the  courage  of 
his  convictions  and  was  as  outspoken  in  the 
AdmiraPs  cabin  as  he  had  been  in  the  head- 
quarters of  the  Soldiers'  and  Workmen's  Depu- 
ties. When  Admiral  Knight  learned  that  the 
belief  was  held  by  many  of  the  Eussians  that 
the  coming  of  the  Brooklyn  was  a  sure  presage 
to  American  occupation  of  the  railway,  he 
placed  before  the  Eussian  extremist,  without 
any  delay  for  special  preparation,  the  exact 
text  of  the  cablegram  from  the  Naval  Depart- 
ment in  Washington  which  had  taken  Admiral 
Knight  into  Siberian  waters  with  his  ship.  That 
telegram  could  not  have  been  better  or  more 
diplomatically  worded  had  the  incident  in  Vlad- 
ivostok been  foreseen.  It  contained  simple 
enough  instructions  and  gave  as  a  reason  for 
the  visit  of  the  warship  to  Vladivostok  the  fact 
that  it  was  desired  to  demonstrate  to  the  Eus- 
sians the  complete  friendship  for  and  sym- 


Revolution  Comes  to  Russia      91 

pathy  with  them  of  the  American  Government. 

There  was  no  Japanese  Admiral  with  a  wise- 
ly worded  cablegram  from  his  Government  to 
allay  Eussian  suspicions  in  Siberia.  For  the 
matter  of  that,  however  the  cablegram  from 
Tokyo  might  have  been  worded,  it  would  have 
had  little  effect  in  the  way  of  soothing  any  sus- 
picions that  might  have  been  aroused  as  to  Ja- 
pan's intentions. 

The  fear  of  Japan  had  a  good  effect  on  the 
extremists  who  had  such  predominant  voice  in 
the  newly  formed  governmental  committees  in 
Habarovsk  and  Vladivostok.  The  more  conser- 
vative elements  in  the  community  used  that  fear 
and  played  upon  it.  In  Harbin  particularly, 
wild  action  on  the  part  of  the  Committee  of 
Soldiers'  and  Workmen's  Delegates  was  held  in 
check  more  than  once  by  a  reminder  that  any 
serious  breaches  of  the  peace  would  result  in 
the  coming  of  Japanese  troops  from  Manchuria 
within  a  few  hours.  Matters  were  quite  bad 
enough  in  Harbin,  but  they  would  have  been 
infinitely  worse  but  for  the  proximity  of  avail- 
able Japanese  troops. 

This  fear  of  Japan  was  very  much  in  evidence 
during  the  first  months  of  the  Eussian  Eevolu- 
tion.  In  Vladivostok,  for  instance,  the  immi- 
nence of  a  Japanese  landing  was  in  every  mouth. 


92  Japan  or  Germany 

It  was  a  blessing,  for  it  instilled  fear  into  th« 
nnnily  elements.  It  gave  confidence  to  the  pro- 
visional authorities,  who  soon  recognised  its 
value,  and  played  on  it.  It  was,  in  fact,  the 
subject  of  the  pious  gratitude  of  the  more  timid 
among  the  people,  who  saw  in  it  a  safeguard 
against  the  worst  elements  in  Siberia. 

For  months  the  Japanese  fleet  was  universally 
believed  to  be  cruising  just  off  the  Siberian 
Coast  and  details  of  its  composition  were  passed 
from  lip  to  lip  in  awed  whispers.  When  a  small 
Japanese  training  ship  happened  to  call  at 
Vladivostok  there  was  almost  a  panic.  No  one 
could  be  prevailed  upon  to  doubt  that  she  was 
in  wireless  communication  with  the  Japanese 
naval  force  outside  and  prepared  to  call  it  into 
the  port  on  the  slightest  excuse,  such  as  an  out- 
break or  riot,  with  a  view  to  the  immediate 
military  occupation  of  Vladivostok  by  the  Jap- 
anese. 

I  talked  with  a  number  of  Russians  of  several 
classes  about  the  possibility  that  Japan  might 
have  to  guard  the  accumulated  stores  in  Vlad- 
ivostok. Nowhere  in  Siberia  did  I  find  a  Rus- 
sian in  favour  of  this.  It  was  to  discuss  this 
question  that  I  walked  one  day  over  the  wharves 
of  Vladivostok  and  along  the  paths  that  lead 
around  the  shores  of  the  bay,  with  two  Rus- 


Revolution  Comes  to  Russia      93 

sians  who  were  among  the  most  astute  and  pow- 
erful of  the  new  element  that  had  the  reins  of 
Government  in  Vladivostok  in  its  hands.  They 
were  against  Japanese  intervention  in  any  form. 
To  see  over  600,000  tons  of  cargo  piled  promis- 
cuously here  and  there  is  an  experience.  An 
inevitable  amount  of  loss  and  damage  had  re- 
sulted from  the  lack  of  protection  which  had 
been  accorded  to  the  goods.  The  limited  amount 
of  warehouse  space  in  Vladivostok  had  been  sup- 
plemented by  some  82,000  square  feet  of  go- 
downs,  but  the  greater  part  of  the  material  gath- 
ered had  been  piled  in  the  open. 

To  walk  through  those  piles  on  piles  of  indis- 
pensable materials,  most  of  which  had  come 
from  Japan  and  America,  made  one  feel  that 
some  one  ought  to  guard  them  if  there  was  any 
immediate  danger  of  their  falling  into  the  hands 
of  the  Germans. 

To  return  to  the  story  of  how  the  Russian 
Eevolution  came  to  Siberia,  General  Nischen- 
kofP,  the  Commander-in-Chief,  was  taken,  after 
a  few  weeks '  confinement  in  the  military  prison 
at  Habarovsk,  to  the  borders  of  the  Pri-Amur, 
where  he  was  released.  In  his  place  the  com- 
mittee, which  contained  a  number  of  soldier 
members,  elected  a  Colonel  Vissotsky.  Vissot- 
sky  was  a  colonel  in  the  reserves  and  not  in 


94  Japan  or  Germany 

the  regular  army.  He  had  once  been  a  banker 
in  Vladivostok  and  was  held  in  little  esteem — 
in  fact,  the  greater  part  of  the  business  element 
in  Vladivostok  considered  him  an  out-and-out 
scoundrel.  He  held  the  position  of  Commander- 
in-Chief,  however,  until  the  Eevolutionary  Gov- 
ernment in  Petrograd  sent  General  Hagondokoff 
to  take  the  position.  Hagondokoff  was  once 
Governor  of  the  Amur  province,  and  both  he  and 
his  Chief  of  Staff,  Domanyeffsky,  are  capable 
officers.  Vissotsky  was  deposed  from  the  posi- 
tion of  Commander-in-Chief  upon  Hagondo- 
koff  *s  arrival,  without  any  difficulty,  as  the  for- 
mer never  enjoyed  the  confidence  of  either  com- 
mittee or  army  and  had  no  real  authority.  When 
he  issued  an  order  the  army  would  consider  it 
and  if  they  agreed  with  it,  obey  it ;  if  not,  they 
would  forget  it. 

While  Habarovsk  was  the  capital  of  the  Pri- 
Amur,  the  committee  which  had  been  formed 
there  and  which  had  thrown  the  Governor-Gen- 
eral and  the  Commander-in-Chief  into  jail  and 
had  subsequently  turned  them  out  of  Siberia, 
was  never  recognised  in  Far  Eastern  Russia  as 
being  in  supreme  control.  A  better  group  than 
the  committee  in  Habarovsk  was  the  committee 
in  Vladivostok,  and  the  fact  that  Vladivostok 
was  at  the  end  of  the  trans-Siberian  railway  and 


Revolution  Comes  to  Russia      95 

was  tlie  great  seaport  of  the  Far  Northeast 
made  the  Vladivostok  committee  of  more  real 
importance  than  the  Habarovsk  committee. 

The  Eussian  is  an  easily  governed  person.  He 
is  docile.  He  will  go  a  long  way  to  escape 
trouble.  Any  committee  that  represents  itself 
as  being  the  government  of  the  moment  finds 
less  difficulty  in  usurping  the  direction  of  af- 
fairs than  it  would  find  in  most  other  countries. 

The  great  difficulty  which  was  immediately 
felt  in  Siberia  after  the  revolution  in  Russia  was 
the  labour  problem.  This  was  all  the  more  nat- 
ural in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  labour  problem 
in  the  Far  Northeast  has  ever  been  in  an  unset- 
tled, unsatisfactory  state.  Gondatti's  efforts  to 
do  away  with  Chinese  and  Korean  labour  and 
the  scarcity  of  Russian  labour,  together  with 
the  fact  that  the  Russian  is  not  a  particularly 
efficient  laboring  man  in  the  abstract,  each  had 
a  bearing  on  the  troubles  that  were  to  ensue. 
There  was  no  real  industry,  as  such,  in  the  Pri- 
Amur  when  the  revolution  came.  The  flour  mil- 
ling industry  was  the  only  one  which  had  been 
long  established.  Gold  mining  was  confined  to 
the  Zeya  and  Amgun  valleys  and  had  never 
proved  particularly  remunerative.  Gondatti's 
schemes  for  the  development  of  the  other  min- 
eral  resources    of   the   Pri-Amur   had   never 


96  Japan  or  Germany 

reached  anything  like  conclusion.  One  might 
almost  say  that,  except  for  the  gold  mining  and 
the  mining  of  zinc  at  Tiutiukhe,  there  is  no 
mining  industry  in  Siberia  as  yet.  Consequent- 
ly, except  for  the  conduct  of  the  railway  line 
and  such  ordinary  local  industries  as  may  be 
found  in  every  community  where  good-sized 
towns  and  cities  exist,  no  sufficient  industrial 
life  was  to  be  found  in  the  country  from  which 
to  create  or  support  a  good-sized  and  intelli- 
gent body  of  working  men. 

The  fact  that  the  soldiers  and  working  men, 
such  as  they  are,  with  all  their  limitations,  took 
over  the  government  at  Vladivostok  and  did 
as  well  with  it  for  a  time  as  they  did  do,  is  a 
lesson  in  itself  as  to  the  possibilities  of  rule  by 
the  people.  The  effect  on  the  whole  Pri-Amur 
district  of  the  attitude  and  actions  of  the  Vlad- 
ivostok committee  w^as  more  far-reaching  than 
that  of  the  Habarovsk  committee. 

Those  first  days  of  the  Eussian  revolution, 
with  the  continual  contradictory  orders  that 
came  to  Vladivostok  from  Petrograd,  and  with 
that  excess  of  zeal  with  which  a  new  group  in 
power  feels  its  first  strength,  might  have  pro- 
duced more  sinister  results. 

The  power  in  Vladivostok  was  in  the  hands, 
when  the  revolution  came,  of  men  who  were 


Revolution  Comes  to  Russia      97 

known  to  be  henchmen  of  Gondatti's.  The  Gov- 
ernor-General at  Vladivostok  was  named  Tol- 
matchoff .  When  the  government  was  taken  over 
by  a  Committee  of  Public  Safety — ^immediately 
formed  on  receipt  of  the  news  that  the  old  re- 
gime had  been  superseded  in  Russia — Tolmatch- 
oif  was  deprived  of  his  official  residence,  with 
the  exception  of  one  bedroom.  He  was  given 
to  understand  that  his  authority  had  been  taken 
over  by  the  committee,  although  the  fact  that 
he  was  a  popular  man  and  that  the  Committee 
of  Public  Safety  itself  was  formed  from  quite 
rational  elements,  protected  the  Governor-Gen- 
eral from  any  personal  ill-treatment.  Tolmatch- 
off  wisely  applied  at  once  for  leave  of  absence 
and  until  it  was  granted  and  he  left  for  Petro- 
grad,  he  kept  quietly  in  the  background  and  took 
no  part  in  the  conduct  of  public  affairs. 

The  Vice-Govemor  of  Vladivostok,  Ternov- 
sky,  might  have  come  into  prominence  at  this 
point,  except  for  the  fact  that  he  was  a  great 
favourite  of  Gondatti's.  That  alone  proved  his 
downfall.  As  in  the  instance  of  the  Governor- 
General,  there  was  no  bitterness  of  feeling 
against  him  and  he  was  not  only  allowed  to  re- 
main in  Vladivostok  but  was  given  an  official 
position  subsequently  under  the  new  regime. 

Vladivostok's  Mayor  was  General  Yushtchen- 


98  Japan  or  Germany 

koff.  He,  too,  was  known  as  one  of  Gondatti's 
men,  althougli  he  cut  little  figure  one  way  or 
the  other,  as  he  was  a  man  of  no  marked  in- 
dividuality or  ability.  In  spite  of  this  fact,  he 
had  been  in  touch  so  long  with  various  municipal 
elements  in  Vladivostok,  that  he  was  able  to 
gain  a  hearing  with  the  Committee  of  Public 
Safety  and  to  induce  them  to  include  among 
their  numbers  some  of  the  more  moderate  cit- 
izens. Yushtchenkoff  hung  on  long  enough  to 
effect  some  real  good  in  this  connection.  One 
of  the  results  of  the  Mayor's  influence  was  that 
the  Committee  of  Public  Safety  which  first 
grouped  itself  around  the  old  Municipal  Gov- 
ernment gradually  became  disassociated  from 
the  municipality  and  allowed  distinctly  civic  in- 
terests to  be  handled  by  a  purely  municipal 
body. 

The  situation  in  Vladivostok  immediately  aft- 
er the  outbreak  of  the  revolution  was,  then,  that 
the  Committee  of  Public  Safety  took  over  the 
powers  of  the  Governor-General,  in  spite  of  the 
fact  that  Petrograd  gave  him  orders  to  con- 
tinue in  authority.  Most  of  the  officials  in  the 
Government  service  carried  on  their  work  in 
the  same  way  that  they  had  done,  except  that 
they  took  orders  from  the  Committee  instead 
of  the  Governor-General.    That  moderate  ele- 


Revolution  Comes  to  Russia      99 

ments  were  in  the  Committee  was  evident  from 
the  fact  that  no  disturbance  occurred  in  Vlad- 
ivostok and  that  law  and  order  were  very  well 
maintained.  The  very  first  few  hours  and  days 
of  the  revolution  seemed  to  hold  some  menace 
of  unruly  conditions  to  come,  but  a  better  con- 
dition of  things  continued  and  no  little  common 
sense  in  administration  was  shown  by  the  Com- 
mittee. 

Only  one  incident  occurred  which  showed  the 
animus  of  the  new  governing  power  for  some 
of  the  old  bureaucratic  group.  The  chief  of 
the  commercial  port  of  Vladivostok  was  a  Baron 
Toube.  A  deep  feeling  against  Germany  ex- 
isted in  the  community  and  considerable  popu- 
lar indignation  was  directed  against  Toube,  on 
account  of  his  German  name.  Toube  was  un- 
doubtedly a  man  of  exceptional  capability.  He 
cared  nothing  for  the  opinions  of  other  people, 
however,  and  was  accustomed  to  running  the 
port  to  suit  himself.  His  methods  and  man- 
ners were  high-handed. 

When  the  revolution  came  the  feeling  against 
Toube  took  the  form  of  frequent  threats  against 
his  safety  and  accusations  of  all  sorts  of  pro- 
German  actions  on  his  part.  Threats  came  to 
him  by  telephone  and  by  anonymous  letters. 
Feeling  that  his  safety  would  be  more  assured, 


100  Japan  or  Germany 

he  moved  his  residence  to  one  of  the  tugs  in 
the  Bay.  That  gave  his  enemies  the  chance 
for  which  they  had  been  waiting.  An  outcry 
at  once  arose  to  the  effect  that  Toube  was  plan- 
ning to  escape.  His  arrest  followed  the  popular 
clamour.  The  Committee  of  Public  Safety  had 
made  no  other  move  of  this  kind  and  that  it 
felt  that  possible  injustice  had  been  done  to 
Baron  Toube,  might  be  gauged  from  the  fact 
that  the  Committee  explained  its  action  to  be 
due  to  a  desire  to  protect  Toube  from  the  peo- 
ple. Dame  Rumour  immediately  became  busy. 
Stories  to  the  effect  that  Toube  had  manipulated 
the  unloading  of  cargoes  in  the  port  in  such 
manner  that  combustible  materials  had  been 
so  stored  as  to  invite  fire,  soon  developed  into 
statements  that  goods  had  actually  been  de- 
stroyed by  Toube  in  his  effort  to  assist  the 
Germans.  While  his  first  incarceration  had 
been  in  the  fortress,  it  soon  became  necessary 
to  transfer  him  to  the  common  jail.  A  couple 
of  months  afterwards,  despite  the  fact  that 
many  charges  had  been  formed  against  him  and 
there  was  a  strong  feeling  on  the  part  of  the 
Vladivostok  people  that  he  should  be  brought 
to  trial  for  dereliction  of  duty,  better  counsels 
prevailed.  He  was  released  on  bail  eventually 
and  allowed  to  leave  Siberia  for  Russia. 


Revolution  Comes  to  Russ'm^     loi 

Thus  the  revolutionary  element  tbCiik  control 
of  affairs  of  government  in  Siberia,  and  the 
individuals  in  whose  hands  the  conduct  of  af- 
fairs had  previously  rested  drifted  out,  one 
after  another,  and  left  the  new  element  in  entire 
control. 

A  bad  administration  had  left  the  country  in 
anything  but  a  sound  industrial  condition  and 
the  work  of  a  Eussian  settlement  of  the  Far 
Northeast  had  been  but  begun.  The  resources  of 
the  country  were  hardly  as  yet  tapped.  The 
day  of  the  Russian  Far  East  could  not  as  yet 
have  been  said  to  have  reached  its  dawn. 


r3 


NEW  HANDS  AT  THE  HELM  OF 
GOVERNMENT 


\ 


CHAPTER  VI 

New  Hands  at  the  Helm  of  Government 

The  first  Committee  of  Public  Safety  formed 
in  Vladivostok  contained  a  majority  of  men  who 
were  of  decidedly  moderate  tendencies.  This 
fact  bore  fruit  in  two  directions.  First,  the  ac- 
tions of  the  Committee  assumed  an  importance 
greater  than  that  of  any  other  of  the  revolu- 
tionary committees  in  the  Russian  Far  East. 
Second,  its  initial  political  complexion  was  iden- 
tified too  closely  to  the  system  which  had  existed 
before  the  revolution  to  allow  the  Committee 
to  escape  the  constant  charge  on  the  part  of  its 
critics  of  reactionary  and  bourgeois  tendencies. 

Gradually,  as  the  revolution  gained  impetus 
in  Russia  and  the  Bolshevik  crew  gained  more 
and  more  ascendency,  the  extreme  element  in 
the  Committee  of  Public  Safety  in  Vladivostok 
gained  ground,  until  to-day  the  conservative  ele- 
ment has  become  practically  subordinated,  if 
not  eliminated.  In  its  place  there  has  sprung 
up,  however,  a  semi-conservatism — a  sort  of 

105 


io6  Japan  or  Germany 

Minimalist  group  against  the  Maximalists, 
which  have  had  the  effect  of  giving  some  bal- 
ance to  the  mind  and  deliberations  of  the  com- 
mittee. 

For  several  months  after  the  revolution  came 
to  Siberia,  the  Committee  of  Public  Safety  held 
the  reins  of  government,  and  considering  the 
circumstances  under  which  it  was  compelled  to 
operate  and  the  personnel  of  its  members,  it 
is  only  fair  to  accord  to  it — during  those  early 
days — a  considerable  element  of  success  as  re- 
garded the  results  of  its  working. 

One  example  of  its  capability  was  with  ref- 
erence to  the  manner  in  which  it  grappled  with 
the  police  problem.  Under  the  old  regime  the 
police  of  Vladivostok  were  worse  than  useless. 
They  were  corrupt  and  a  menace  to  the  social 
order  of  things  municipal.  The  Committee  of 
Public  Safety  immediately  replaced  the  police 
by  a  militia  force.  No  one,  however  much  they 
could  criticise  the  militia,  could  argue  that  they 
were  not  an  improvement  on  the  old  police  force. 
The  maintenance  of  good  order  cannot  be  placed 
solely  to  the  credit  of  the  militia,  for  all  classes 
of  the  population  desired  peace  and  quiet,  and 
their  continual  effort  seconded  well  the  efforts 
of  the  new  force. 

The  revolution  was  not  many  days  old  when 


At  the  Helm  of  Government     107 

the  Council  of  Soldiers'  and  Workmen's  Depu- 
ties was  formed  and  took  a  prominent  part  in 
operations.  It  worked  hand  in  hand  with  the 
Committee  of  Public  Safety  and  some  members 
of  the  former  body  were  taken  into  the  latter. 
The  soldiers  in  Vladivostok  during  the  early 
days  of  the  revolution  numbered  about  thirty 
thousand.  There  were  few  workmen,  compara- 
tively. The  fact  that  industry  in  the  Pri-Amur 
was  undeveloped  and  that  no  one  firm  or  estab- 
lishment employed  many  men,  except  the  Gov- 
ernment Arsenal,  made  it  inevitable  that  the 
soldiers  should  be  predominant  in  the  Council 
of  Soldiers'  and  Workmen's  Deputies. 

The  history  of  that  Council  in  Vladivostok 
would  read  much  the  same  as  the  history  of 
similar  committees  in  other  parts  of  Kussia. 
Immediately  upon  their  formation  they  passed 
a  resolution,  declaring  that  the  commandant  of 
the  fortress  could  issue  no  orders  before  first 
submitting  them  to  the  Council  for  approval. 
Their  commanding  officer  was  an  old  man  and 
in  bad  health.  He  had  little  option  or  inclina- 
tion to  quarrel  with  the  mandate  of  the  Council. 
Fortunately  for  affairs  in  Vladivostok  one  or 
two  young  soldiers,  who  were  eloquent  speakers, 
gained  the  immediate  ascendency  over  their 
comrades,  and,  still  more  fortunately,  possessed 


io8  Japan  or  Germany 

no  small  amount  of  common  sense.  These  young 
fellows  held  quite  sound  opinions,  and,  but  for 
comparatively  few  instances,  the  Council  of  Sol- 
diers' and  Workmen's  Deputies,  so  far  as  its 
decrees  which  had  to  do  with  the  soldiers  them- 
selves were  concerned,  took  but  little  action 
that  could  be  described  as  other  than  rational. 
When  the  Council  applied  its  power  to  the  ar- 
bitration or  settlement  of  labour  disputes,  its 
judgment,  as  might  be  expected,  was  less  sound. 
Chief  among  its  labours,  however,  was  the  Coun- 
ciPs  effort  to  weed  out  dishonest  practices  and 
corrupt  methods  from  Russian  officialdom.  The 
soldiers'  committee  was  just  as  keen  to  detect 
and  punish  crooked  officials  of  the  new  regime 
as  it  would  have  been  to  have  hounded  out  cor- 
rupt functionaries  of  the  old  bureaucratic  group. 

Their  own  organisation  came  in  for  no  little 
attention  at  their  hands  and  when  it  seemed 
necessary  that  the  militia  should  be  assisted  in 
the  maintenance  of  good  order,  the  soldiers 
showed  themselves  to  be  willing  and  ready  to 
give  such  help. 

Their  action  along  one  line  was  somewhat 
amusing  and  intensely  distasteful  to  the  official 
element.  The  Council  desired  to  have  one  of 
its  own  representatives  keep  active  touch  with 
all  branches  of  the  public  service.    The  work 


At  the  Helm  of  Government     109 

of  the  Customs  Officials,  the  receipt  and  de- 
spatch of  cargo,  and  questions  relating  to  the 
amount  of  accommodation  for  the  storage  of 
goods  and  the  amount  of  car  space  on  the  rail- 
ways, were  items  which  the  Council  of  Sol- 
diers' and  Workmen's  Deputies  considered  vital 
points  with  which  they  should  come  into  close 
contact  and  upon  which  they  should  keep  a  vigi- 
lant eye.  The  utter  and  extraordinary  ignorance 
of  some  of  the  soldiers  who  were  thus  appointed 
to  watch  official  operation  of  one  department  or 
another  produced  several  amusing  situations. 
The  object  of  the  Committee  and  of  the  men 
themselves,  however,  was  a  good  one,  and  pro- 
ductive of  good  in  the  main. 

The  bourgeoisie  and  official  classes  of  the  old 
day  in  Siberia  could  apparently  no  more  work 
with  the  new  element  than  water  could  be  mixed 
with  wine.  The  evident  sincerity  of  the  soldiers 
was  entirely  misunderstood  by  the  better  edu- 
cated classes,  who  failed  more  deplorably  than 
one  would  hav.e  thought  possible.  In  Siberia, 
as  in  the  rest  of  Russia,  what  might  usually 
be  spoken  of  as  the  better  element  of  the  pop- 
ulation has  shown  no  initiative,  no  real  patriot- 
ism, and,  above  all,  an  entire  absence  of  cour- 
age. Nowhere  more  patently  than  in  Vlad- 
ivostok could  the  better  element  in  the  com- 


no  Japan  or  Germany 

munity  have  rendered  more  signal  service  and 
sympathetic  understanding  of  and  honest  en- 
deavour to  work  with  the  Council  of  Soldiers' 
and  Workmen's  Deputies.  In  some  parts  of  Rus- 
sia the  suspicion  with  which  the  bourgeoisie 
were  looked  upon  by  the  extreme  radical  ele- 
ment made  it  seem  impossible  that  any  assist- 
ance could  be  given  by  them.  In  Vladivostok 
this  was  not  the  case — at  least  during  the  early 
days  of  the  revolution.  Those  who  remained 
of  the  more  wealthy  and  official  classes  in  Vlad- 
ivostok made  their  primary  mistake  in  creating 
an  organisation  of  their  own,  which  was  known 
as  *  *  The  Alliance  of  Free  Russia. ' '  They  lacked 
punch  and  strength  and  vim,  however,  and,  al- 
though they  held  meetings  at  times,  in  no  in- 
stance was  there  evidence  of  their  having  had 
the  slightest  effect  or  influence  upon  the  trend 
of  events.  Their  association  was  subsequently 
disbanded  and  assimilated  with  the  **  Party  of 
National  Freedom." 

Early  in  the  game  the  Government  in  Petro- 
grad  realised  that  it  was  necessary  to  supply 
some  one  from  the  central  government  to  try 
to  hold  Siberia  closer  to  the  seat  of  affairs  in 
Russia.  The  first  representative  of  the  new 
government  to  arrive  in  Vladivostok  was  a  man 
named  Rusanoff,  who  was  a  deputy  for  the 


At  the  Helm  of  Government     1 1 1 

Maritime  Province  of  Vladivostok  in  the  Im- 
perial Duma.  Rusanoff  was  appointed  by  Pet- 
rograd  to  be  Commissioner  for  the  Pri-Amur. 
While  he  had  no  great  personal  authority  and 
no  practical  experience  of  administration,  he 
had  the  advantage  of  thorough  local  knowledge 
and  was  known  to  be  honest  and  broad-minded. 
Petrograd  made  a  good  selection  when  they  put 
him  at  the  head  of  affairs,  but  he  was  not  strong 
enough  to  really  take  the  reins.  The  Committee 
of  Public  Safety  co-operated  with  him  to  a  cer- 
tain extent,  but  never  considered  that  they 
should  take  their  cue  from  him. 

Another  element  that  loomed  large  in  the  sit- 
uation in  Vladivostok  was  the  naval  force  sta- 
tioned there.  The  Russian  fleet  in  the  port  con- 
sisted only  of  a  half  dozen  torpedo  boats  and 
a  few  small  auxiliary  vessels.  Several  thou- 
sand sailors  were  quartered  in  the  barracks, 
however,  and  attached  to  the  arsenal.  Trouble 
with  the  sailors  might  not  have  ensued  except 
for  the  arrival,  during  the  first  month  of  the 
revolution,  of  three  agitators  from  the  Baltic 
fleet.  These  devils  came  to  Vladivostok  with 
trouble  in  their  hearts.  Then  it  was  that  the 
sober  minds  and  good  common  sense  of  the 
Council  of  Soldiers'  and  Workmen's  Deputies 
was  most  needed.  The  firebrands  from  the  Bal- 


112  Japan  or  Germany 

tic  counselled  a  wholesale  massacre  of  officers. 
The  Soldiers '  Deputies  soon  put  a  veto  on  this 
project.  The  sailors  insisted  upon  the  removal 
of  the  Vice-Admiral,  who  was  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  the  Port,  and  of  the  Port  Admiral  also. 
In  the  Vice-Admiral's  place  they  elected  a  Lieu- 
tenant, and  an  engineer  captain  was  given  the 
position  of  Port  Admiral.  Here  again  the  in- 
fluence of  the  Soldiers'  Deputies  was  marked, 
for  the  appointment  of  the  two  tiew  officers  were 
sound  appointments  of  good  men  and  Petro- 
grad  found  no  difficulty  in  confirming  them. 

Eussian  naval  officers,  as  is  well  known,  have 
themselves  to  thank  for  the  attitude  of  the  Rus- 
sian sailor  toward  them.  Brutality  of  officers 
toward  men  was  reduced  to  a  fine  art  in  the 
Russian  navy.  Since  the  revolution  the  naval 
officers  in  Vladivostok  have  shone  in  an  unen- 
viable light,  evidently  afraid  that  retribution 
might  be  dealt  out  to  them  and  if  their  own 
hands  were  clean  that  the  sins  of  other  officers 
in  previous  days  might  cause  some  punishment 
to  fall  on  their  own  heads.  They  have,  except 
in  very  rare  instances,  shown  no  adaptability 
whatever  to  the  new  conditions.  A  close  ob- 
server told  me  in  Vladivostok  that  the  naval 
officers  since  the  revolution,  without  exception, 
either  exhibited  complete  subserviency  to  the 


At  the  Helm  of  Government     1 13 

men  or  that  they  sulked  and  tried  by  all  possi- 
ble means  to  avoid  further  service  in  the  navy. 
The  natural  result  of  this  was  that  the  men, 
finding  their  demands  met  with  no  opposition, 
made  the  most  absurd  proposals.  The  Vice- 
Admiral's  house,  which  stands  on  the  main 
street  of  Vladivostok,  was  taken  over  by  the 
sailors  and  turned  into  a  club  for  their  own 
use,  and  almost  any  hour  of  the  day  or  night 
that  one  passed,  one  could  see  them  playing 
billiards,  their  girl  friends  standing  about  as 
interested  spectators.  To  make  their  club  a 
success  they  demanded  from  the  officers  ten  per 
cent  of  the  officers'  pay.  This  sum  is  devoted 
to  the  expenses  of  the  club,  and  if  the  officers 
should  by  any  chance  venture  therein  they  are 
driven  forth  with  insult  and  abuse.  Under  no 
circumstances  will  the  sailors  obey  orders  to 
take  the  government  transport,  a  fairly  busy 
ship,  to  sea,  except  on  the  express  condition 
that  they  will  be  able  to  return  for  Sundays 
and  holidays.  Should  an  officer  be  housed  in 
an  apartment  that  the  sailors  consider  too  large 
and  luxurious  for  him  they  summarily  evict  him 
and  compel  him  to  live  elsewhere. 

While  all  these  things  sound  very  absurd  and 
very  lawless  and  are  in  themselves  inexcusably 
outrageous  from  one  standpoint,  the  practices  of 


114  Japan  or  Germany 

the  officers  of  the  Eussian  navy  in  the  old  Ro- 
manoff days  explain  the  spirit  behind  them.  In 
spite  of  these  excesses  the  sailors  maintained 
order  amongst  themselves  in  Vladivostok  and 
were  not  slow  to  punish  drunkenness  and  other 
offences  committed  by  their  comrades.  Certain 
it  is  that  they  preserved  an  orderly  demeanour 
in  the  streets.  Always  among  the  sailors  can 
be  found  extreme  anarchists  and  their  follow- 
ing ebbs  and  flows  in  accordance  with  their  in- 
dividual ability  to  hold  sway  over  their  fellows. 
For  the  most  part  the  sailors  in  Vladivostok 
were  inclined  to  be  loyal  to  the  temporary  gov- 
ernment. They  were  incredibly  lazy,  but  that 
is  an  attribute  by  no  means  unusual  in  Rus- 
sians. I  saw  but  few  of  them  that  could  be 
characterised  as  slovenly  or  dirty. 

The  influence  of  the  Soldiers'  and  Workmen's 
Council  and  its  desire  for  clean  administration 
might  be  gauged  from  what  befell  General  Saga- 
tovsky,  who  commanded  the  artillery  of  the  port, 
appointed  by  the  Soldiers'  Deputies  to  succeed 
General  Kriloff,  who  was  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  at  Vladivostok  at  the  time  of  the  revolu- 
tion. In  spite  of  the  fact  that  General  Saga- 
tovsky  was  the  nominee  of  the  Soldiers'  Depu- 
ties, he  was  not  in  the  position  of  Commander- 
in-Chief  many  weeks  before  certain  malprac- 


At  the  Helm  of  Government     115 

tices  were  discovered,  which  were  traced  to  him. 
At  once  he  was  deposed  and  placed  under  ar- 
rest, where  he  was  held  for  many  long  months. 

The  transition  that  the  minds  of  the  Russian 
soldiers  in  Vladivostok  went  through  during  the 
early  days  of  the  revolution  was  an  interesting 
study  in  psychology.  At  first  they  seemed  to 
be  wrapped  in  a  fine  glow  of  enthusiasm.  High 
ideals  were  not  uncommonly  expressed.  They 
felt  apparently  a  fierce  flame  of  patriotism  burn- 
ing in  their  breasts.  All  were  eager  to  do 
something  to  help  the  new  cause.  They  chafed 
under  a  sense  of  helplessness,  and  disappoint- 
ment that  they  could  not  do  something  imme- 
diately constructive  to  assist  the  progress  of  the 
revolution. 

Then  this  first  burst  of  enthusiasm  died  out. 
A  wave  of  demoralisation  swept  over  the  army. 
Discipline  went  by  the  board.  Their  attitude 
was  passive  rather  than  active.  They  took  no 
overt  steps  and  were  guilty  of  no  specific  ac- 
tions by  which  they  could  be  particularly  con- 
demned. They  destroyed  no  property.  They 
were  sober  as  a  rule  and  behaved  themselves, 
but  it  seemed  that  they  had  reached  the  stage 
of  *^ don't  care.'*  Their  disorganisation  was 
marked.  Their  personal  appearance  became 
dirty  and  slovenly.     In  short,  they  ceased  to 


Ii6  Japan  or  Germany 

be  soldiers  and  became  a  mere  disorganised 
mob. 

The  poor  fellows  had  no  help  from  their  offi- 
cers. The  average  Russian  officer  of  lower  rank 
was  a  poor  stick  with  no  education  and  little 
intelligence.  He  rarely  had  any  moral  fibre 
whatever.  He  had  not  been  trained  to  care  for 
his  men  nor  for  their  welfare  and  had  been 
brutal  to  them  if  he  pleased,  without  reproof 
from  his  superiors.  The  Eussian  officer  natu- 
rally felt  no  little  fear  as  how  the  Russian  sol- 
dier was  going  to  look  upon  him  under  the  new 
conditions.  Had  the  officers,  as  a  class,  been 
efficient  and  courageous,  when  confronted  with 
the  moral  and  psychological  problem  presented 
by  the  dying  out  of  the  soldiers'  enthusiasm, 
they  might  have  been  a  useful  factor  in  the  sit- 
uation. As  it  was,  they  were  worse  than  useless. 
Most  of  them  seemed  thoroughly  cowed.  I 
rarely  met  one  and  engaged  in  any  kind  of  con- 
versation with  him  that  the  predominant  idea 
in  his  mind  was  not  escape  from  Russia  and 
the  Russian  army.  I  do  not  wish  to  throw  too 
much  blame  upon  him  for  this,  for  it  was  nat- 
ural for  the  officers  to  wish  to  get  away,  but  it 
is  deplorable  that  they  were  not  of  better  class, 
for  in  Siberia  at  least  clever  and  conscientious 
work  on  their  part,  had  they  put  heart  into  their 


At  the  Helm  of  Government     117 

efforts,  would  have  resulted  in  a  much  better 
feeling  between  officers  and  men. 

As  the  months  passed,  the  third  phase  of  the 
transition  came  on.  It  was  to  the  credit  of 
the  men  themselves  that  some  sort  of  reforma- 
tion seemed  to  be  working  and  that  it  came 
from  themselves — from  within.  This  was  solely 
due  to  the  fact  that  in  their  own  numbers  there 
were  some  young  fellows  who  possessed  no  lit- 
tle common  sense  and  honesty  of  purpose.  Dis- 
cipline of  a  sort  began  to  reassert  itself.  It 
was  not  the  old  discipline,  which  was  born  of 
fear  of  a  heavy  fist  or  a  club.  It  was  discipline 
that  was  being  adopted  by  the  men  because 
some  of  the  wiser  of  their  own  fellows  had 
shown  them  that  they  were  better  off  under  dis- 
cipline, and  that  they  could  not  be  soldiers  with- 
out it.  True,  it  didn't  go  very  far.  Neverthe- 
less, it  was  a  genuine  movement  and  as  such  was 
interesting,  even  in  its  stages  of  inception. 
While  the  men  did  not  salute  their  officers,  they 
bore  themselves  quite  differently  to  their  su- 
periors, and  there  seemed  to  be  hope  of  the 
natural  enmity  that  the  soldiers  had  begun  to 
have  for  the  officers  disappearing  in  time.  One 
has  to  know  the  Russian  army  thoroughly  to 
realise  how  much  this  meant.  The  poor  Rus- 
sian soldier  has  had  little  for  which  to  live. 


Ii8  Japan  or  Germany 

He  has  been  a  brave,  hard  fighter  and  no  one 
has  cared  a  rap  whether  he  lived  or  died.  What 
probably  was  brought  home  to  him  more  for- 
cibly was  the  fact  that  nobody  cared  whether 
he  suffered  while  he  was  alive.  To  ask  him 
to  have  any  inherent  respect  or  love  for  his 
superiors  or  to  have  any  real  fundamental  ap- 
preciation of  the  value  of  discipline  and  order 
was  out  of  the  question.  Therefore,  when  the 
soldiers  in  Vladivostok  began  to  buck  up,  smart- 
en themselves,  and  show  by  their  general  bear- 
ing that  they  were  trying  to  be  better  soldiers, 
it  was  concrete  evidence  of  the  amount  of  good 
that  can  be  done  among  that  class  of  soldiers 
by  a  little  missionary  work  on  the  part  of  those 
who  know  them  and  sympathise  with  them. 

Some  units  among  the  soldiers  of  the  Siberian 
army  became  imbued  with  a  definite  anarchis- 
tic view.  Some  regiments  dismissed  quite  fair- 
ly competent  ofiicers  and  put  utterly  incompe- 
tent ones  in  their  places.  As  a  whole,  however, 
the  Russian  soldiers  in  Siberia,  and  particu- 
larly in  Vladivostok,  were  by  no  means  anar- 
chists. The  anarchists  in  Vladivostok  tried  to 
get  hold  of  the  soldiers  and  started  a  definite 
propaganda  with  that  end  in  view.  A  large 
anarchist  manifestation  was  planned  in  Vlad- 
ivostok, the  date  for  it  set,  and  threats  made 


At  the  Helm  of  Government     119 

that  on  that  occasion  the  reds  would  loot  the 
offices  of  a  paper  which  did  not  agree  with  their 
sentiments,  would  ransack  and  pillage  some  of 
the  larger  stores  in  the  town  and  would  arrest 
summarily  the  members  of  the  Council  of  the 
Soldiers'  and  Workmen's  Deputies. 

The  Council  handled  this  matter  splendidly. 
Trustworthy  troops  with  machine  guns  were 
placed  at  various  quarters  about  the  city,  and 
a  broad  smile  illumined  the  faces  of  most  of  the 
men  who  had  been  so  direly  threatened.  No 
effort  was  made  to  keep  the  anarchists  from 
having  their  meeting,  and  have  it  they  did.  A 
number  of  them,  including  some  soldiers,  gath- 
ered together  and  indulged  in  some  oratorical 
fireworks,  but  the  lack  of  opposition  and  some 
possible  foreboding  that  the  quiet  held  some 
unknown  menace  of  trouble  to  come  in  case  they 
'*  started  something, ''  made  them  decide  to  aban- 
don all  idea  of  rioting  and  disperse  peacefully 
when  they  had  run  out  of  adjectives,  expletives 
and  breath. 

The  net  result  of  this  meeting  was  that  not 
only  the  anarchists  but  the  rest  of  the  soldiers, 
and  the  balance  of  the  population  of  Vlad- 
ivostok as  well,  realised  that  the  extremists 
were  but  a  small  unimportant  minority. 

Thus  may  be  pointed  out  the  good  that  lies 


120  Japan  or  Germany 

in  some  of  the  soldier  elements  in  Russia.  There 
is  plenty  to  criticise.  It  is  perhaps  little  use 
to  either  condemn  or  excuse.  The  main  point 
to  be  remembered  is  that  the  Russian  soldier 
offers  fine  ground  for  missionary  effort.  He 
has  a  lovable  personality  and  is  easily  swayed. 
He  is  not  entirely  unintelligent  by  any  means, 
and  while  he  has  little  to  be  patriotic  about  and 
has  never  been  trained  to  be  industrious,  once 
he  is  convinced  that  a  certain  line  of  action  is 
the  right  one  to  take,  it  is  not  difficult  to  get 
him  to  adopt  it.  He  is  strangely  capable  of 
enthusiasm  for  a  project.  He  has  always  been 
abused  and  ill-treated,  and  since  the  revolution 
has  been  fed  continuously  and  everlastingly  on 
enough  wicked  and  soulless  propaganda  to  ad- 
dle the  brains  of  wiser  men. 

That  the  Council  of  Soldiers'  and  Workmen's 
Deputies  which,  after  all,  represent  the  thirty 
thousand  soldiers  in  Vladivostok  and  which  are 
a  real  power  in  the  community,  have  co-oper- 
ated with  the  Committee  of  Public  Safety  so 
well  as  they  have  done  and  with  so  little  of  bad 
result,  is  an  encouraging  feature  rather  than 
a  discouraging  one. 


ON  DISCIPLINE 


CHAPTER  VII 
On  Discipline 

A  juNioB  officer  of  the  Russian  army  who  had 
been  promoted  to  a  position  of  some  importance 
in  Siberia,  asked  me  to  dinner  one  evening.  We 
had  a  long  talk  about  army  reorganisation  in 
Russia,  and  about  the  possibility  of  the  Russian 
soldier  of  this  generation  again  absorbing  any 
ideas  of  discipline. 

My  young  friend  waxed  eloquent  in  his  de- 
nunciation of  the  type  of  Russian  officer  whose 
attitude  toward  the  Russian  soldier  for  many, 
many  years  was  largely  responsible  for  the  re- 
sult that  no  Russian  soldier  would  be  likely  to 
accord  much  respect  or  authority  to  a  Russian 
officer  again  for  a  long  time  to  come. 

My  experience  with  the  Russian  army  on  dif- 
ferent occasions  gave  me  a  groundwork  for  an 
understanding  of  my  young  friend 's  feelings  in 
the  matter.  I  remembered  a  day  in  China  in 
1900  during  the  Boxer  troubles  when  I  had  gone 
from  Tientsin  to  Tongku  for  provender.    We 

123 


124  Japan  or  Germany 

were  under  heavy  bombardment  in  Tientsin  and 
supplies  had  run  low.  We  drew  lots  to  see 
which  of  our  quartette  of  correspondents  should 
journey  down  the  Pei-ho  and  apply  to  some  of 
the  ships  of  the  British  fleet  for  permission  to 
purchase  eatables.  The  lot  fell  to  me.  The 
British  officers  on  the  men-of-war  in  Taku  Bay 
were  very  hospitable  and  exceedingly  kind. 
When  I  landed  from  a  steam  pinnace  at  Tongku 
on  my  return  journey  I  was  laden  with  a  big 
sack  of  food  and  drink.  I  obtained  assistance 
in  carrying  it  to  the  railway  station,  which  I 
reached  just  in  time  to  catch  the  one  train  of 
the  day  for  Tientsin. 

We  had  not  proceeded  more  than  half  of  the 
25-mile  journey  before  the  train  came  to  a 
standstill  and  we  were  ordered  out.  The  engine 
had  stopped  at  a  break  in  the  line.  A  damaged 
bridge  which  the  Chinese  troops  had  destroyed 
was  inamediately  in  front  of  us,  and  far  distant 
the  smoke  of  another  engine  rose  lazily  in  the 
quiet  air.  Nearly  a  mile  away  was  the  other 
section  of  the  train  for  Tientsin  and  the  pas- 
sengers were  already  scurrying  across  the  in- 
tervening ground.  I  managed  to  get  my  heavy 
load  out  of  the  compartment  and  on  to  the  em- 
bankment in  front  of  the  engine.  I  tried  to 
shoulder  it  before  carrying  it  down  the  twelve 


On  Discipline  125 

or  fifteen  foot  slope  that  led  to  the  plain  be- 
low. I  realised  that  it  was  too  heavy  for  me 
to  carry  to  the  Tientsin  section  of  the  train. 
I  could  not  abandon  it.  It  was  worth  almost 
its  weight  in  gold  to  me  at  that  moment.  I 
turned  to  a  member  of  the  Eussian  railway 
company,  which  was  hard  at  work  repairing 
the  damaged  railway  bridge  in  front  of  us,  and 
noticing  that  he  was  idle  for  the  moment,  asked 
him  in  my  most  polite  and  best  Eussian  if  he 
would,  for  a  consideration;,  assist  me  to  carry 
my  load  across  the  break. 

He  was  a  strapping  big  fellow,  that  Eussian 
soldier.  He  looked  a  strong  man.  Either  he 
had  gotten  out  of  his  bunk  on  the  wrong  side 
that  morning  or  his  breakfast  had  disagreed 
with  him,  for  he  not  only  refused  to  give  me 
any  assistance,  but  his  refusal  was  couched  in 
very  abrupt  terms. 

He  used  an  expression  at  the  close  of  his  brief 
remarks,  which  was  not  at  all  the  sort  of  thing 
that  he  should  have  said  to  me.  I  stood  and 
gazed  at  him  for  a  moment,  wondering  what  I 
could  possibly  have  said  which  would  have 
aroused  in  him  the  least  feeling  of  antagonism. 
A  hand  fell  on  my  shoulder  and  a  Eussian  ac- 
quaintance, an  officer  of  the  statf  who  spoke 
good  English,  said  to  me,  *'What  is  the  mat- 


126  Japan  or  Germany 

ter!"  I  told  him  briefly.  I  explained  that  I 
had  meant  no  harm  in  wanting  to  hire  the  Rus- 
sian soldier  to  assist  me. 

**Did  I  hear  that  soldier  use  such-and-such 
an  expression  to  youT*  queried  the  officer. 

**I  don't  know  whether  you  did  or  not.  I 
did,'*  I  replied. 

The  officer  stepped  a  couple  of  paces  f orwarc^ 
and  looked  straight  in  the  soldier's  eyes.  The 
latter 's  hand  went  to  the  vizor  of  his  cap  smart- 
ly, and  remained  in  that  position.  Russian  mil- 
itary discipline  demanded  that  a  soldier  in  the 
presence  of  an  officer  kept  his  hand  at  the  salute 
until  he  had  obtained  the  officer's  permission  to 
remove  it.  With  some  low  exclamation  of  an- 
noyance, the  officer,  doubling  his  fist,  smashed 
the  soldier  squarely  in  the  jaw.  The  poor  fel- 
low's heels  were  together,  and  the  rail  was 
immediately  behind  him.  The  blow  was  no  light 
one  and  it  was  fair  on  the  jaw.  Over  the  sol- 
dier went,  head  over  heelsy;  down  the  bank, 
turning  at  least  one  complete  somersault. 
Scrambling  to  his  feet  at  the  bottom  of  the  slope 
he  drew  himself  up  and  looked  at  the  officer 
standing  on  the  bank  above.  From  the  moment 
he  was  struck,  during  all  his  evolutions  down 
the  embankment,  and  again  as  he  rose  and 
looked  up  at  the  man  who  had  struck  him  in 


On  Discipline  127 

the  face,  his  hand,  so  far  as  I  could  see,  had 
hardly  once  left  the  vizor  of  his  cap.  Russian 
discipline. 

When  my  young  friend  in  Vladivostok  talked 
to  me  about  the  abuses  to  which  Russian  sol- 
diers had  been  subjected  for  so  many  years,  I 
knew  what  he  was  talking  about.  One  who  has 
been  with  the  Russian  army  in  the  field  in 
time  of  war  may  not  realise  the  extent  to  which 
the  Russian  officer  in  time  of  peace  exerted  that 
continual  discipline,  as  he  called  it,  which  was 
only  another  name  for  legalised  brutality. 

I  was  being  rowed  out  from  Port  Arthur  to 
a  big  Russian  man-of-war  anchored  in  the  har- 
bour one  day.  I  was  seated  on  one  side  of  the 
coxswain,  and  on  the  other  was  an  intelligent 
and  well  bom  Russian  officer  of  good  rank.  As 
the  sailors  swung  to  their  oars  and  the  boat 
shot  across  the  blue  waters  of  the  harbour,  the 
question  of  discipline  came  under  discussion.  I 
referred  to  the  well-trained  crew,  whose  smart- 
ness seemed  to  me  to  be  rather  unusual  in  the 
Russian  navy,  as  I  knew  it.  To  illustrate  just 
what  he  meant  by  discipline,  the  officer  turned 
toward  the  coxswain  who  was  on  his  left  and, 
half  rising,  struck  the  man  full  in  the  face  with 
his  clenched  fist.  I  winced  as  though  I  had 
been  the  one  struck.    The  sheer  savagery  of  that 


128  Japan  or  Germany 

quick  blow  astounded  me.  The  coxswain  was  a 
fine  type  of  man.  He  had  a  splendid  face,  and 
he  took  the  blow  unflinchingly.  The  officers 
hard  jaw  set,  and  as  he  saw  the  horror  on  my 
face  it  goaded  him  to  a  further  exhibition  of 
brutality.  Again  he  struck — twice.  The  blood 
ran  down  the  face  of  the  man  at  the  tiller,  but 
he  set  his  lips,  and  with  his  eyes  straight  ahead, 
kept  his  hands  on  the  tiller  ropes. 

I  could  stand  it  no  longer,  and  told  my  Eus- 
sian  acquaintance  plainly  that  such  was  the 
case.  When  he  saw  that  I  had  thoroughly  lost 
my  temper,  he  regained  his  former  sweet  com- 
posure, laughed,  and  taunted  me  with  having  a 
soft  heart.  *^You  would  not  be  one  to  teach 
discipline  in  the  Eussian  na\y,"  he  said,  with 
a  sneer. 

Such  pictures  come  back  to  me  sometimes 
when  I  see  Eussian  soldiers  that  refuse  to  sa- 
lute their  officers,  and  when  there  are  evidences 
that  discipline  has  become  lax,  so  far  as  the 
recognition  of  authority  goes  among  the  Eus- 
sian soldiers. 

We  had  dinner,  the  young  Eussian  officer  and 
me,  with  two  others  of  the  local  Eussian  army 
organisation.  We  dined  in  a  private  room.  As 
we  were  chatting  after  dinner,  loud  laughter 
came  through  the  folding  doors  which  shut  off 


On  Discipline  129 

an  adjoining  room  from  ours.  The  boisterous 
shouts  from  next  door  increased  in  volume,  un- 
til they  interrupted  our  conversation. 

**Do  you  recognise  the  voice?'*  asked  one  of 
the  young  officers  of  another.  At  that  they  all 
listened  and  my  friend  rose,  went  to  the  door 
and  shouted  through  it,  **I  hope  you're  having 
a  good  time,  General.''  There  was  an  answer- 
ing shout  from  the  next  room,  and  after  a  few 
exchanges  of  badinage  through  the  closed  door, 
it  was  opened  from  the  other  side,  and  I  saw 
the  gross  form  of  a  man  in  the  uniform  of  a 
Eussian  General  seated  on  a  sofa  which  had 
been  drawn  a  little  way  from  the  table.  The 
remains  of  what  for  Siberia  must  have  been  a 
sumptuous  repast  were  still  in  evidence.  The 
General's  companions  were  not  from  the  rec- 
ognised social  strata  of  the  community.  A 
glance  at  them  showed  their  walk  in  life.  On 
the  table  were  bottles  and  glasses  containing 
some  weird  illicit  sort  of  red  liquor,  undoubted- 
ly alcoholic,  and  as  such,  prohibited  by  law.  It 
is  seldom  indeed  that  the  law  against  the  sale 
of  liquor  is  evaded  in  most  restaurants  and  eat- 
ing places  in  Siberia. 

We  were  duly  presented,  and  sat  down  for 
coffee.  Shortly  afterwards  we  left  the  Gen- 
eral   with    his    disreputable    associates,    and 


130  Japan  or  Germany 

strolled  off  to  our  sleeping  places.  Mine  was 
on  the  billiard  room  sofa  of  a  hospitable  friend. 
Beds  were  scarce  in  the  town. 

As  we  walked  arm  in  arm  through  the  rich 
moonlight,  the  clear,  pure  air  striking  us  like 
a  shower  bath  after  the  heated,  polluted  atmos- 
phere of  the  close  room,  my  young  Eussian 
friend  took  a  long  breath  and  said,  **We  were 
talking  about  Eussian  officers  during  dinner, 
were  we  not?  That  is  the  man  we  might  be 
obeying  to-day.  We  have  put  in  his  place  a 
very  young  man  who  has  had  little  military 
experience.  It  is  not  an  enormously  important 
position  which  he  fills,  and  he  is  not  a  won- 
derfully capable  fellow.  He  is  a  clean  young 
man.  He  has  some  sense  of  responsibility  as  to 
his  job.  He  has  done  nothing  to  disgrace  his 
newly  found  rank.  Of  the  two — the  young  sol- 
dier who  has  been  placed,  in  spite  of  his  lack 
of  training,  in  command  of  his  fellows,  or  the 
old  soldier  whom  you  saw  to-night — which  do 
you  think  the  more  likely  to  merit  and  receive 
respect  at  the  hands  of  the  men?  If  we  have 
to  salute  an  officer  it  had  much  better  be  a 
decent  officer  who  has  some  self-respect.  We 
have  had  too  much  of  the  other  kind  in  the 
Eussian  army." 

Something  in  that. 


On  Discipline  131 

In  1912  I  accompanied  126  officers— most  of 
them  picked  staff  officers — at  their  head  the  Gen- 
eral in  supreme  command  of  all  railway  and 
other  transportation  for  the  Eussian  army — 
throughout  the  Eussian  Empire  on  a  two-thou- 
sand-mile tour.  We  went  into  parts  of  Eus- 
sia  which  were  indeed  the  heart  of  it.  More 
than  one  town  we  visited  was  primitive  to  a 
degree.  In  many  places  I  was  the  first  Amer- 
ican the  people  had  ever  seen.  The  village  and 
townsfolk,  and  the  peasant  people  along  the  way 
were  kind  and  hospitable.  The  country  through 
which  we  passed  was  frequently  interesting. 
Civic  bodies  in  the  larger  places  gave  us  lavish 
entertainment.  Yet  there  was  a  sufficiency  of 
drunkenness  and  debauchery  among  the  Eus- 
sian officers  on  that  staff  ride  to  make  the  ob- 
server wonder  whether  those  who  revelled  in  it 
were  capable  of  serious  effort.  A  capacity  for 
drink  and  a  freedom  from  all  restraint  were 
the  chief  characteristics  of  much  too  great  a 
number  of  the  officers  of  the  Eussian  army  of 
the  old  pre-war  days. 

When  one  thinks  what  the  Eussian  soldier 
has  undergone,  when  one  realises  the  brutality 
from  which  he  has  suffered  for  decades,  when 
it  is  taken  into  consideration  that  no  Eussian 
officer  has  been  trained  to  take  the  sliarhtest  care 


132  Japan  or  Germany 

for  the  welfare  or  comfort  of  his  men,  it  is  a 
surprise,  that  the  Russian  officers  as  a  class 
have  been  molested  so  little  by  their  men  since 
the  outbreak  of  the  Russian  revolution.  The 
Russian  officer  has  fought  well  in  many  in- 
stances. As  a  class,  however,  it  can  hardly  be 
said  that  he  merited  much  respect  from  his  sol- 
diers. After  such  a  revulsion  as  the  Russian 
revolution  it  was  inevitable  that  he  should  be 
relegated  in  the  minds  of  his  soldiers  to  an  en- 
tirely different  position  than  that  which  he  oc- 
cupied under  the  old  regime. 


AGAREV— MAYOR  OP 
VLADIVOSTOK 


CHAPTER  VIII 

Agarev — Mayor  of  Vladivostok 

The  Committee  of  Public  Safety  in  Vladi- 
vostok commenced  to  encounter,  before  the 
revolution  was  many  months  old,  a  new  element 
of  disturbance  in  the  community.  This  was  sup- 
plied by  the  fact  that  Vladivostok  was  the  port 
at  which  the  returning  Russian  political  and 
criminal  element  flowed  freely  homeward  from 
the  United  States,  Canada  and  Australasia. 
Many  men  who  came  in  with  this  immigration 
were  good  men.  There  was  also  a  liberal  scat- 
tering of  some  of  the  most  thorough  scoundrels 
that  could  be  found.  When  the  first  contingents 
began  to  arrive,  their  coming  was  a  unique  event 
and  one  for  which  the  townsfolk  readily  turned 
out.  Every  steamer  from  Japan  brought  a  com- 
plement which,  on  landing,  marched  through 
the  town  with  black  flags  bearing  various  in- 
scriptions, headed  by  a  band,  singing  on  its  way 
and  halting  at  intervals  for  speeches. 

An  acquaintance  of  mine,  who  took  particular 

135 


136  Japan  or  Germany 

interest  in  these  returning  delegations,  told  me 
that  there  seemed  to  be  a  preponderance  of 
Jews  among  these  immigrants,  but  that  they  in- 
cluded exponents  of  every  conceivable  theory 
of  government,  misgovernment  and  anarchy. 
The  early  arrivals  were  greeted  with  enthusi- 
asm, he  said.  Their  speeches  were  listened  to 
with  attention  and  were  doubtless  productive 
of  harm.  But  this  sort  of  thing  wears  itself 
out  in  time.  Wild-eyed  enthusiasts  spouting 
hare-brained  propaganda  can  tire  even  Eussian 
audiences.  The  day  came  when  a  less  and  less 
number  of  the  townsfolk  would  turn  out  when 
the  black  flag  processions  came  by.  Women  out 
shopping  turned  back  to  the  bargain  counter 
after  a  glance  which  was  sufficient  to  show  that 
it  was  the  same  old  game  over  again.  Workmen 
who  had  paused  to  watch  and  sometimes  had 
followed  some  large  contingent,  shrugged  their 
shoulders  as  the  latest  arrivals  passed.  Sol- 
diers who  had  nothing  else  to  do  except  listen 
to  speeches  became  so  accustomed  to  the  reiter- 
ation of  weird  doctrines  that  they  would  not 
go  across  the  street  to  hear  new  orators.  First 
apathetic,  the  Vladivostok  audiences  became 
critical.  Next  they  saw  the  humour  of  some 
of  the  speeches  and  would  gather  to  be  amused. 


Agarev — Mayor  of  Vladivostok     137 

This  feeling  eventually  changed,  first  to  ridicule, 
and  finally  to  open  hostility. 

The  sailors  in  Vladivostok  apparently  de- 
cided that  they  could  obtain  considerable  enter- 
tainment by  interrupting  some  of  the  meetings. 
Soon  the  sailor  element  was  recognised  as  be- 
ing definitely  in  opposition  to  the  returning 
prophets.  Kough  treatment  began  to  be  meted 
out  to  those  whose  speeches  did  not  suit  the 
sailors.  A  member  of  one  group  was  so  badly 
handled  that  he  died  of  his  injuries.  News  of 
this  and  similar  occurrences  somewhat  abated 
the  desire  on  the  part  of  the  returning  orators 
to  indulge  in  stump  speaking  in  the  streets  of 
Vladivostok.  The  Soldiers'  and  Workmen's 
Deputies  took  the  view  that  forcible  measures 
were  quite  excusable  if  they  were  used  to  com- 
bat theories  subversive  of  public  order. 

The  general  view  was  held,  too,  that  among 
the  returning  immigrants  was  many  a  man  in 
German  pay.  Certain  it  was  that  no  one  could 
have  served  Germany's  cause  any  better  wheth- 
er or  not  they  were  on  the  payroll  of  the  Ger- 
man secret  service. 

Invariable  animosity  was  displayed  against 
America  by  the  agitators  and  political  speakers 
who  passed  through  Vladivostok  on  their  way 
to  Eussia.    That  America  was  the  home  of  plu- 


138  Japan  or  Germany 

tocraoy  and  despotism  of  wealth  and  tliat  the 
American  workingman  was  in  worse  case  than 
any  other  workingman  in  the  world  was  the  bur- 
den of  the  song  on  the  lips  of  most  of  the  re- 
turning Russians  who  came  from  the  United 
States.  America's  entrance  into  the  war  was 
declared  by  almost  all  of  them  to  be  purely  in 
the  interest  of  the  plutocrats  and  the  employers 
of  labour  and  definitely  against  the  interest  of 
the  American  labouring  classes. 

Some  mass  meetings  were  ordered  by  the 
anarchists  to  take  place  in  front  of  the  Amer- 
ican Consulate  in  Vladivostok.  One  in  par- 
ticular had  as  its  chief  motive  the  registering 
of  a  protest  against  the  death  sentence  passed 
on  Mooney  in  San  Francisco.  That  Mooney  and 
his  accomplices  should  pay  the  extreme  pen- 
alty of  the  law  for  the  part  he  played  in  the 
dynamite  outrage  was  to  the  extreme  anarchist 
element  a  monstrous  injustice.  They  intended 
to  make  great  capital  out  of  it.  The  speeches 
were  planned  to  be  particularly  inflammatory 
and  high  feeling  was  anticipated.  The  gather- 
ing took  place  and  without  any  outside  sugges- 
tions whatever  the  whole  matter  was  handled 
skilfully  and  beautifully  by  the  Committee  of 
Public  Safety,  assisted  by  the  Council  of  Sol- 
diers' and  Workmen's  Deputies.    Cleverly,  and 


Agarev — Mayor  of  Vladivostok     139 

without  the  slightest  show  of  force,  the  meeting 
was  shifted  to  an  open  spot  at  some  distance 
from  the  American  Consulate.  When  the 
speeches  became  too  vividly  anti-American, 
some  mysterious  soft  pedal  was  applied  and 
the  phraseology  of  the  speaker  kept  mysterious- 
ly within  reasonable  limits.  Perfect  order  was 
maintained  throughout.  The  American  Consul 
was  invited  to  attend  and  a  copy  of  the  resolu- 
tion of  the  meeting,  condemning  the  judicial 
proceedings  in  the  Mooney  case  and  demanding 
the  release  of  the  criminal,  was  handed  to  him. 
There  the  matter  ended. 

One  of  the  reasons  for  the  maintenance  of  a 
comparatively  satisfactory  state  of  affairs  for 
so  many  months  in  Vladivostok  was  that  there 
was  little  actual  hardship  in  the  community. 
Only  people  who  have  come  into  touch  with 
hunger  to  the  verge  of  starvation,  or  with  ex- 
posure and  cold  to  the  danger  of  life,  can  real- 
ise what  fertile  ground  is  supplied  for  anar- 
chistic doctrines  and  extremist  propaganda  by 
deprivation  and  suffering.  Extreme  conditions 
produce  extremists.  Food  in  Siberia  has  not 
been  plentiful  and  the  provisional  government 
in  Petrograd  has  interfered  with  the  economic 
situation  once  or  twice  in  a  way  that  might  have 
created  some  food  shortage  in  Siberia;  but  no 


140  Japan  or  Germany 

sufficient  shortage  occurred  to  cause  real  suf- 
fering. Laws  which  tamper  with  the  monetary 
situation  to  a  point  which  prevents  Korean 
farmers  from  shipping  live  stock  into  Siberia 
means  that  the  Vladivostok  family  must  go 
without  meat.  Eules  of  railway  commissions  as 
regards  the  distribution  of  empty  cars  and 
short-sightedness  as  to  coal  shipments  may  re- 
sult in  a  fuel  shortage  in  Vladivostok,  in  spite 
of  the  fact  that  great  coal  deposits  exist  within 
easy  reach  under  normal  circumstances. 

Further,  the  average  man  in  Far  Eastern 
Russia  has  reached  a  higher  stage  of  individual 
development  than  his  brother  of  Western  Rus- 
sia. Politically  the  people  of  Siberia  and  par- 
ticularly the  people  of  Vladivostok  are  far  more 
independent,  broad-minded  and  reasonable  than 
in  most  parts  of  Russia.  Anarchistic  and  other 
pernicious  doctrines  are  considered  visionary 
by  a  much  larger  proportion  of  the  population 
in  the  east  than  in  the  west.  Japan,  too,  is 
much  closer  to  Vladivostok  than  Petrograd. 
The  lessons  of  the  Russo-Japanese  war  are  much 
more  vivid  in  the  minds  of  the  Russians  of 
the  Far  East. 

The  first  election  for  mayor  that  took  place 
in  Vladivostok  in  1917  resulted  in  the  selection 
of  a  man  by  the  name  of  Agarev. 


Agarev — Mayor  of  Vladivostok     141 

Some  time  afterwards  I  set  out  one  morning 
in  Vladivostok  with  the  determination  to  pay 
a  call  on  Agarev,  the  mayor.  I  had  been  told 
that  Agarev  had  been  in  the  United  States,  was 
a  workman,  and  had  wild  ideas  on  the  subject 
of  Socialism. 

Most  of  the  people  of  the  better  classes  in 
Vladivostok  seemed  to  think  that  Agarev  was 
just  about  as  bad  a  man  to  have  in  the  seat  of 
authority  as  could  be  found. 

I  heard  no  good  word  for  him  on  any  side. 
One  intelligent  Eussian  told  me  that  Agarev 
was  a  Leninist.  Another  told  me  that  Agarev, 
if  he  could  have  his  way,  would  divide  up  the 
property  in  Vladivostok  at  once.  Still  another 
told  me  that  Agarev  was  crooked,  that  he  would 
shortly  find  some  way  to  line  his  own  pockets, 
and  that  he  was  the  sort  of  a  man  who  was 
generally  to  be  feared  for  his  unscrupulousness. 

Agarev  had  not  been  sufficiently  long  mayor 
of  Vladivostok  so  that  the  foreign  officials  in 
the  town  had  seen  much  of  him.  They  were 
not  rabid  against  him,  but  I  suppose  they  were 
constantly  hearing  hard  things  said  about  him. 
At  all  events,  it  so  happened  that  I  had  found 
no  one  who  championed  him. 

I  walked  down  Vladivostok's  hilly  main  street 
until  I  came  to  the  building  which  had  been  set 


142  Japan  or  Germany 

aside  as  the  seat  of  municipal  government.  The 
doorway  was  crowded  with  tovarishchi.  All 
were  comrades,  readily  enough.  Everybody 
thereabouts  was  a  comrade — a  tovarishchi.  The 
use  of  the  word  sometimes  almost  amounts  to 
a  passport,  if  one  adopts  the  right  tone  and 
manner  with  it. 

There  was  considerable  bustle  in  the  corri- 
dors. I  stood  for  a  moment  in  the  hallway, 
watching  the  faces  of  the  men  who  seemed  to 
be  doing  business  in  that  odd  City  Hall.  It 
was  a  dirty  place.  The  floor  had  been  swept 
that  morning,  I  should  judge,  but  the  walls  were 
inconceivably  grimy,  and  the  windows  had  not 
had  a  washing  for  many  a  long  day.  Men  in 
various  walks  of  life  had  evidently  been  co- 
opted  into  this  new  form  of  revolutionary  gov- 
ernment in  Siberia.  One  could  see  intelligent 
faces  pass  at  frequent  intervals,  and  there  was 
many  a  fine  looking  Eussian  standing  in  some 
group,  for  the  large  hallway  was  full  of  groups 
gathered  here  and  there.  One  or  two  long  haired 
enthusiasts  with  the  stamp  of  the  fanatic  all 
over  them  rushed  past,  a  bundle  of  papers  in 
each  hand.  Most  of  the  men  who  were  hatless, 
thus  distinguishing  them  from  the  casual  visitor 
to  the  building,  seemed  sober  and  earnest  about 
their  work,  and  very  attentive  to  it.    I  opened 


Agarev — Mayor  of  Vladivostok     143 

a  door  leading  off  the  main  corridor  and  stood 
for  a  moment  watching  a  dozen  clerks  and  as- 
sistants of  some  sort,  each  at  his  desk.  They 
were  working  and  working  hard.  Turning  again 
into  the  corridor,  I  stepped  to  a  soldier  who 
stood  loj  the  foot  of  the  stairs  and  asked  him 
where  I  would  find  the  mayor,  Agarev. 

While  not  actually  impolite,  the  soldier  made 
an  apparently  studied  effort  to  assume  a  very 
careless  independence,  and  implied  by  a  jerk 
of  the  thumb  over  one  shoulder  that  I  would 
find  the  Worshipful  Mayor  somewhere  up  the 
stairway. 

On  the  next  landing  there  was  more  sem- 
blance of  official  order.  Quite  a  crowd  was 
waiting  to  see  some  one.  Both  men  and  women 
were  gathered  in  little  groups.  One  noticed  the 
patience  and  quiet  with  which  the  Russian  folk 
waited.  There  was  conversation  in  plenty,  but 
it  was  held  in  low  tones,  which  sank  still  lower 
when  some  one  approached  or  passed.  Consid- 
ering that  these  people  were  part  and  parcel 
of  the  proletariat,  that  the  proletariat  ruled 
thereabouts  unquestionably,  and  that  it  was 
new  to  its  feeling  of  powe^  they  seemed  to  me 
to  be  unusually  humble. 

I  walked  to  a  desk  at  which  a  soldier  sat  and 
tossed  down  my  card,  merely  announcing  that 


144  Japan  or  Germany 

it  was  for  Mr.  Agarev.  He  picked  it  up,  glanced 
at  it  quite  stupidly,  shook  his  head  disparaging- 
ly, but  lost  no  time  in  conveying  it  through  the 
large  door  that  opened  to  permit  the  entrance 
of  only  those  who  had  permission  to  pass. 

In  a  moment  he  had  returned,  and  with  a  ges- 
ture motioned  me  to  follow  him.  Arriving  at 
another  door  he  indicated  it  as  the  one  of  which 
I  was  in  search,  and  left  me  standing  outside, 
vrondering  whether  to  brazenly  enter  or  an- 
nounce my  arrival  with  a  modest  knock. 

Modesty  not  seeming  a  very  necessary  com- 
modity at  that  juncture,  I  tried  to  assume  the 
air  of  a  tovarishchi  and  boldly  entered.  I  found 
myself  in  a  large  waiting-room,  a  huge  table 
in  the  centre,  and  great  paintings  about  the 
walls,  but  not  a  soul  in  sight.  Four  doors  led 
out  of  this  large  compartment,  and  I  was  ap- 
parently to  be  allowed  to  pursue  my  own  inves- 
tigations in  my  own  way.  Beginning  with  the 
right  hand  door,  I  opened  it  unceremoniously 
and  there  found,  seated  at  a  desk,  and  engaged 
in  conversation  with  a  man  standing  by  him,  a 
thoughtful,  earnest-looking  man  of  middle  age. 
He  rose  and  when  I  asked  if  he  was  the  mayor, 
answered  in  broken  English  in  the  affirmative, 
and  asked  me  to  have  a  chair. 

I  spent  an  hour  and  a  half  in  that  office,  and 


Agarev — Mayor  of  Vladivostok    145 

I  have  seldom  talked  to  a  man  who  was  more 
earnest  and  honest  in  voicing  the  opinions  which 
he  held  than  was  Mayor  Agarev  of  Vladivostok. 

During  the  first  part  of  our  conversation  we 
were  subjected  to  constant  interruptions.  The 
unceremonious  form  of  entrance  which  I  had 
adopted  seemed  the  rule,  and  not  the  exception. 
Men  bent  on  serious  official  matters  walked  right 
into  the  room,  and  sometimes  apologising  and 
sometimes  not,  broke  in  on  our  conversation 
with  a  request  to  the  mayor  to  give  them  an 
answer  to  some  proposition  or  to  glance  over 
some  document  which  they  laid  before  him. 

This  annoyed  me  and  Agarev  seemed  equally 
to  dislike  it.  Smilingly,  I  suggested  barring 
the  door.  The  Mayor  said  there  was  no  key. 
As  the  door  opened  inward,  I  conceived  the  idea 
of  swinging  a  heavy  oak  centre  table  against 
it  for  a  few  moments.  That  made  an  effective 
barrier,  particularly  as  I  mounted  it. 

Sometimes  it  was  hard  to  get  Agarev 's  mean- 
ing, as  my  knowledge  of  Russian  has  ever  been 
meagre  and  was  suffering  from  long  disuse. 
Agarev 's  English  was  simple  and  usually  effec- 
tive, but  now  and  then  he  had  to  search  for  a 
word.  He  was  earnest,  however,  in  trying  to 
transmit  his  ideas  and  was  equally  earnest  in 
endeavouring  to  catch  my  meaning.    Therefore, 


146  Japan  or  Germany 

we  found  no  difficulty  in  gaining  a  very  good 
insight  into  what  each  of  us  thought  on  the 
subject  of  democratic  government,  particularly 
as  applied  to  Siberia. 

Agarev  told  me  that  he  had  been  with  the 
Russian  Purchasing  Commission  in  America 
during  the  early  part  of  the  war.  He  was  a 
mechanic  and  a  clever  one,  and  was  used  by 
the  Russian  Commission  as  an  expert  in  con- 
nection with  mechanical  matters.  He  told  me 
some  interesting  facts  about  the  methods  of 
that  Russian  buying  commission.  Those  facts 
are  not  a  part  of  this  narrative,  but  the  knowl- 
edge of  them  may  have  contributed  to  Agarev 's 
feeling  that  it  would  indeed  be  a  bad  form  of 
government  which  was  not  an  improvement  on 
the  Imperial  Russian  regime. 

Agarev  was  not  a  well  known  man  in  Vladi- 
vostok. He  had  never  seen  the  place  before  he 
returned  from  the  United  States.  He  had  run 
for  mayor  on  an  open  ticket  and  been  elected 
by  a  good  majority.  He  was  a  Social  Democrat 
and  an  Internationalist.  He  belonged  to  the 
left  but  not  to  the  extreme  left. 

To  see  that  man,  a  workman,  an  earnest  fel- 
low, leaning  over  his  desk  and  trying  to  explain 
to  me  the  real  meaning  of  the  Russian  revolu- 
tion, would  have  brought  conviction  into  the 


Agarev — Mayor  of  Vladivostok    147 

heart  of  more  than  one  sceptic  as  to  the  hon- 
esty of  purpose  which  some  of  these  Kussian 
revolutionaries  have  brought  to  their  task. 

Agarev  knew  Lenin  personally  and  liked  him, 
but  he  told  me  that  he  by  no  means  held  with 
Lenin  ^s  views.  He  thought  Lenin  a  fanatic  and 
quite  out  of  focus  and  perspective  on  some  ques- 
tions. 

The  idea  that  Agarev  was  anxious  that  I 
should  absorb  was  that  the  real  power  of  Rus- 
sia was  in  the  people.  More  than  one  hundred 
and  twenty  millions  of  Russians  meant  the  revo- 
lution with  their  whole  hearts  and  souls. 
-  Agarev 's  arraignment  of  the  Grovernment  of 
the  Czar,  which,  strangling  Russia  with  its  li- 
cense and  treachery,  sold  right  and  left  her  in- 
terests and  those  of  her  allies,  was  quite  easy 
to  understand.  Agarev  was  one  of  those  men 
who  saw  in  that  glare  of  liberty  that  illuminated 
the  political  horizon,  hope  for  a  more  successful 
prosecution  of  the  war,  entailing  the  overthrow 
of  German  militarism.  Agarev  believed  that 
the  German  people  were  strangled  by  the  per- 
secution of  the  Prussian  junkers.  Where  Ag- 
arev differed  from  Lenin  was  in  his  attitude  to- 
ward class  war  in  Russia.  Agarev  thought  that 
all  Russians  should  pull  together  for  the  formu- 
lation of  a  new  regime.    The  Maximalist  theory 


148  Japan  or  Germany 

that  the  co-operation  of  the  middle  classed 
should  be  denied  and  that  the  entire  authority 
of  the  country  should  be  delivered  into  the 
hands  of  revolutionary  democracy  was  not  ac- 
cepted by  Agarev  in  its  entirety. 

We  discussed  the  class  of  people  that  made 
up  Siberians  citizenship.  Agarev  agreed  that 
a  very  large  number  of  the  local  population 
who  were  comparatively  prosperous,  industri- 
ous and  intelligent,  must  be  utilised  in  the  gen- 
eral scheme  of  government  which  would  have 
to  be  formed. 

He  had  already  experienced  some  trouble  with 
the  Maximalist  element  in  Vladivostok.  One  or 
two  red-hot  anarchists  were  working  diligently 
in  the  community  and  the  mottoes  that  they  ad- 
vertised were  very  attractive.  Their  theories 
found  fertile  soil  in  the  uneducated  masses,  and 
they  were  particularly  active  among  the  soldiers 
and  the  workmen. 

On  the  other  hand,  Agarev  thought,  the  sober- 
er element  in  the  Eussian  Far  East  would  prove 
less  liable  to  conversion  to  some  of  the  more 
wild  ideas  of  the  extreme  left  than  might  the 
people  of  European  Eussia. 

Agarev  was  against  the  continuance  of  the 
war.  He  thought  Eussia  had  but  little  to  gain 
by  going  through  a  fourth  winter  campaign. 


Agarev — Mayor  of  Vladivostok    149 

Still,  he  was  no  advocate  of  a  peace  which  would 
assist  Germany.  He  held  the  idea  in  common 
with  so  many  of  his  compatriots  that  the  Ger- 
man workingman  would  rise  against  the  Kaiser. 
Agarev  was  anxious  that  Americans  should 
know  that  he  and  his  class  were  conscientiously 
trying  to  evolve  a  form  of  government  for  Rus- 
sia which  would  be  fair  and  right  to  everybody. 
The  keenness  of  the  man,  his  simplicity,  above 
all  his  ever-present  earnestness,  could  not  but 
strike  a  spark  of  sympathy  in  the  heart  of  any 
man  who  listened  to  him.  He  talked  long  about 
the  plans  he  had  for  civic  government  and  im- 
provement, and  spoke  of  the  difficulties  which 
he  found  in  the  way.  Unruly  elements  were  al- 
ways with  him,  around  him,  behind  him.  The 
Central  Government  in  Petrograd  sent  out  peo- 
ple at  times  whose  ideas  did  not  always  fit  in 
with  the  Agarevs.  The  labour  question  was  be- 
coming increasingly  difficult.  Workmen  were 
demanding  wages  in  excess  of  what  employers 
thought  they  could  pay.  The  workmen  were 
cutting  down  the  hours  of  labour  to  a  minimum 
that  made  the  sensible  Agarev  fearful  of  trou- 
ble. The  more  he  talked  about  the  labouring 
men  the  more  his  brow  wrinkled.  A  look  came 
into  his  eyes  that  showed  that  the  problem 
loomed  large  in  front  of  him  and  worried  him. 


15^  Japan  or  Germany 

We  talked  about  the  American  railway  ma- 
terial, the  locomotives,  the  cars  and  the  coal 
trucks  that  were  to  come  across  the  Pacific  to 
help  solve  the  big  problem  of  congested  trans- 
portation on  the  Trans-Siberian  Railway.  I 
spoke  of  the  difficulties  with  which  the  railway 
people  w^ould  be  faced  when  the  workers  tried  to 
take  into  their  own  hands  the  matter  of  erect- 
ing these  engines  and  cars.  I  spoke  of  the  rail- 
way constructional  work  about  Vladivostok 
during  the  previous  twelvemonth  which  had  to 
be  abandoned,  owing  to  the  attitude  of  the  la- 
bouring men.  Agarev  agreed  that  matters  were 
serious,  but  he  was  convinced,  and  his  eyes  lit 
with  a  quiet  fire  as  he  said  it,  that  there  was 
sufficiency  of  patriotism  and  love  of  their  own 
country  in  some  Russian  workmen  still,  to  en- 
able him  to  get  together  a  nucleus  around  which 
a  considerable  labour  effort  could  be  organised. 

The  general  tone  of  Agarev 's  conversation 
was  that  things  were  by  no  means  hopeless.  He 
spoke  often  of  his  own  incapacity  and  inexpe- 
rience. He  held  no  hallucinations  on  that  sub- 
ject. He  was  a  workman.  His  associates  were 
for  the  most  part  workmen  and  soldiers.  They 
had  to  creep  before  they  could  walk.  He  knew 
that  some  of  his  associates  were  incompetent, 
but  he  considered  they  were  all  honest.     He 


Agarev — Mayor  of  Vladivostok    151 

wished  to  impress  me  with  the  fact  that  those 
who  were  trying  to  run  the  Government  of  the 
Pri-Amur  District  were  doing  so  conscientious- 
ly, and  not  with  any  idea  of  personal  gain  or 
emolument. 

We  probed  deeply  into  the  question  of  what 
Siberia  would  do  if  the  more  sober  element  con- 
tinued to  have  a  voice  in  governmental  affairs, 
while  wilder,  more  revolutionary  councils  con- 
tinued to  prevail  in  Petrograd.  That  part  of 
the  conversation  was  mostly  **ifs''  and  **buts.'* 
I  gathered  from  it,  nevertheless,  that  Agarev 
thought  the  extreme  Bolsheviki  element  would 
find  difficulty  in  carrying  Siberia  with  it  if  it 
went  too  far. 

Agarev  realised  the  value  of  the  friendship 
and  sympathy  of  America  and  deplored  the  no 
inconsiderable  amount  of  anti- American  feeling 
among  his  associates.  He  was  frank  to  say 
that  he  considered  that  there  was  much  of  plu- 
tocracy in  America,  and  that  it  needed  wiping 
out.  He  thought  that  the  imperialism  of  Eng- 
land and  the  capitalistic  control  in  France  were 
menaces  to  sound  international  fellowship. 
Plainly,  Agarev  saw  things  to  fight  in  Germany, 
things  to  fight  in  America,  things  to  fight  in 
England,  and  things  to  fight  in  France.  It  was 
hard  to  make  him  see  that  the  method  of  fight- 


152  Japan  or  Germany 

ing  these  various  conditions  with  which  he  and 
his  fellows  disagreed  must  be  a  different  meth- 
od for  each  one.  On  that  subject  Agarev  was 
consistent — foolishly  consistent.  When  I  ar- 
gued to  him  that  the  day  of  extreme  plutocracy 
in  America  was  beginning  to  close ;  that  the  im- 
perialism of  England  was  to-day — so  far  as  he 
understood  it  to  mean  a  policy  of  aggrandise- 
ment— a  thing  of  the  past,  and  that  he  was  all 
wrong  about  France,  he  listened  most  atten- 
tively. 

I  suggested  that  a  campaign  of  education  was 
what  was  needed  in  America  and  England  and 
France,  if  it  was  true  that  the  Russian  proleta- 
riat was  really  further  advanced  than  the  peo- 
ple of  those  countries.  When  I  pressed  home 
the  argument  that  a  campaign  of  education  was 
the  only  way  for  the  internationalists  to  gain 
ground,  Agarev  turned  back  to  his  contention 
that  what  was  needed  against  Germany,  more 
than  the  meagre  resistance  which  might  be 
made  against  the  German  army  by  the  scat- 
tered and  discouraged  and  disintegrated  Rus- 
sian legions,  was  a  campaign  of  education  to 
convert  the  Teutonic  labouring  man. 

On  most  subjects  I  could  talk  to  my  Russian 
friends  with  the  knowledge  that  they  tried  to  get 
my  viewpoint.  The  one  wall  which  I  was  always 


Agarev — Mayor  of  Vladivostok    153 

finding  across  my  path  was  the  ingrained 
belief  that  Germany  would  some  day  rise 
against  its  ruling  classes.  I  told  Agarev  that 
never  until  Russia  had  suffered  all  sorts  of  in- 
dignity at  the  hands  of  Germany — never  until 
a  German  army  had  swept  over  defenceless  Rus- 
sia— would  he  or  his  fellows  get  the  right  per- 
spective as  to  the  mind  of  the  German  working- 
man.  Educated  in  state  schools,  preached  at 
in  state  churches,  fed  with  state  pap  from  in- 
fancy, the  German  workingman  was  utterly 
misread  and  is  utterly  misread  by  the  Russian 
workingman.    Germany  has  seen  to  that. 

Agarev 's  summary  of  the  situation  political- 
ly in  Russia  was  somewhat  different  than  that 
which  I  encountered  elsewhere.  He  drew  up 
a  little  table  for  me,  beginning  with  the  Tempo- 
rary Government  and  writing  under  that  the 
Temporary  Council  of  the  Republic.  Under 
that  came  the  Central  Administrative  Commit- 
tee, and  then  drawing  a  long  line,  he  said, 
**  These  three  are  but  the  froth  on  the  real  power 
of  Russia;  the  real  power  lies  along  this  line 
below.''  He  wrote  three  captions  along  that 
lower  line:  one  was  the  Council  of  Workmen's 
and  Soldiers'  Deputies;  next  was  the  Central 
Committee  of  the  Fleets,  and  the  third  was  the 
Council  of  Peasant's  Deputies. 


154  Japan  or  Germany 

**It  has  taken  the  outside  world  too  long  to 
realise  that  the  real  power  in  Eussia  lies  in 
the  hands  of  the  people's  committees,"  said 
Agarev.  **The  temporary  government  is,  in  a 
sense,  only  exploiting  the  real  power  of  Rus- 
sia. Temporary  governments  may  come  and 
go,  but  so  long  as  there  is  a  Russia,  the  power 
will  be  in  the  people.  They  may  not  know  how 
to  wield  it.  It  may  take  them  years  to  be  able 
to  express  and  organise  that  power.  Dark  days 
may  be  ahead,  but  the  coming  of  a  better  day  is 
sure." 

Agarev  told  me  that  of  all  the  political  par- 
ties in  Russia  there  were  only  half  a  dozen  that 
cut  much  figure.  He  would  divide  all  the  politi- 
cal elements  in  Russia  into  two  groups,  the  In^ 
ternationalists  and  the  Protectionists.  On  a 
writing  pad  he  drew  out  his  groups,  placing  the 
Internationalists  on  the  left  and  the  Protection- 
ists on  the  right.  The  extreme  right  were  the 
Cadets ;  next  to  them  came  the  right  section  of 
the  Socialist  Revolutionaries.  The  third  group 
of  the  Protectionist  element  was  the  right  wing 
of  the  Social  Democrats. 

The  left,  the  Internationalists,  he  divided  into 
three  groups  likewise.  The  extreme  left,  the 
Bolsheviks,  he  said,  were  many  of  them  So- 
cial Democrats,  whose  views  were  less  extreme 


Agarev — Mayor  of  Vladivostok    155 

than  people  thought.  Next  in  authority  in  Pet- 
rograd  came  the  Maximalists,  who  were,  ac- 
cording to  Agarev,  the  left  wing  of  the  Socialist 
Revolutionaries.  His  third  section  of  Interna- 
tionalists was  the  left  wing  of  the  Social  Demo- 
crats, which  he  termed  Minimalists,  and  to 
which,  I  gathered,  he  belonged. 

Agarev  was  satisfied  that  Lenin  was  not  a 
traitor  to  Russia,  nor  bought  with  German  gold. 
Agarev  was  against  many  of  Lenin's  policies. 

The  agitation  that  the  Bolsheviki  were  carry- 
ing on  against  the  Allies,  did  not  get  much  sym- 
pathy in  Siberia.  At  least,  many  Russians  in 
Siberia  were  less  rabid  against  the  forms  of 
government  which  the  Allies  enjoyed  than  were 
the  Bolsheviki  of  European  Russia.  Another 
point  of  divergence  between  the  extreme  Bol- 
shevik group  and  the  Social  Democrats  of  Si- 
beria was  the  question  of  the  complete  social- 
isation of  industrial  concerns  and  the  imme- 
diate confiscation  of  private  property.  While 
Agarev 's  views  on  these  two  points  would  be 
considered  extremely  radical,  they  were  not  an- 
archistic. He  wanted  to  see  a  certain  amount 
of  nationalisation  of  big  businesses,  and  he  also 
wanted  to  see  the  land  taken  from  the  large 
land  owners  and  the  peasantry  of  the  country 
given  a  chance  to  administer  it.     He  would 


156  Japan  or  Germany 

reach  neither  goal,  however,  by  hurried  or  un- 
fair means.  It  was  just  those  little  differences, 
.between  the  Bolshevik  view  in  Russia  and  the 
view  of  Agarev,  those  he  represented  and  those 
with  whom  he  was  grouped  in  Siberia,  which 
showed  the  difference  between  the  Russian 
point  of  view  and  the  Siberian  point  of  view. 
It  may  have  been  hard  sometimes  to  see  the 
actual  difference,  but  it  existed  nevertheless  and 
was  always  cropping  up. 

I  think  that  Agarev  hoped  some  day  to  see 
complete  socialisation  of  industrial  enterprises 
in  Russia.  He  was  certainly  very  much  in  fa- 
vour of  an  immediate  peace,  if  an  honourable 
peace  could  be  gained.  His  views  on  such  topics 
were  not  in  accord  with  those  of  most  of  us 
from  the  Western  World,  but  his  attitude  to- 
ward them  and  toward  us  was  such  that  friendly 
co-operation  and  mutual  understanding  was  by 
no  means  impossible.  The  very  fact  that 
Agarev  and  the  best  political  elements  in  Si- 
beria were  tolerant  of  the  idea  that  some  one 
beside  the  workingmen  themselves  might  have 
a  voice  in  things  to  do  with  government  and  ad- 
ministration was  a  much  more  happy  state  of 
affairs  than  one  found  in  Petrograd  or  Moscow. 

As  we  concluded  our  conversation,  Agarev 
stood  beside  me  and  said,  *  *  It  is  a  big  problem 


Agarev — Mayor  of  Vladivostok    157 

for  us  and  we  are  new  to  it.  We  want  so  mucli 
to  do  right.  We  want  so  much  to  avoid  making 
mistakes.  That  we  will  never  be  able  to  do. 
If  you  great  people  of  America  will  give  us 
sympathy  and  assistance,  if  you  will  be  patient 
with  us  and  try  to  understand  us,  if  you  will  not 
become  angry  and  disgusted  with  us  because 
we  make  mistakes  in  the  beginning,  it  will 
help  us  wonderfully  to  pull  through.  We  are 
going  to  win  in  the  end,  in  this  generation  or 
the  next,  or  possibly  in  some  generation  unborn. 
There  is  too  much  good  in  Russia — it  will  not 
be  entirely  lost." 

Agarev  took  my  hand  in  his,  and  I  looked 
straight  into  his  clear,  grey  eyes, — patient  eyes, 
eyes  that  held  in  them  some  unconscious  antici- 
pation of  trouble  ahead.  I  felt  a  lump  in  my 
throat  a^  I  tried  to  tell  him  that  there  are  many 
of  us  who  sympathised  but  little  with  hosts  of 
his  ideas  and  methods,  but  back  of  it  all  our 
eyes  were  on  a  very  similar  goal,  our  hearts 
were  in  a  very  similar  fight. 

I  could  not  walk  down  the  crowded  stairway 
and  out  into  the  bright  sun  and  clear  crisp  air 
of  Vladivostok  without  a  vague  restless  feeling 
that  trouble  lay  ahead  for  Agarev  and  his  kind. 
The  Bolsheviki  element  with  its  catch  phrases 
was  gaining  the  ear  of  the  people.     German 


158  Japan  or  Germany 

propaganda,  hard  at  work  in  Siberia,  as  else- 
where, was  assisting  the  overthrow  of  the  Mini- 
malist group,  and  the  ultimate  domination  of 
the  Maximalists  or  even  of  the  Bolsheviki. 

But  so  long  as  there  are  men  like  Agarev, 
who  are  fighting  to  save  Siberia,  no  man  can 
withhold  his  sympathy,  advice  and  such  assist- 
ance as  he  may  be  able  to  give. 

To  what  good  end?  God  knows.  Without 
sympathy  and  assistance,  without  a  word  of 
guidance  here  and  a  word  of  admonition  there, 
what  good  lies  in  such  men  and  their  work  may 
be  irretrievably  lost.  Every  atom  of  that  good 
which  we  can  save,  Russia  needs — Siberia 
needs.  Who  would  withhold  help,  if  there  is 
even  a  fighting  chance  that  some  of  the  seed 
may  take  root  and  one  day  bear  flower! 


THE  TRANS-SIBERIAN  TRANS 
PORTATION  PROBLEM 


CHAPTER  IX 

The  Trans-Sibekian  Transportation  Problem 

It  is  easy  to  criticise  the  actions  of  a  man  or 
a  group  as  regards  their  handling  of  the  affairs 
of  the  community.  It  is  much  more  difficult 
to  try  to  understand  and  appreciate  the  real 
fundamental  reasons  for  the  action  of  such 
people.  To  know  just  what  the  Committee  of 
Public  Safety,  the  Council  of  Soldiers'  and 
Workmen's  Deputies  in  Vladivostok  and  Mayor 
Agarev,  with  his  assistants  in  the  municipal 
government,  might  have  been  expected  to  have 
been  able  to  effect  in  connection  with  their  ef- 
forts toward  a  government  of  the  people,  by 
the  people  and  for  the  people  in  the  Pri-Amur, 
it  is  necessary  to  glance  at  the  picture  which 
Vladivostok  and  Siberia  presented  when  the 
revolution  in  Petrograd  drifted  out  across  the 
Steppes  and  into  the  Russian  Far  East. 

Never  in  the  history  of  the  country  had  it 
known  decent  constructive  government.  Was 
it  to  have  any  better  form  of  government  under 

161 


i62  Japan  or  Germany 

the  revolutionary  regime!  If  not,  if  the  most 
conscientious  efforts  on  the  part  of  a  group  of 
really  honest  citizens  could  not  bring  order 
out  of  chaos,  were  they  more  to  be  deserving 
of  condemnation  or  of  sympathy? 

Let  us  first  see  the  conditions  which  they  had 
to  face  when  they  took  upon  themselves  the  task 
of  untangling  the  ravelled  skein  of  political  af- 
fairs and  the  absolute  chaos  of  economic  condi- 
tions, into  which  the  Far  Northeast  had  been 
plunged. 

Never  since  the  completion  of  the  Trans-Si- 
berian Railway  has  its  administration  and 
operation  been  other  than  painfully  inefficient. 

The  old  bureaucratic  Russia  under  the  Ro- 
manoffs knew  this  well.  Moreover,  the  bureau- 
crats knew  the  vital  importance  of  the  Trans- 
Siberian  Railway  to  Russia  in  the  great  war 
that  commenced  in  1914,  and  no  steps  were 
taken  to  remedy  a  situation  which  must,  by 
the  very  nature  of  things,  have  resulted  sooner 
or  later  in  an  almost  complete  breakdown  of 
the  system. 

Not  only  the  general  facts,  but  a  great  num- 
ber of  specific  instances,  may  be  cited  to  show 
that  a  pro-German  element  had  a  finger  in  the 
Trans-Siberian  Railroad  pie.  All  the  disor- 
ganisation and  all  the  delay  was  not  to  be  put 


Trans-Siberian  Problem        163 

solely  upon  incompetency.  Sometimes  the  sin- 
ister hand  of  some  German  operator  behind 
the  scenes  might  be  discovered  pulling  wires 
that  made  the  transportation  of  goods  from 
Siberia  to  Eussia  more  and  more  impossible  as 
the  war  went  on. 

In  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  administration  of 
the  Trans-Siberian  road  was  inherently  faulty 
during  the  first  eighteen  months  of  the  war, 
the  Siberian  railway  system,  as  a  whole,  proved 
more  adequate  to  the  demands  that  had  been 
put  upon  it  than  one  who  knew  the  system  might 
have  anticipated. 

The  Eussian  railway  employe  of  certain 
grades  is  by  no  means  a  bad  railway  man.  The 
better  type  of  railroad  employe  was  working 
hard  to  try  to  achieve  the  maximum  possible, 
and  his  efforts  bore  fruit. 

Early  in  1915  the  immense  amount  of  goods 
that  were  shipped  to  Vladivostok  resulted  in 
some  congestion  there.  Efficient  and  capable 
local  officials  grappled  with  the  trouble  in  a 
bold  manner  and  in  spite  of  Petrograd,  rather 
than  with  its  assistance,  succeeded  in  tempo- 
rarily cleaning  up  the  difficulty. 

When  1916  came,  however,  a  very  difficult 
situation  had  to  be  faced.  In  January  of  that 
year  the  railway  was  working  at  very  high 


164  Japan  or  Germany 

pressure.  Its  full  capacity  at  that  time  allowed 
two  hundred  cars,  carrying  one  thousand 
poods  each,  of  through  traffic  goods  to  leave 
Vladivostok  each  day,  in  addition  to  which,  in 
some  qf  the  early  months  of  1916  one  hundred 
wagons  left  Vladivostok  daily  loaded  with  rail- 
way material. 

Of  the  two  hundred  cars  which  left  for  the 
West  daily,  one  hundred  and  sixty  were  set 
aside  for  goods  and  materials  which  were  the 
property  of  the  government,  leaving  a  remain- 
ing forty  for  the  goods  of  private  firms  and 
shippers. 

This  distinction  between  government  goods 
and  the  goods  of  business  houses  was  not  an 
important  one,  for  the  reason  that  the  latter 
included  metals,  machinery,  leather,  rubber, 
tanning  extract,  chemicals  and  such  commodi- 
ties which  were,  for  the  most  part,  consigned 
to  factories  which  were  busy  with  government 
work  or  to  indispensable  industries. 

Vladivostok  has  had  dumped  upon  it,  since 
the  beginning  of  the  war,  an  amount  of  cargo 
far  in  excess  of  the  capacity  of  the  port,  but 
the  proportion  of  the  material  which  could  be 
described  as  useless  toward  the  prosecution  of 
the  war  is  a  negligible  quantity.  Few  luxuries 
or  articles  that  were  not  necessary  to  the  life 


Trans-Siberian  Problem        165 

of  the  nation  or  the  life  of  the  people  have 
passed  over  the  Trans-Siberian  Eailway  dur- 
ing the  World  War. 

The  end  of  January,  1916,  saw  the  beginning 
of  a  congestion  in  the  Port  of  Vladivostok 
which  was  to  reach  proportions  beyond  the  im- 
agination of  any  one  in  Siberia.  At  that  time 
exclusive  of  government  materials,  some  six- 
teen thousand  tons  of  privately  owned  goods 
had  been  gathered  in  the  port,  mostly  consisting 
of  tea  and  cotton.  No  sooner  had  the  spring  of 
1916  opened  than  the  steamers  began  to  crowd 
the  quays  and  anchorages  all  about.  They  came 
laden  for  the  most  part  with  cotton,  saltpetre, 
powder  and  barbed  wire.  The  last  day  of  Feb- 
ruary saw  the  government  goods  still  moving 
out  of  Vladivostok  toward  the  West,  but  the  pri- 
vately owned  goods  were  piling  up  fast  and 
warehouse  accommodation  was  soon  threatened. 

During  March  the  last  of  the  go-down  space 
was  filled.  First  cotton,  then  gunnies,  then  rub- 
ber in  great  quantities  began  to  be  stored  in  the 
open.  There  was  no  other  place  to  put  it. 
Mid-March  saw  fifty  thousand  tons  of  private 
cargo  safely  landed  but  with  no  prospect  of 
being  shipped  over  the  railway.  By  the  1st  of 
June  there  were  eighty  thousand  tons  of  pri- 
vate  cargo   and   much   more   of   government 


1 66  Japan  or  Germany 

goods.  The  amount  grew  steadily  until  the 
early  part  of  1917,  when  there  was  a  slight  tem- 
porary diminution  in  the  tonnage. 

All  this  time  the  government  cargo  was  being 
handled  in  some  sort  of  way,  although  the  num- 
ber of  the  freight  cars  available  was  steadily 
dropping.  In  June,  metals,  lathes  and  Red 
Cross  materials  were  piled  high  on  the  quay- 
side and  in  the  fields  adjacent  to  the  ware- 
houses. Then  came  July  with  conditions  grow- 
ing worse  daily. 

The  top  had  to  be  reached  some  time.  Ship- 
ping was  diverted  and  ordered  stopped,  but  not 
before  674,000  tons  of  cargo  was  piled  promis- 
cuously here  and  there  in  the  open  spaces,  and 
the  fields  around  the  Port  of  Vladivostok. 
Small  imports  cut  this  down  in  the  latter  part 
of  1917  and  the  work  of  the  Stevens  Railway 
Commission  resulted  in  an  increase  of  efficiency 
on  the  part  of  the  railway  service,  which  cleared 
up  a  proportion  of  the  goods  but  the  greater 
part  of  them  still  lie  in  Vladivostok  to-day. 

An  inspection  of  the  piles  of  goods  and  ma- 
terials showed  that  an  inevitable  amount  of  loss 
and  damage  had  resulted  from  the  lack  of  pro- 
tection which  had  been  accorded  the  cargoes. 

Railway  material,  nitrate  of  soda,  barbed 
wire,  tea,  phosphates  and  munitions  caused  the 


Trans-Siberian  Problem        167 

greatest  congestion.  Next  came  metals,  rice, 
cotton,  machines  and  lathes,  tanning  extract, 
oils,  rubber,  tallow,  gunnies  and  motor  cars.  It 
was  pitiable  to  walk  tbrougb  those  piles  on  piles 
of  indispensable  materials.  The  rolling  stock 
of  the  railway  had  been  allowed  to  get  into  dis- 
repair to  an  extent  which  made  it  certain  that 
until  the  results  of  the  recommendations  of  the 
Stevens  Commission  were  felt — long  months  in 
the  future — the  available  freight  capacity  would 
continue  to  be  miserably  inadequate. 

It  was  inevitable  that  the  state  of  things 
which  existed  in  Vladivostok  should  have  re- 
sulted in  strenuous  efforts  on  the  part  of  in- 
terested parties  to  obtain  preference  of  the  ship- 
ment of  the  goods  in  which  they  were  inter- 
ested. Up  to  the  end  of  1916  the  heads  of  the 
government  departments  and  the  Commandant 
of  the  Fortress  of  Vladivostok  had  control  of 
the  disposal  of  the  railway  wagons.  Working 
as  a  committee  they  were  guided  by  general 
instructions  received  from  Petrograd,  but  full 
power  as  to  the  allotment  of  space  was  left  in 
local  hands.  The  forty  cars  daily  which  were 
set  aside  for  private  cargo  were  jealously 
watched,  the  Vladivostok  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce assisting  the  conunittee  with  its  allot- 


i68  Japan  or  Germany 

ments.  No  favouritism,  or  at  least  very  little, 
existed. 

The  difficulties  increased  when  toward  the 
autumn  of  1916  the  forty  cars  daily  were  re- 
duced to  twenty-five  cars  or  less.  Siberian  mer- 
chants found  themselves  in  a  critical  position. 
Most  of  them  sought  to  pull  wires  of  every 
sort  to  obtain  car  space.  The  usual  method  of 
gaining  an  advantage  over  a  competitor  was  to 
conspire  with  minor  railway  officials.  Go-be- 
tweens, rumour  said,  coined  money  in  connec- 
tion with  such  transactions.  The  Russian  au- 
thorities made  no  little  effort  to  catch  offend- 
ers, but  without  any  noticeable  success.  Every 
one  knew  that  crooked  work  was  the  rule  rather 
than  the  exception.  One  of  the  favourite  de- 
vices of  the  merchants  was  to  arrange  with  the 
railway  employes  to  load  unauthorised  cargo 
at  wayside  stations  in  the  vicinity  of  Vladivos- 
tok. Another  common  practice  was  for  the 
merchant  to  obtain  orders  for  forwarding  a  cer- 
tain class  of  goods  and  despatch  others  in  their 
place.  Unutilised  space  in  freight  cars  which 
contained  bulky  goods  was  snapped  up  with 
avidity. 

This  condition  of  things  went  on  for  months 
and  was  ample  evidence  of  a  bad  organisation, 
both  of  the  police  in  Vladivostok  and  the  rail- 


V        Trans-Siberian  Problem        169 

way  company  itself.  The  rectification  of  abuses 
was  continually  proposed  but  never  carried  into 
effect.  As  regarded  the  prosecution  of  the  war, 
the  question  of  whether  a  private  cargo  or  gov- 
ernment cargo  was  forwarded  was  not  of  the 
greatest  importance,  however.  When  the  total 
tonnage  of  goods  shipped  was  taken  into  con- 
sideration, the  amount  of  cargo  that  found  its 
way  over  the  railway  was  almost  without  ex- 
ception destined  for  indispensable  industries. 
Russia  needed  the  goods,  whether  they  were 
the  property  of  the  government  or  of  outside 
firms. 

At  the  end  of  December,  1916,  an  order  came 
from  Petrograd  to  Vladivostok  that  all  wagons 
available  should  be  utilised  for  the  shipment 
of  government  materials.  No  other  goods  were 
to  be  forwarded  unless  a  ^^naryacV' — a  des- 
patch order — from  Petrograd  had  been  obtain- 
ed. Two  months  before  orders  had  come  from 
Petrograd  closing  the  Port  of  Vladivostok  to 
private  cargo  unless  it  was  shipped  under  spe- 
cial permits.  Had  this  order  been  religiously 
obeyed — it  was  dated  October  29th,  1916 — a 
good  end  would  have  been  served.  For  some 
reason  it  was  not  put  into  execution  for  months. 
Most  of  the  private  cargo  that  came  in,  if  not  all 
of  it,  subsequent  to  the  issuance  of  this  decree, 


170  Japan  or  Germany 

came  from  Japan.  Some  feeling  was  caused  in 
the  Orient  by  the  fact  that  the  business  houses 
of  most  of  the  Allies  recognised  that  a  difficult 
situation  had  arisen  and  co-operated  to  the 
fullest  extent  to  assist.  The  Japanese  were 
more  interested  in  the  profits  that  might  be 
obtained  than  in  assisting  the  Russian  situa- 
tion. This  applied  to  the  Japanese  houses 
rather  than  to  the  Japanese  government,  which 
had  always  shown  an  inclination  to  play  the 
game  with  Russia  in  the  Far  East  during  the 
war. 

The  coming  of  the  Stevens  Commission  from 
America  was  the  only  ray  of  light  on  a  very 
black  horizon.  The  situation  which  was  found 
by  the  American  railway  men  was  not  hopeful. 

First,  the  Siberian  Railway  was  wasteful  and 
inefficient  in  almost  every  particular.  Never 
in  peace  times  was  rolling  stock  on  the  railway 
handled  in  the  best  way,  and  during  the  war  the 
administration  had  become  increasingly  worse. 
While  the  government  at  Petrograd  was  in- 
clined to  blame  Vladivostok  to  some  extent  for 
the  congestion  of  the  railway,  it  was  not  the 
inadequacy  of  the  Port  of  Vladivostok  itself 
which  had  been  the  primary  cause  of  the 
trouble.  Only  a  slight  investigation  was  neces- 
sary to  prove  that  ships  that  had  come   to 


Trans-Siberian  Problem        171 

Vladivostok  had  fairly  good  despatch  all 
through,  until  those  days  had  come  when  the 
railway  had  broken  down  and  the  ships  con- 
tinued to  arrive  in  increasing  numbers. 

That  no  covered  accommodation  existed  for 
the  cargoes,  that  no  tarpaulins  were  to  be  had, 
that  goods  had  to  be  piled  promiscuously  on 
the  quays,  in  the  fields  by  the  water's  edge  and 
all  over  the  hillsides  adjacent  to  the  coast,  that 
the  ground  all  about  the  basin  of  the  bay  be- 
came strewn  with  all  manner  of  stuff,  that  load- 
ed lighters  were  untouched  for  weeks  and  that 
steamers  which  after  a  long  fight  gained  a  berth 
alongside  the  quay  could  find  no  open  place  on 
which  to  deliver  goods  from  their  slings  was 
the  result  of  circumstances  with  which  Vladi- 
vostok could  not  be  expected  to  cope.  There 
was  little  at  fault  so  far  as  Vladivostok  was 
concerned. 

The  Stevens  Commission  probed  quickly  to 
the  heart  of  the  matter  and  in  very  short  time 
found  the  sore.    It  was  not  at  Vladivostok. 

Against  the  good  working  of  the  Siberian 
Kailway  stood  the  fundamental  fact  that  the 
long  line  from  Petrograd  to  Vladivostok — over 
5,500  miles — ^was  made  up  of  five  separate  rail- 
ways, each  of  which  had  its  own  independent 
administration   and   its   own  headquarters   in 


172  Japan  or  Germany 

Petrograd.  This  division  of  control  had  never 
been  properly  co-ordinated  and  overlapping 
was  continuous.  Each  section  was  interested 
in  itself  only  and  had  nothing  to  do  with  the 
other  four  sections. 

The  Chinese  Eastern  Railway  was  not  badly 
handled.  The  part  of  the  line  from  Vladivostok 
to  Tchita,  while  it  might  be  improved,  was  capa- 
ble of  much  better  work  as  it  stood  than  were 
some  other  parts  of  the  line.  The  weakest 
point  of  all  was  the  Tomsk  Railway.  From  the 
very  beginning  it  had  been  absolutely  unable 
to  cope  with  the  demand.  In  the  centre  of  the 
great  trans-continental  system,  its  weakness 
was  the  weakness  of  the  whole  line.  From  the 
commencement  of  the  w^ar  every  head  of  the  rail- 
way department  in  Petrograd  must  have  known 
how  rotten  the  Tomsk  railway  administration 
had  become  and  he  must  have  known  too  of  the 
vital  importance  of  the  whole  system  to  the  con- 
duct of  the  war.  Yet  examination  of  the  orders 
issued  by  the  Minister  of  Ways  and  Communi- 
cations shows  that  they  were  so  hopelessly  bu- 
reaucratic that  no  prospect  of  reform  was  evi- 
dent. 

As  an  example  of  the  manner  in  which  this 
Minister  made  fatal  errors,  the  coal  traffic 
through  Siberia  into  Russia  had  gone  from  east 


Trans-Siberian  Problem        173 

to  west.  With  coal  in  plentiful  quantities  at 
various  points  along  the  line  there  was  abso- 
lutely no  excuse  for  this.  Coal  should  have 
come  from  west  to  east  in  the  empty  wagons 
that  were  being  hurried  back  to  Vladivostok 
to  come  westward  again  loaded  with  war  ma- 
terial. 

The  apparent  keynote  of  the  trouble  on  the 
Trans-Siberian  Eailway  was  shortage  of  rail- 
way wagons,  locomotives  and  general  railway 
rolling  stock.  Repair  had  been  hampered  since 
the  beginning  of  the  war  and  all  railway  prop- 
erty had  gotten  into  a  deplorable  state.  The 
first  cars  to  come  to  Siberia  from  America  were 
ordered  by  the  Russian  Commission  before  the 
arrival  of  the  Stevens  Commission  in  Russia. 
The  Russian  Commission  had  ordered  less  than 
two  hundred  engines  and  cars,  but  the  demand 
for  more  was  so  evident  at  the  outset  that  be- 
fore the  Stevens  Commission  reached  Russia, 
it  ordered  the  construction  of  three  times  the 
number  of  engines  and  ten  times  the  number 
of  cars  that  had  been  ordered  by  the  Russian 
Commission.  Even  this  amount  of  rolling 
stock  was  only  a  drop  in  the  bucket.  The  Rus- 
sian railway  people  at  Vladivostok  expected 
that  the  arrival  of  this  rolling  stock  from  Amer- 
ica under  the  orders  placed  in  1915,  would  be 


174  Japan  or  Germany 

followed  immediately  by  further  consignments 
of  wagons  and  locomotives.  Further  they 
never  dreamed  that  so  few  freight  cars  would 
come  back  to  them  from  Russia.  That  men  in 
charge  in  Vladivostok  were  able  to  grasp  the 
new  situation  and  struggle  strenuously  with  it 
was  shown  by  the  fact  that  when  it  became 
known  in  Siberia  that  the  order  for  cars  and 
engiaes  to  be  built  in  America  had  not  been 
supplemented  by  further  orders  and  would  not 
be  until  the  Stevens  Commission  had  investi- 
gated the  matter  at  first  hand,  warehouses  were 
at  once  started.  In  December,  1916,  the  Vladi- 
vostok authorities  decided  to  build  82,000  square 
yards  of  new  go-downs.  This  was  too  late,  of 
course,  to  save  some  of  the  cargo  from  dam- 
age, but  the  work  was  proceeded  with  boldly 
and  with  considerable  success.  The  work  that 
has  actually  been  performed  in  Vladivostok, 
considering  the  situation  into  which  the  officials 
there  were  thrust,  reflects  credit  on  those  who 
had  a  hand  in  the  job. 

It  was  strange,  indeed,  that  no  fires  of  mag- 
nitude took  place,  when  so  many  combustible 
piles  of  goods  were  spread  about  in  the  open. 
Four  small  fires  did  occur,  the  largest  taking 
place  in  March,  1917.  On  that  occasion  piles 
of  ammunition  were  lying  in  close  proximity 


Trans-Siberian  Problem        175 

to  a  wharf  where  artillery  supplies  were  being 
discharged.  At  the  next  berth  were  piles  of 
nitrate.  Close  by  great  stacks  of  crated  cotton 
caught  fire.  It  was  providential  that  the  wind 
bore  the  flames  and  sparks  away  from  the  ni- 
trate, the  ammunition  and  the  artillery  supplies, 
otherwise  an  immense  amount  of  devastation 
would  have  taken  place. 

The  Port  Commandant,  realising  the  danger, 
lost  no  time  in  procuring  three  good  motor  fire 
engines  and  a  number  of  tugboats  equipped 
with  powerful  pumps. 

The  Stevens  Commission  had  to  face  the  fact 
that  Vladivostok  had  seen  1,840,000  tons  of 
cargo  arrive  in  1916.  I  checked  over  some  of 
the  railway  figures  in  Vladivostok  and  tried  to 
get  an  idea  of  how  many  sixteen-ton  wagons  ac- 
tually left  for  the  west  each  day.  On  one  day 
in  September,  1916,  103  cars  left.  Three  days 
in  October  showed  166,  96  and  177,  respectively. 
In  November,  one  day  saw  40  leave  and  an- 
other 108.  Two  checkings  in  December  showed 
90  and  71.  An  average  day  in  January,  1917, 
saw  but  31  depart,  while  three  days  in  Feb- 
ruary gave  the  following  figures,  51,  94,  and 
136.  So  they  ran  on.  Two  days  in  March 
showed  69  and  66.  Two  days  in  April,  51  and 
70.    Two  in  May,  81  and  139.    Two  in  June,  118 


176  Japan  or  Germany 

and  103.  Two  in  July  129  and  102 ;  two  in  Au- 
gust, 49  and  38 ;  two  in  September,  94  and  96. 
Under  the  plans  made  by  the  Stevens  Com- 
mission, three  hundred  wagons  as  a  minimum 
were  to  leave  Vladivostok  daily  and  it  was  ex- 
pected that  the  number  would  be  increased  to 
four  hundred.  The  original  plan  was  to  supply 
many  thousand  wagons,  thousands  of  locomo- 
tives and  thousands  of  coal  cars.  Plans  were 
made  to  erect  these  at  Vladivostok,  in  numbers 
of  hundreds  per  day.  The  scheme  was  an  ambi- 
tious one  and  meant  the  arrival  in  Vladivostok 
of  a  million  tons  of  cargo,  including  a  half  mil- 
lion tons  of  rails.  This  would  necessitate  the 
employment  of  three  hundred  steamers  for  six 
months,  at  the  rate  of  fifty  per  month,  allowing 
16  to  19  days '  time  for  discharge,  and  that  very 
little  else  would  come  into  Vladivostok  for  six 
months  except  railway  material.  The  labour 
question  presented  all  sorts  of  difficulties  in  this 
connection.  The  Chinese  are  the  best  available 
class  of  labour,  and  at  first  the  Kussians  were 
not  inclined  to  let  the  Chinese  labour  come  in. 
This  was  gotten  over  somewhat,  however,  by 
the  proposal  of  the  Chinese  to  join  the  Kussian 
labour  union.  I  asked  one  of  the  American  rail- 
way men,  who  was  best  qualified  to  judge,  what 


Trans-Siberian  Problem        177 

he  thought  of  the  average  Russian  railway  en- 
gineer. 

*  *  He  is  a  good  employe  and  a  good  workman 
and  knows  how  to  handle  his  engine,"  was  the 
reply. 

The  Americans  were  somewhat  amused  at 
the  system  that  obtained  of  one  man  to  one 
engine.  When  the  engineer  slept,  the  engine 
slept.  Thus,  due  to  the  fact  that  but  one  driver 
was  allowed  to  handle  one  locomotive,  the  en- 
gine would  only  cover  two  thousand  miles  in 
the  space  of  time  in  which  it  might  be  expected 
to  travel  three  thousand.  Examination  of  re- 
pair books  and  records  showed  that  the  percen- 
tages of  **sick''  engines  were  not  high.  This 
was  evidence  that  the  Russian  railway  engi- 
neer took  good  care  of  his  machine. 

When  the  American  Railway  Commission 
reached  Petrograd,  it  sought  to  ascertain  the 
theory  upon  which  empties  were  sent  back  from 
Russia  to  Vladivostok,  but  no  man  could  make 
much  headway  with  the  tangle  into  which  things 
had  gotten  along  this  line.  All  Russian  rail- 
ways were  short  of  rolling  stock,  and  the  Trans- 
Siberian  Railway  had  to  suffer  in  consequence. 
A  committee  handled  the  disposition  of  the 
empties  and  gave  orders  for  their  despatch  to 
various  centres  and  over  various  roads.     A 


178  Japan  or  Germany 

Russian  friend  of  mine  spent  all  one  night  prov- 
ing to  me  that  this  committee  was  actuated  by 
pro-German  sentiment,  if  in  fact  it  was  not  paid 
by  German  gold.  He  could  produce  no  little 
evidence  of  actions  on  the  part  of  the  committee 
which  looked  very  much  as  though  they  were 
deliberately  planned  to  hamper  the  efficient 
working  of  the  railway.  I  could  sympathise 
with  his  point  of  view,  and  whether  or  not  the 
committee  could  be  convicted  of  effort  to  help 
Germany,  the  Boche  had  the  assistance,  indi- 
rectly. 

Stevens  came  to  the  conclusion  that  young 
American  railway  men  as  general  superintend- 
ents, heads  of  the  engineering  departments  and 
general  managers,  as  well  as  chief  despatchers 
and  line  superintendents  would  be  invaluable  to 
the  Trans-Siberian  Railway.  The  Russians 
seemed  eager  and  anxious  to  learn,  and  were 
only  waiting  for  the  coming  of  some  one  who 
could  teach  them.  In  spite  of  the  shortage  of 
railway  men  which  the  coming  of  the  war  would 
make  inevitable  in  America,  some  three  hundred 
picked  men  were  sent  from  the  United  States 
to  Vladivostok  in  1917.  For  various  reasons 
they  were  diverted  temporarily  to  Japan  in- 
stead of  commencing  their  work  of  reorganisa- 
tion in  Siberia. 


Trans-Siberian  Problem        179 

The  outbreak  of  the  Eevolution  in  1917  and 
the  formation  of  the  Conunittee  of  Public  Safety 
in  Vladivostok  had  but  little  effect  at  first  on 
the  railway  situation.  A  new  Commissioner 
from  Petrograd  was  started  eastward  to  take 
over  the  administration  of  the  railway  and  con- 
trol the  despatch  of  goods  from  Vladivostok. 
This  Commissioner,  Petrograd  decreed,  was  to 
be  assisted  by  a  committee  formed  from  the 
heads  of  local  departments  and  such  public 
bodies  as  the  Committee  of  Public  Safety  and 
the  Council  of  Soldiers'  and  Workmen's  Depu- 
ties. Pending  the  arrival  of  this  Commissioner, 
the  Commandant  of  the  Fortress  was  in  charge 
of  all  shipping  matters  and  his  chief  assistance 
came  from  the  transport  section  of  the  Com- 
mittee of  Public  Safety.  This  sub-committee 
was  formed  by  the  main  body  solely  to  prevent 
abuses  on  the  railway.  Some  of  the  Soldiers' 
and  Workmen's  Deputies  who  could  be  found 
advising  matters  relating  to  shipping  and  trans- 
port knew  nothing  whatever  of  the  work  in 
hand,  and  had  no  knowledge  of  either  railway 
or  steamship  lines.  Their  interference  was 
sometimes  annoying,  but  for  the  most  part  they 
were  content  with  seeing  that  matters  were 
conducted  in  accordance  with  their  idea  of 
fairness  and  right. 


THE  FANATIC  ELEMENT 


CHAPTER  X 
The  Fanatic  Element 

As  the  months  of  1917  rolled  by  it  became  evi- 
dent that  the  more  rabid  element  among  the 
Eussian  politicians  was  gaining  strength  rather 
than  losing  in  Vladivostok. 

The  average  business  man  in  the  city  would 
tell  you,  with  a  shrug  of  his  shoulders  or  a  ges- 
ture of  despair,  that  the  worst  element  among 
the  people  had  gotten  hold  of  the  reins  of  gov- 
ernment. In  Vladivostok  I  came  into  contact 
with  several  men,  whose  judgment  should  have 
been  sound,  who  had  become  hopeless  regarding 
the  situation.  The  chief  difficulty  in  trying  to 
get  an  accurate  line  on  just  how  matters  stood 
was  the  unreliability  of  report.  Some  Russian 
would  tell  me  that  the  people  in  power  politi- 
cally were  anxious  to  split  up  all  the  property 
in  the  town,  immediately  and  without  compen- 
sation to  owners  of  land  or  buildings.  Others 
denied  that  this  was  the  case. 

I  became  somewhat  curious  to  know  just  what 

183 


184  Japan  or  Germany 

was  being  advocated  by  the  Eussians  in  Vladi- 
vostok who  were  closest  in  touch  with  affairs 
and  who  were  in  the  seat  of  government,  if  not 
the  seat  of  power. 

Great  care  had  to  be  taken  in  ascertaining 
whether  or  not  a  Russian  politician  was  a  rep- 
resentative of  the  government  at  Petrograd 
or  was  one  of  the  Vladivostok  crowd.  One  of 
the  first  things  I  learned  about  the  Russian 
element  who  were  closest  to  the  government 
was  that  they  were  men  from  entirely  different 
classes.  I  knew  one  sober,  thoughtful  fellow, 
who  had  never  been  in  the  least  an  agitator, 
who  had  worked  hard  in  America  and  come  back 
to  Russia  with  an  honest  desire  to  serve  his  fel- 
low-men. Closely  associated  with  him  was  one 
of  the  most  visionary  and  erratic  anarchists 
with  whom  I  have  ever  met.  These  men  dis- 
agreed on  many  points,  but  hung  together  on 
some  fundamental  theories,  with  which  their 
minds  were  both  full.  It  did  not  seem  to  worry 
the  quiet,  thoughtful  chap  that  his  friend  was 
utterly  mad  on  several  very  important  subjects. 
He  seemed  oblivious  of  that.  He  would  discuss 
with  me  his  friend's  ideas  and  condemn  some  of 
them  frankly,  but  he  seemed  to  think  that  on 
the  whole  they  were  each  working  together  for 
a  common  end,  though  trying  to  achieve  it  by 


The  Fanatic  Element  185 

different  methods.  He  was  not  so  mucli  inter- 
ested in  the  manner  in  which  the  goal  which  he 
sought  might  be  reached,  as  in  the  fact  that  he 
and  his  friend  were  impelled  by  desire  for  the 
establishment  of  the  same  ultimate  conditions. 

A  socialist  meeting  in  the  Russian  Far  East 
has  an  atmosphere  all  its  own. 

In  a  big  empty  factory  building  in  Siberia, 
silent  machines  grouped  round  as  if  in  mute 
protest  at  the  interruption  of  their  daily  work, 
Russian  men  and  women  gathered  in  the  after- 
noon of  a  pleasant  autumn  day. 

Admission  to  the  meeting  was  easily  gained. 
Any  one  could  come.  Each  member  of  the  au- 
dience was  supposed  to  contribute  a  piece  of 
silver  at  the  door,  but  many  drifted  in  without 
paying  any  attention  to  the  collection  box. 

I  was  an  early  arrival.  I  stood  by  the  bar- 
rier, through  a  small  gate  in  which  the  incom- 
ing crowd  had  to  pass,  and  watched  the  faces. 

Men  were  there,  and  women,  who  were  toil- 
ers in  that  very  factory.  Others  were  work 
people  of  other  factories,  not  far  distant,  whose 
machinery  was  idle,  too.  It  was  not  a  day  for 
work.  It  was  a  lazy  day.  The  air  was  soft. 
Even  the  sun  shone  lazily.  I  was  lazy,  and  I 
pride  myself  I  am  rarely  lazy.  Why,  then, 
should  not  the  Russians  have  been  lazy — so 


1 86  Japan  or  Germany 

many  of  wliom  are  born  lazy  and  never  get 
over  it? 

They  came  in  quietly  enough.  Some  of  the 
men  were  fine  looking  fellows.  Some  of  the 
women  were  comely,  but  none  of  them  hand- 
some. They  were  a  stolid  lot.  With  the  work 
people  a  few  sailors  drifted  by,  then  a  group  of 
soldiers,  and  last  a  score  of  students. 

I  recognized  one  or  two  men  who  might  be 
described  as  bourgeois.  Trimming  their  sails 
to  the  wind,  they  were.  But  few  of  the  bour- 
geois had  either  sufficient  courage,  sufficient 
common  sense,  or  sufficient  patriotism  to  try  to 
guide  the  more  socialistic  elements  in  Siberia. 
If  any  class  in  Eussia  has  failed  utterly  to  grasp 
the  slightest  conception  of  its  duty  toward  it- 
self, its  brethren,  the  State,  or  humanity,  it  is 
the  bourgeois  class  in  Russia.  True,  it  has  had 
a  rough  passage.  But  it  cringed  and  ran.  It 
did  not  stay  and  help — except  in  rare  instances. 
It  loved  its  wealth,  such  as  it  had,  more  than 
it  loved  Russia. 

The  Bolsheviki  are  bad  enough,  but  I  had 
rather  be  a  Bolshevik  than  a  bourgeois  in  Rus- 
sia, if  I  was  to  condemn  myself  to  the  line  of 
action  that  either  class  has  taken. 

Piles  of  metal  lay  about.  Along  one  wall 
were  rods  of  steel  which  should  have  been  being 


The  Fanatic  Element  187 

rapidly  turned  into  bolts  on  the  screw  macliines 
not  far  away.  I  suppose  I  was  the  only  person 
present  who  thought  that  the  socialists  might 
be  better  engaged  in  working  the  lathes  and 
drills  than  in  listening  to  flowery  orations  on 
the  subject  of  the  millennium.  We  seemed  a  long 
way  from  the  millennium  that  day  in  Siberia. 

As  I  walked  in  with  the  crowd,  and  stood  at 
a  point  where  I  could  be  sure  to  hear  the  speak- 
ing, I  became  impatient  with  that  audience,  in- 
dividually and  collectively. 

My  impatience  died,  and  I  looked  upon  them, 
as  one  should  look  upon  them,  as  sober,  mis- 
guided children. 

They  were  so  docile.  They  were  so  quiet  and 
orderly.  They  were  in  such  deadly  earnest. 
They  could  not  help  being  lazy.  Most  Eus- 
sians  are  lazy.  It  is  a  lazy  land.  Very  few 
Kussians  have  had  any  incentive  in  their  lives 
to  be  anything  but  lazy.  It  really  hasn't  mat- 
tered in  Russia.  The  average  Russian  didn't 
get  on  very  much  better,  if  he  wasn't  lazy.  It's 
all  a  matter  of  experience.  If  you  start  out 
being  lazy  in  this  world,  and  nobody  criticises, 
and  the  necessaries  of  life  come  along  natural- 
ly enough  and  pretty  well  the  same  as  they  come 
to  everybody  else  in  the  community,  you  drift. 
A  spark  may  be  blown  into  a  small  blaze  now 


i88  Japan  or  Germany 

and  again  by  the  breeze  of  a  passing  inspira- 
tion, but  it  dies  down.  Nobody  cares.  Nobody 
notices.  It's  a  hopeless  business,  being  indus- 
trious all  by  yourself.  All  the  more  so — when  it 
isn't  fashionable. 

They  were  orderly,  that  audience.  They  were 
patient.  Russia  stands  for  patience.  It's  a 
monument  of  patience.  A  people  could  have  a 
worse  attribute. 

And  so  they  filed  in,  there  by  the  still  ma- 
chines, that  seemed  to  me  to  be  crying  out  to 
be  worked,  and  waited — with  no  disorder,  with 
no  tumult,  with  no  loud  words.  They  were  con- 
siderate enough  of  one  another  coming  in. 
There  was  no  pushing  or  shoving — ^no  rudeness. 
They  were  a  bit  bovine,  perhaps,  but  very  nice- 
ly, very  considerately  so. 

The  soldiers  were  quiet.  Typically  Russian, 
they  were  as  patient  as  the  work-folk.  As  I 
stood  there  watching  them  my  mind  went  back, 
years  into  the  past,  to  other  days  in  Siberia. 
I  remembered  the  smooth-faced  boy,  the  order- 
ly of  a  drunken  Russian  colonel  who  had  been 
beaten  to  death  by  his  master  with  a  scabbard- 
ed  sabre,  because  he  had  failed  to  procure  some- 
thing for  which  he  had  been  sent.  That  boy 
died  a  violent  death.  He  had  lived  a  violent 
life.    Violence  was  an  every-day  experience  to 


The  Fanatic  Element  189 

him.  The  colonel,  who  was  unpunished  for  his 
crime,  and  was  soon  beating  another  orderly 
at  regular  intervals,  saw  to  it  that  any  Kussian 
soldier  with  whom  he  came  in  constant  contact, 
had  his  share  of  violence. 

But  these  Russian  soldiers  were  not  violent. 
They  were  a  bit  restless,  as  if  having  no  very 
clearly  defined  plan,  but  they  were  not  the  sort 
of  men  who  would  be  violent,  unless  drunk. 
There  is  no  drink  to  be  had  in  Siberia. 

The  big  shop  filled  at  length.  Then  there 
was  a  commotion  near  the  door  and  a  lane  open- 
ed. Down  the  lane  came  a  trio,  who  were  to 
be  the  speakers  of  the  afternoon. 

Samelyoff,  Parenogo  and  Commandantoff 
were  what  their  names  sounded  like  to  me. 
Those  were  not  the  names,  exactly,  but  as  the 
three  speakers  were  none  of  them  international 
celebrities,  it  does  not  matter  much  what  I  call 
them. 

I  instinctively  liked  SamelyofP.  He  was  a  big 
chap,  tall  and  strong.  He  had  a  fine  chest  and 
well-set  shoulders.  His  hair,  brown,  with  red 
lights,  waved  back  picturesquely  from  his  high 
forehead.  He  was  cleanshaven.  His  eyes  were 
brown,  and  large.  His  mouth  was  too  small, 
and  weak,  if  one  wished  to  be  critical,  but  he 
was  a  fine-looking  young  chap,  for  all  that.    He 


190  Japan  or  Germany 

was  about  thirty.  From  his  dress  I  judged 
him  a  workman,  but  an  acquaintance  said  no, 
he  was  a  stranger  who  had  drifted  into  Siberia 
since  the  revolution,  and  did  no  work. 

Samelyoff  was  the  first  speaker.  He  talked 
fluently  enough,  but  the  combined  efforts  of 
two  quite  good  interpreters  could  not  discover 
much  sense  in  what  he  said.  He  was  clearly  a 
disciple  of  Karl  Marx.  To  him  there  was  only 
one  class  against  whom  to  rail — the  bourgeois. 
It  mattered  not  what  country  was  that  of  their 
origin.  If  they  were  what  he  called  bourgeois, 
that  was  sufficient.  He  was  against  them  and 
theirs.  Peace  mthout  annexations  and  with- 
out indemnities  came  in  for  much  of  his  time. 
He  was  so  thoroughly  convinced  that  the  Ger- 
man workingman  was  about  to  rise  and  shake 
off  the  yoke  of  the  Kaiser  and  his  class,  that 
it  almost  seemed  a  shame  to  disabuse  his  mind. 
The  German  working  man  was  given  more  con- 
fidence by  that  odd,  likable  young  Russian,  than 
any  one  could  appreciate,  at  first.  The  Ger- 
man workers  were  not  only  to  overthrow  Junk- 
erism  in  Germany,  but  were  to  place  back  in 
Russia's  hands  all  which  she  had  lost  during 
the  war,  as  well  as  to  restore  complete  liberty 
to  Poland.    The  German  working  man  was  the 


The  Fanatic  Element         191 

friend,  apparently,  to  whom  the  Eussian  brother 
must  look  for  succour. 

No  man  who  saw  and  heard  Samelyoff  and 
had  met  with  no  others  of  his  type  could  have 
imagined  him  anything  but  a  German  agent. 
I  had  seen  too  many  like  him,  however,  to  think 
that  was  necessarily  true.  Many  a  young  Eus- 
sian enthusiast  who  would  not  take  a  penny  of 
German  money,  or  willingly  aid  the  Prussian 
regime  in  any  way,  has  spread  broadcast 
through  Eussia  doctrines  that  might  well  have 
had  their  inception  in  the  very  headquarters  of 
German  propaganda.  They  served  the  Boche 
as  well,  did  these  misguided  folk,  as  if  they  had 
been  in  German  pay. 

Parenogo  was  a  little  man.  He  had  a  head 
like  a  spaniel,  with  a  mane  of  wavy  black  hair. 
Most  of  the  harangue  was  taken  up  with  a  dis- 
sertation on  the  character  of  the  Eussian  revo- 
lution. Parenogo  argued  that  the  co-operation 
of  the  middle  classes  must  be  excluded.  The 
government  must  be  purely  by  the  people.  A 
world  social  revolution,  he  was  convinced,  was 
inevitable,  and  we  were  standing  on  the  thresh- 
old of  it.  Peace,  he  said,  should  be  made  by 
democracy  and  not  by  diplomats.  Democracy 
must  fight  for  general  disarmament. 

The  crowd  listened    attentively,    and  there 


192  Japan  or  Germany 

were  no  dissenting  voices  raised.  One  hardly- 
needed  to  understand  Parenogo  's  words  to  real- 
ise that  he  considered  himself  a  man  with  a 
message.  He  felt  what  he  said  and  was  con- 
vinced that  no  argument  would  hold  against 
him. 

Commandantoff,  the  third  speaker,  was  an- 
other firebrand  against  the  bourgeois.  He 
wanted  to  sweep  the  bourgeois  out  of  every  po- 
sition and  declared  that  the  Workmen's  and 
Soldiers'  Council,  a  council  composed  of  true 
revolutionaries,  must  have  all  the  power  in  their 
hands.  He  began  to  speak  of  dividing  up  the 
land.  Every  workman  was  to  have  shorter 
hours.  Every  peasant  was  to  have  some  ground 
which  he  could  call  his  own.  The  State  was  to 
control  all  industry,  and  an  equalisation  of 
wealth  was  to  be  assured. 

Commandantoff  was  a  big  fellow,  with  a 
breadth  of  shoulder  and  depth  of  chest,  and  his 
words  rolled  forth  sonorously,  his  promises 
falling  on  eager  ears.  The  audience  took  in- 
creased interest  in  what  he  was  saying.  There 
was  not  one  voice  raised  to  question  him  or  to 
point  out  the  impossibilities  in  some  of  his  sug- 
gested schemes.  He  talked  on  and  on,  drawing 
a  more  and  more  roseate  picture  of  the  Russia 
that  was  to  come.    He,  too,  was  convinced  that 


The  Fanatic  Element  193 

the  rest  of  the  nations  would  follow  in  the  foot- 
steps of  revolutionary  Eussia.  The  workmen 
of  the  world  would  wipe  out  national  boundary 
lines  and  become  an  internationalist  group, 
swaying  the  world  toward  social  democracy 
until  the  rich  no  longer  existed  as  a  class,  and 
there  were  no  poor  in  any  land. 

When  the  meeting  broke  up,  people  were 
quite  enthusiastic.  Their  simplicity  was  so 
marked  and  their  gullibility  so  great  that  these 
specious  phrases  of  the  socialistic  orators  took 
away  their  breaths  for  the  moment. 

I  tried  to  find  out  to  what  extent  these  doc- 
trines had  really  been  adopted  by  the  audience, 
and  the  result  was  more  encouraging  than  I 
had  anticipated.  The  Siberians  seemed  inclined 
to  question  some  of  the  axioms  which  had  been 
laid  down  so  dogmatically  by  the  speakers.  I 
was  in  the  home  of  a  Russian  acquaintance, 
questioning  him  as  to  the  extent  to  which  such 
revolutionary  doctrines  were  imbibed  on  short 
notice  when  Commandantoff  called.  I  was  in- 
troduced to  him  and  listened  to  him  with  close 
attention  for  some  time.  I  told  him  frankly 
that  I  was  in  favour  of  the  prosecution  of  the 
war  against  Germany  and  that  I  did  not  sym- 
pathise particularly  with  the  Russion  bour- 
geois, for  the  reason  that  they  had  lost  heart 


194  Japan  or  Germany 

to  an  extent  which  made  one  disgusted  with 
them. 

"I  have  come  to  the  conclusion,"  I  told  him, 
**that  the  better  educated  classes  of  the  Russian 
people  throughout  the  whole  country  love  their 
own  skins  and  their  property  as  much  as  they 
love  Russia.  When  the  unconscious  and  ignor- 
ant masses  of  the  people,  particularly  the  men 
without  education  among  the  army  and  the  la- 
bouring classes  began  to  answer  the  Bolshevik 
call  and  agitate  for  social  revolution,  the  more 
conscious  elements  of  the  Russian  people  threw 
up  the  sponge  too  quickly.  Once  the  agitation 
was  started  and  the  call  for  class  war  was 
sounded,  the  Russian  intelligent  and  educated 
classes,  entirely  unprepared  for  a  struggle  and 
seemingly  with  no  capacity  or  capability  of 
putting  up  a  fight,  retired  and  sulked  in  the 
corner,  accepting  at  once  the  theory  that  they 
were  powerless  to  stop  the  riot.  By  doing  this 
they  gave  a  free  hand  to  the  uneducated,  loaf- 
ing and  totally  unconscious  bulk  of  the  popu- 
lation, who  were  guided  by  extreme  anarchists 
and  socialists  and  who  were  continually  misled, 
although  sometimes  unconsciously,  by  German 
agents.  The  fact  that  the  bourgeois  element  has 
been  guilty  of  less  strenuous  effort  to  help  than 
might  have  been  expected  from  it,  does  not  mean 


The  Fanatic  Element         195 

that  there  are  not  good  people  among  that  class. 
They  are  Russians.  Why  do  you  not  willingly 
accept  their  co-operation  and  assistance  in  mak- 
ing over  Eussia  into  a  new  Republic?  Has  not  a 
man  of  the  bourgeois  as  much  right  to  be  called 
a  Russian  as  a  man  of  the  working  classes?'' 

The  argument  Conunandantoff  used  in  reply 
was  no  answer  to  my  question.  Either  he  was 
utterly  shallow  and  had  adopted  a  number  of 
high-sounding  phrases  and  arguments  from  the 
leaders  of  the  Bolsheviki,  or  he  was  incapable 
of  argumentative  reasoning.  He  talked  bitterly 
against  the  Allies,  but  I  could  not  get  him  into 
a  state  of  mind  where  cohesive  statements  on 
one  side  or  the  other  would  lead  to  a  continuity 
of  reasoning.  He  admitted  that  there  was  a 
good  deal  of  German  propaganda  going  on  in 
Russia,  but  immediately  swung  to  the  argument 
that  there  was  a  great  deal  of  Socialist  propa- 
ganda going  on  in  Germany.  The  poor  fellow 
was  undoubtedly  of  the  opinion  that  Russian 
propaganda  would  win  against  Germany  no 
matter  how  much  German  propaganda  might 
be  used  in  Russia.  He  asked  me  if  I  did  not 
think  the  Allies  were  at  fault  for  not  having 
supported  Russia  by  recognising  the  Bolshevik 
government. 

**The  decomposition  of  the  victualling  and 


196  Japan  or  Germany 

transport  organisation  in  Russia  became  an  ex- 
cellent ally  for  German  agitation,''  I  replied, 
*■  ^  and  the  fault  of  tlie  Allies  lay  in  the  fact  that 
they  did  not  earlier  pay  sufficient  attention  to 
these  two  serious  questions.  On  the  other  hand, 
every  difficulty  was  put  in  the  way  of  Allied 
effort  to  assist.  The  Allied  missions  which  were 
sent  to  Russia  lacked  sympathy  with  the  objects 
of  the  extremists  who  were  exploiting  the  real 
power  in  Russia,  and  an  impasse  under  such 
circumstances  was  inevitable.  The  Allies,  how- 
ever, could  not  make  a  certain  section  of  the 
Russian  army  fight  longer  in  this  war.  Never- 
theless, a  section,  a  considerable  section,  of  the 
Russian  army  would  fight  against  Prussian 
militarism.  It  is  you  and  speakers  like  you  who 
argue  against  the  continuation  of  the  war  on 
any  gTounds  who  are  forcing  your  country  un- 
der the  feet  of  Germany,  and  the  first  thing 
they  will  trample  out  of  the  prostrate  body  of 
Russia  will  be  the  fruits  of  the  Russian  revolu- 
tion." 

Some  of  the  statements  I  made  Command- 
antoff  inquired  into  through  my  friend  who 
was  doing  the  interpreting  for  us.  He  thought 
a  moment,  and  then  said,  **What  you  say  seems 
sensible  in  some  ways,  but  you  fail  to  take  into 
consideration  the  fact  that  the  German  work- 


The  Fanatic  Element         197 

man  and  the  Austrian  workman  have  in  their 
hearts  the  same  ideals  which  we  have.  Would 
you  like  to  know  what  I  consider  our  new  Rus- 
sia should  be?  It  should  be  a  country  where 
there  were  no  men  who  did  not  work  produc- 
tively for  at  least  five  hours  every  day,  if  not 
six.  The  remainder  of  the  day  should  be  at 
the  entire  disposal  of  the  individual.  The  State 
should  control  all  industries  so  that  no  monopo- 
lies would  be  possible.  Great  riches  could  not 
be  amassed  and  the  State  should  see  to  it  that 
there  was  work  for  every  one,  so  that  there 
would  be  no  misery  and  poverty.  The  Imperial 
Romanoff  Government  went  into  this  war  for 
no  such  ideals.  England  and  France  are  not 
fighting  for  such  a  result  to  the  war.  England 
and  France  are  fighting  for  industrial  and  com- 
mercial interests  or  for  a  gain  of  territory. '' 

I  broke  in  here  to  try  to  prove  to  him  that 
England  and  France  were  fighting  for  some- 
thing else,  but  Commandantoff  was  not  anxious 
to  hear  new  theories  on  that  head.  The  base  on 
which  all  his  arguments  were  reared  took  into 
account  first  the  fact  that  he  was  the  advocate 
of  something  higher  and  better  for  Russia, 
something  more  ideal  and  more  honestly  to  be 
sought  than  any  object  of  any  other  country  in 


198  Japan  or  Germany 

the  war.  To  argue  that  the  Allied  nations  were 
in  any  way  right  was  tearing  from  under  him 
some  of  the  platform  on  which  he  stood.  He 
could  have  no  sympathy  with  that. 

**If  you  can  show  me  how  continuing  to  fight 
Germany  would  change  the  mind  of  England 
and  France  as  to  the  sort  of  government  they 
should  have,  the  way  the  workmen  of  their 
country  should  be  treated,  and  the  attitude 
their  people  should  take  against  the  rights  of 
property,''  he  said,  *'I  would  be  interested  to 
hear  it." 

His  words  were  utterly  untrue.  He  was  not 
in  the  least  interested  to  hear  anything  which 
combatted  his  arguments.  There  was  only  one 
view  for  him,  and  that  was  the  one  that  had 
been  given  him  in  Petrograd.  Curiously  enough, 
I  think  he  was  conscientiously  of  the  belief  that 
he  was  right.  He  simply  had  a  total  incapacity 
for  argument  or  for  reason. 

That  is  the  class  of  man  that  in  many  in- 
stances one  finds  in  Russia  and  the  Russian  Far 
East,  and  a  little  well  directed  educational  work 
to  counteract  the  influence  of  this  type  would 
wipe  away  much  of  the  poison  from  the  mindwS 
of  the  people.  A  campaign  of  education  is  a 
positive  necessity  if  the  Russians  throughout 


The  Fanatic  Element         199 

their  whole  empire  are  to  gain  any  more  intelli- 
gent ideas  than  those  which  are  being  fed  to 
them  by  such  men  as  those  to  whom  I  listened 
that  afternoon  in  the  empty  factory  building. 


GERMAN  PROPAGANDA 


CHAPTER  XI 

Gbbman  Pbopaganda 

No  man  who  has  not  come  into  touch  with  it 
can  appreciate  the  depth  and  subtlety  of  Ger- 
man propaganda.  I  have  seen  so  much  of  it  in 
different  parts  of  the  world  since  1914  that  I 
am  beginning  to  recognise  the  earmarks  once 
in  a  while,  before  I  can  trace  the  actual  source 
of  operation. 

When  walking  along  a  street  in  a  town  in  Si- 
beria, one  might  come  into  frequent  contact 
with  soldiers  and  sailors  and  hold  short  conver- 
sations on  different  topics.  Neither  soldiers 
nor  sailors  had  much  to  do.  Strolling  along 
one  morning  in  Vladivostok,  a  British  officer 
whom  I  knew  met  a  fine,  clean-looking  young 
Russian  sailor.  As  the  boy  passed  the  officer, 
he  paused  a  moment  and  addressed  him  in  Rus- 
sian. Fortunately  my  friend  could  speak  Rus- 
sian well.  He  smilingly  returned  the  saluta- 
tion of  the  young  bluejacket.  We  always  smile 
in  Russia ;  it  never  fails  to  bring  an  answering 

203 


204  Japan  or  Germany 

smile.  The  Russian  boy  was  clear-eyed,  open- 
faced,  and  his  smile  was  good  to  see. 

* '  Would  you  mind  if  I  asked  you  a  question  1  ^ ' 
he  asked  my  friend  the  Major. 

** Certainly  not,''  was  the  reply.  **You  are 
quite  at  liberty  to  ask  anything  that  you  like." 

**We  are  much  interested  in  your  uniform," 
said  the  young  Russian.  *  *  We  have  seen  it  sev- 
eral times  now,  and  we  have  had  one  or  two 
discussions  as  to  just  what  uniform  it  is.  If 
you  do  not  mind  my  asking  you,  I  should  like 
to  know  if  it  is  the  uniform  of  a  Turkish  general 
or  of  an  American  lieutenant." 

**How  in  the  world  did  you  come  to  the 
conclusion  that  it  might  be  one  or  the  other  ? ' ' 

**I  did  not.  One  of  the  boys  said  he  thought 
it  looked  like  the  uniform  of  a  Turkish  general. 
He  has  been  in  Constantinople,  and  he  thought 
he  knew.  Another  of  my  comrades  said  he  was 
sure  it  was  an  American  uniform  and  thought 
it  might  be  that  of  a  lieutenant." 

The  Major  laughed  heartily.  *'My  uniform 
is  that  of  a  regiment  known  as  the  Black 
Watch.    It  is  a  British  uniform." 

** Really!  How  interesting.  The  boys  will 
be  pleased  to  know  that." 

The  sailor  was  about  to  pass  on  down  the 
street,  when  my  friend  stopped  him  and  asked. 


German  Propaganda  205 

*  'How  could  you  think  that  my  uniform  was  that 
of  a  Turkish  officer  when  you  know  that  your 
country  is  at  war  with  Turkey!  If  I  were  the 
Turkish  general  I  could  not  be  here  in  Vladi- 
vostok." 

**Ah,"  replied  the  sailor,  'Hhat  would  have 
been  so  a  few  days  ago.  But  now  that  the  revo- 
lution in  Turkey  has  come  and  we  are  no  longer 
at  war  with  Turkey,  there  is  no  reason  that  you 
could  not  be  here,  even  were  you  a  Turkish 
general,  is  there  f 

**But  no  Turkish  revolution  has  taken  place, 
my  boy,''  said  the  Major. 

**Have  you  not  heard  the  news?"  came  from 
the  sailor.  **Do  you  not  know  that  the  people 
in  Turkey  have  overthrown  their  rulers  as  we 
did  in  Russia  ?  Do  you  not  know  that  Turkey, 
too,  is  governed  by  Committees  of  Soldiers '  and 
Workmen's  Deputies?" 

'^I  do  not  know  that,"  said  the  Major,  with 
a  smile.  *'In  fact,  I  know  that  such  is  not  the 
case,  unfortunately.  No ;  Eussia  is  still  at  war 
with  Turkey.  There  is  no  peace  for  the  South 
of  Russia  yet,  and  no  peace  in  immediate  pros- 
pect, unless  it  would  be  one  that  would  be  worse 
than  war." 

The  sailor's  eyes  brightened  and  he  smiled 
back,    delighted   to    find    some    one   to   whom 


2o6  Japan  or  Germany 

he  could  impart  newly  gathered  information. 
**Then  my  news  is  later  than  yours,"  he  said. 
*  *  Come  with  me  to  the  barracks  and  I  will  show 
you.    I  have  proof  that  what  I  say  is  true.'' 

The  Major  walked  down  with  him,  and  there 
in  the  barracks  the  boy  produced  a  printed 
sheet  in  Russian,  giving  all  the  details  of  the 
Turkish  revolution — telling  all  the  story  in  a 
clever,  detailed  way,  ably  compiled  to  catch  the 
mind  and  the  imagination  of  just  such  bright 
young  Russian  boys.  No  need  to  ask  where  that 
sheet  originated.  No  need  to  ask  the  source  of 
that  news.  That  poison  came  straight  from 
Germany. 

Fortunate  it  was  that  the  Major  had  that  cas- 
ual conversation  on  the  pavement  that  morning, 
for  he  was  able  to  hammer  home  some  plain 
truths,  not  only  about  that  highly  imaginative 
account  of  the  Turkish  revolution,  but  about 
the  methods  of  the  men  who  had  manufactured 
the  information  for  Russian  consumption. 

The  Austrian  and  German  prisoners  were 
sometimes  visited  by  neutral  officials.  Before 
America's  entrance  into  the  war  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States  had  this  duty  to  perform.  When 
I  was  in  Siberia  I  met  a  Swedish  gentleman  of 
rank,  whose  ostensible  labours  in  the  Russian 
Far  East  were  to  report,  as  an  unbiassed  ob- 


German  Propaganda  207 

server,  on  the  maimer  in  which  the  Russians 
were  treating  the  prisoners  from  the  armies  of 
the  Central  Powers. 

On  more  than  one  occasion  the  Swedish  gen- 
tleman indulged  in  close  conversation  with 
some  Russian.  Usually  it  was  an  employe  of  the 
government  or  a  soldier  in  the  army,  but  the 
Swedish  gentleman  was  nothing  if  not  catholic 
in  the  selection  of  his  acquaintances. 

**You  poor  fellows,''  was  the  gist  of  one  con- 
versation which  was  overheard.  *  *  You  splendid 
Russians.  Is  it  not  a  pity  that  after  you  have 
fought  so  hard  and  so  well  for  such  a  long  time, 
and  after  you  have  suffered  so  terribly  and  had 
such  awful  casualties,  that  you  should  find  your- 
selves where  you  are  now?  What  a  shame 
that  after  the  sacrifices  you  have  made  in  this 
war  for  the  Allies,  that  they  should  have  de- 
serted you  now,  just  as  you  have  thrown  off 
the  yoke  of  your  old  government  and  are  try- 
ing so  hard  and  so  splendidly  to  formulate  your 
new  Republic.  My  heart  goes  out  to  you.  I 
feel  that  it  is  terribly  unjust  that  the  Allies 
should  refuse  to  recognise  your  new  govern- 
ment. How  ungrateful  of  the  Allies,  after  all 
that  you  have  done  for  them  in  the  way  of  blood- 
shed and  loss,  that  they  should  turn  from  you 
now  and  fail  to  give  you  their  sympathy  or 


2o8  Japan  or  Germany 

support.  You  poor  fellows.  Apparently  the 
only  friend  you  have  left  is  Germany — at  least, 
if  Germany  is  not  a  friend,  she  seems  inclined 
to  treat  you  fairly  and  to  make  a  peace  which 
will  prevent  your  going  on  with  the  paying  of 
so  heavy  a  price  in  the  interests  of  those  Allies 
of  yours.  It  is  they  who  gain  and  you  who  lose. 
You  may  indeed  count  yourselves  fortunate  that 
Germany  is  not  so  heartless." 

The  Swedish  gentleman  was  spreading  that 
sort  of  stuff  wherever  he  went. 

**Made  in  Germany?"    Unquestionably. 

There  were  people  around  Siberia  who  were 
talking  against  the  Allies,  who  were  not  paid 
by  German  gold  nor  subsidised  by  German  in- 
fluence. I  met  such  a  one  in  a  conference  I  was 
holding  with  some  of  the  newspaper  editors  in  a 
city  in  Siberia.  One  of  the  most  important  pub- 
lications in  that  locality  was  what  attempted  to 
be  the  daily  organ  of  the  Soldiers'  and  Work- 
men 's  Deputies.  It  was  intended  to  be  a  *  *  daily ' ' 
right  enough,  but  it  was  very  spasmodic.  It 
was  run  by  a  committee.  The  editor  was  a  soft- 
voiced,  simple,  quiet  Russian,  who,  fortunately 
for  me,  knew  that  my  views  toward  labour  were 
decidedly  liberal.  In  fact,  he  introduced  me 
to  the  rest  as  a  socialist,  although  he  explained 
that  I  was  about  twenty-five  years  behind  the 


German  Propaganda  209 

times.  I  discovered  that  lie  had  been  a  reporter 
on  a  labour  paper  in  Brisbane,  Australia,  and 
had  there  reported  an  address  of  mine  in  which 
I  put  forward  certain  views  with  which  the  la- 
bourites were  at  that  time  in  sympathy.  That 
effort  of  mine  in  Australia  aimed  to  show  that 
there  were  some  of  us  outside  the  Socialist 
group  who  held  fairly  broad-minded  ideas  about 
the  progress  of  humanity,  proved  to  have  been 
bread  cast  upon  the  waters. 

I  visited  the  editorial  rooms  of  this  Soldiers' 
and  Workmen  ^s  paper  in  Siberia  with  no  little 
anticipation.  The  leading  minds  that  had  to 
do  with  the  paper  were  present,  as  well  as  one 
or  two  other  editors  of  similar  papers.  One 
of  these  was  the  editor  of  a  paper  called  the 
Bed  Banner,  which  promulgated  the  views 
of  the  Maximalist  extremists. 

My  friend  from  Australia  interpreted  for  me, 
as  he  did  many  times  afterwards,  proving  most 
helpful  and  offering  his  services  cheerfully  and 
willingly.    He  was  a  nice  boy. 

On  this  particular  occasion  there  were  sev- 
eral present  who  could  speak  some  English. 
After  some  little  time,  when  I  had  become  fairly 
started  on  the  subject  of  the  war  and  we  were 
getting  pretty  close  together  on  the  question 
of  how  more  and  better  war  news  could  be 


210  Japan  or  Germany 

placed  before  them,  a  young  fellow  came  in,  sat 
down  and  rather  unceremoniously  joined  the 
conversation.  He  was  a  pale,  SBsthetic  looking 
young  man,  a  Jew^  with  straight  black  hair  and 
very  black  eyes  under  heavy  eyebrows.  I  saw 
the  stamp  of  the  fanatic  on  him  at  once.  I  was 
really  interested  in  hearing  the  views  of  the 
Eussian  newspaper  men,  and  they  were  thor- 
oughly interested  in  what  I  was  telling  them 
in  return.  For  this  reason  I  did  not  warmly 
welcome  the  intervention  of  the  black-haired 
one.  However,  I  smiled.  Smiles  were  of  no 
use  to  him.  He  was  not  of  the  smiling  kind. 
His  heart  was  bitter. 

**Do  you  criticise  the  conditions  that  you  find 
here?"  he  asked. 

**Yes,"  I  replied,  **some  of  them." 

**  Before  you  do  that  you  had  better  go  home 
to  America  and  look  into  your  own  conditions," 
he  said  venomously. 

I  smiled.  **I  have  looked  into  the  conditions 
in  my  own  country  lots  of  times,"  I  said. 
*  ^  Moreover,  I  have  looked  into  the  conditions  of 
a  good  many  countries  besides  my  own." 

**  After  what  America  has  done  to  Eussia  you 
should  be  ashamed  to  come  here,"  he  said,  his 
black  eyes  darting  fire  as  he  spoke. 


German  Propaganda  2ii 

I  smiled  again.  It  was  a  little  forced  that 
time. 

**  America  has  certainly  done  Russia  no 
harm/'  I  replied. 

^  ^  There  has  been  a  conspiracy  between  Amer- 
ica and  Japan  to  put  down  the  price  of  the 
ruble,''  he  said,  striking  his  fist  on  the  arm  of 
his  chair. 

That  remark  delivered  him  into  my  hands  for 
the  moment.  I  had  no  difficulty  in  winning  that 
argument.  It  required  no  eloquence  or  gift  of 
debate  to  prove  that  America  had  done  more 
than  any  other  nation  in  the  world  to  raise  the 
price  of  the  ruble. 

But  this  made  the  black-haired  one  more  bit- 
ter. As  I  turned  to  the  question  which  we  had 
been  discussing  before  his  arrival  and  spoke  of 
the  necessity  that  the  Russian  labouring  man 
should  give  us  of  his  best  in  Siberia,  the  fanatic 
thrust  himself  forward  again. 

**The  Russian  workingman,"  he  said,  **is 
further  advanced  than  the  American  working- 
man.  He  knows  what  he  wants  and  he  is  going 
to  get  it." 

I  ventured  the  suggestion  that  the  American 
workingman  was  very  well  olf  comparatively. 
This  caused  a  storm.  For  some  minutes  I  had 
to  listen  to  a  denunciation  of  America  which 


212  Japan  or  Germany 

failed  to  amuse  me, — and  for  once  I  stopped 
smiling.  The  fanatic  held  the  floor  with  a  tirade 
against  American  plutocracy,  and  what  he  said 
about  the  conditions  under  which  American  la- 
bour had  to  work  sounded  to  me  most  exagger- 
ated. 

**In  my  youth  I  worked  at  manual  labour,"  I 
told  him.  *  *  Later  I  have  been  a  director  of  more 
than  one  company  which  employed  thousands 
of  workers  in  different  parts  of  the  world.  You 
are  drawing  a  picture  of  American  labour  condi- 
tions which  is  untrue  and  unfair." 

He  declared  that  he  was  not.  He  declared 
that  he  had  worked  in  America  and  knew  what 
he  was  talking  about.  Spurred  on  by  my  con- 
tradiction, his  abuse  of  America  got  beyond  all 
bounds.  I  smelt  the  air  of  battle  for  a  minute 
and,  waiting  until  he  was  out  of  breath,  took  the 
opportunity  to  gain  the  floor  and  told  him  what 
I  thought  of  him  and  his  theories.  ^.,.^5**/ 

**You  are  the  sort  of  Russiaiii^I  said,  *  Vho 
is  working  more  harm  than  good  in  this  coun- 
try. You  may  not  intend  to  do  so.  You  are  of 
the  type  that  is  always  denouncing  somebody  or 
something.     Condemnation  is  your  forte." 

I  waited  until  my  editor  friend  had  trans- 
lated my  few  sentences  and  then  continued, 
**Your  work  in  the  world  will  always  be  de- 


German  Propaganda  213 

structive  and  never  constructive.  You  love 
driving  a  wedge  where  you  can  and  ripping 
things  asunder.  I'll  guarantee  that  when  you 
came  to  Siberia  you  started  at  once  to  try  to 
make  trouble  between  whatever  factions  you 
could  find  sujBficiently  patient  to  listen  to  you. 
You  are  an  obstructionist  and  a  partitionist.  If 
I  was  a  Eussian  the  first  thing  I  would  do  would 
be  to  banish  some  of  your  kind.  This  is  the  day 
for  every  Eussian  to  join  hands." 

That  started  one  of  the  hottest  arguments 
which  I  heard  in  Eussia  or  Siberia.  Several 
people  took  a  hand  in  it.  I  learned  afterwards 
that  the  black-haired  one  was,  luckily  for  my 
analysis  of  his  character,  a  firebrand  of  the 
worst  type  who  had  caused  some  trouble  in  Si- 
beria. He  had  been  sent  out  by  the  Provisional 
Government  in  connection  with  some  official 
work  and  was  truly  the  sort  of  man  who  had  a 
good  word  for  no  one.  He  was  bitterness  per- 
sonified. 

I  do  not  know  how  far  we  succeeded,  he  or  I, 
in  transmitting  our  views  to  those  who  were 
listening  to  us.  One  or  two  of  the  journalists 
told  me  afterward  that  the  fanatic  had  over- 
reached himself  and  that  my  attack  on  him  and 
his  class  and  type  had  stung  all  the  more,  be- 
cause it  was  true  and  deserved.    I  asked  one  of 


214  Japan  or  Germany 

the  journalists  why  this  representative  from 
Petrograd  was  so  bitter  against  America. 

''What  did  America  ever  do  to  himf  I 
asked. 

'*I  will  tell  you,"  was  the  reply.  ''That  boy 
has  been  a  revolutionary  from  childhood.  He 
was  bom  one.  His  father  used  to  take  him  to 
underground  meetings  when  he  was  a  mere 
baby.  The  father  and  the  child  with  him  were 
under  suspicion  for  some  years  and  finally, 
when  evidence  against  the  father  was  procured 
and  he  was  ordered  deported  to  Siberia,  not 
many  years  passed  before  the  boy  was  sent  to 
the  mines  as  well.  His  revolutionary  tenden- 
cies grew  fast  under  restraint.  He  was  always 
in  trouble  with  the  authorities.  For  six  long 
years  of  his  early  manhood  he  wore  ball  and 
chain  on  wrist  and  ankle.  Finally  he  escaped 
and  obtained  permission  to  accompany  a  com- 
patriot who  was  going  to  America.  He  landed 
in  the  United  States  almost  penniless,  found 
his  way  to  the  Atlantic  seaboard,  and  obtained 
employment  in  the  Bethlehem  mines. 

"From  what  he  has  told  me  of  the  conditions 
under  which  he  worked,  they  may  be  open  to 
improvement.  He  could  not  stand  the  strain. 
Obtaining  transportation  by  chance,  he  left  the 
north  and  next  landed  in  New  Orleans." 


German  Propaganda  215 

'*What  a  place  for  a  white  labouring  man, 
who  spoke  little  English,  to  find  a  job,"  I  com- 
mented. 

**So  I  should  gather  from  what  he  has  told 
me,"  my  friend  continued.  **He  did  not  stay 
in  New  Orleans  long  but  drifted  out  to  Texas. 
He  knew  little  of  how  to  make  a  living,  and  suc- 
ceeded at  it  but  poorly.  I  suppose  he  tried  to 
disseminate  some  of  his  extreme  Socialist  ideas 
and  that  they  met  with  an  unpleasant  reception 
in  Texas.  He  says  frankly  sometimes  that  he 
was  more  than  once  knocked  about. ' ' 

I  could  see  that  thin-faced,  black-haired  young 
^!trsw4«ir  all  nerves  and  fire,  being  roughly 
handled  by  some  one  who  had  considered  physi- 
cal violence  the  best  reply  to  some  of  his  argu- 
ments. I  could  see  him  snarl,  too,  when  he  was 
kicked. 

*^He  disliked  America,  and  when  the  Rus- 
sian revolution  came  and  he  was  given  an  op- 
portunity to  come  back  to  Eussia,  he  was  glad 
to  shake  the  dust  of  America  from  his  feet.  He 
has  talked  to  me  about  your  country  more  than 
once.  He  would  not  like  to  go  there  again.  Is 
it  natural  that  he  should  dislike  America?" 

I  suppose  so.  I  suppose  he  saw  no  right  hand 
of  fellowship  reached  toward  him.  Perhaps  it 
was  natural  that  he  should  dislike  America. 


2i6  Japan  or  Germany 

There  may  be  things  in  America  that  some  of 
us  would  dislike  if  we  would  get  into  touch  with 
them.    I  wonder.    Qm^ 

I  met  that  ^QtmflSQ.  afterwards,  and  talked 
further  to  him.  I  think  he  disliked  me  less  on 
the  occasion  of  our  second  encounter.  No  words 
of  mine,  however,  could  convince  him  that  he 
was  wrong  about  America;  or  that  the  condi- 
tions under  which  the  American  labouring  man 
worked  were  better  than  he  thought  them. 
While  I  did  not  sympathise  gieatly  with  him 
from  some  standpoints,  I  could  be  sorry  for 
him.  After  all,  he  was  the  victim  of  a  system — 
of  environments  over  which  he  certainly  had 
but  little  oontroL 


BACK  TO  JAPAN— AND  HOME 
TO  THE  U.  S.  A. 


CHAPTER  Xn 
Back  to  Japan — ^and  Home  to  the  U.  S.  A. 

In  passing  through  from  Siberia,  I  found  of- 
ficial Japan  was  ready  and  willing  to  send  an 
army  into  the  Russian  Far  East  to  guard  the 
accumulated  stores  in  Vladivostok  and  to  take 
possession  of  the  Trans-Siberian  Railway.  It 
would  be  futile  for  Japan  to  land  troops  in 
Vladivostok,  without  taking  over  the  line  as  far 
to  the  eastward  as  Irkutsk.  I  heard  many  and 
varied  stories  of  not  unfriendly  Russian  action 
toward  German  and  Austrian  prisoners,  but  so 
far  as  Siberia  is  concerned,  enemy  prisoners 
had  not  been  released  at  that  time  to  any  ap- 
preciable extent,  and  there  was  no  menace  at 
that  moment  from  this  source. 

In  Japan,  one  cannot  but  come  into  contact 
with  the  loud-voiced  element  which  talks  wildly 
of  the  amount  of  good  to  the  Allied  cause  which 
Japan's  actions  thus  far  have  accomplished. 
In  newspaper  offices,  in  business  houses,  in 
Japanese  homes,  in  the  universities  and  schools 

210 


220  Japan  or  Germany 

and  in  Governmental  Departments,  one  con- 
tinually finds  Japanese  who  overestimate  the 
value  of  Japan's  services  to  the  Allies.  The 
taking  of  Kiao-chow,  the  convoying  of  the  Aus- 
tralian troops,  the  occupation  of  some  of  Ger- 
many's islands  in  the  Pacific  and  the  work  of 
Japan's  fleet  would  be  given  more  prominence 
and  praise  by  the  average  traveller  in  Japan  if 
the  Japanese  did  not  themselves  so  continually 
lay  weight  and  stress  upon  these  things. 

The  man  in  the  street  in  Japan  held  such  a 
diversity  of  views  on  all  subjects  connected  with 
the  war,  that  one  had  to  make  a  veritable  sym- 
posium of  expressions  of  opinion  to  come  to 
any  definite  conclusion  as  to  the  sympathy  of 
the  public  or  its  lack  of  sympathy  with  the  pro- 
posal to  despatch  an  armed  Japanese  expedi- 
tion to  Siberia  or  Eussia  in  support  of  the 
Allies. 

Japan  must  be  understood  and  the  Japanese 
form  of  government  must  be  understood  before 
one  can  grasp  the  exact  values  of  Japanese  pub- 
lic opinion. 

Terauchi  and  his  Cabinet  and  their  expres- 
sions are  a  much  better  guide  to  what  may  be 
expected  of  Japan  than  several  dozen  conver- 
sations with  men  who  hold  no  particular  place 
in  affairs  Japanese. 


Back  to  Japan  221 

Count  Terauchi  told  me  plainly  how  he  felt 
on  the  subject.  He  pledged  Japan,  so  long  as 
he  is  Premier,  to  do  all  in  her  power  to  help. 

Count  Terauchi  told  me  very  plainly  that  per- 
sonally he  had  always  been  sorry  that  circum- 
stances did  not  permit  of  Japan's  armies  taking 
the  field  against  Germany.  Terauchi  is  a  mili- 
tary man  and  a  real  soldier.  He  knows,  as 
many  leading  minds  in  Japan  know,  the  vast 
difference  between  building  up  a  military  force 
on  a  militaristic  basis  in  the  way  Germany  did, 
and  the  maintenance  of  a  strong  army  with  a 
constant  eye  on  adequate  military  preparation. 
Just  as  Japan  must  have  the  support  of  some 
allied  naval  power,  so  she  must  have  some  quid 
pro  quo  to  offer  as  a  basis  for  such  alliance. 
Japan,  armed  and  ready  to  preserve  the  peace 
of  the  Far  East,  may  be  just  as  much  an  asset 
to  such  a  peace  as  she  might  be  a  menace  to  it. 
One  rarely  finds  a  middle  view  on  this  subject 
in  the  Far  East.  Japan  and  the  Japanese  talk 
so  much  about  preserving  the  peace  of  the  Far 
East  that  any  one  who  is  anti-Japanese  sneers 
at  the  very  expression.  Nevertheless,  the  main- 
tenance of  no  little  military  strength  on  the 
part  of  Japan  might  prove  a  very  active  factor 
in  preventing  the  breaking  out  of  trouble  here 


Z22  Japan  or  Germany 

and  there,  as  it  certainly  has  done,  to  some  ex- 
tent, in  Siberia. 

Terauchi  is  the  strong  man  of  the  Orient.  I 
like  him  and  admire  him.  He  is  autocratic, 
but  a  fighter.  The  Island  Empire  could  have 
no  better  hand  on  the  reins  than  his  when  the 
day  comes  for  her  soldiers  to  move  in  their  tens 
of  thousands  along  the  paths  that  lead  to  blood 
and  fire.  Terauchi  has  kept  his  troth  with  the 
Allies,  too.  I  have  no  authority  from  him  to 
say  so,  but  I  am  perfectly  certain  he  brought 
Japan  as  far  as  he  could  toward  giving  the  Al- 
lies the  shipping  assistance  they  asked.  But 
Terauchi  cannot  do  miracles.  The  big  shipping 
concerns  are  the  money  power  in  Japan,  and 
Japan  is  no  democracy.  The  influence  and  au- 
thority of  big  business  in  Japan  is  great.  To 
realise  how  great  try  to  find  out,  in  big  national 
matters  in  Japan,  where  the  Mitsui  Bussan 
Kaisha  begins  and  where  the  government  ends. 
Study  t"he  Mitsukoshi  Company.  Yes,  big  busi- 
ness is  big  business,  and  sometimes  bad  big 
business,  in  Japan.  That  is  some  of  the  ma- 
terialism Japan  has  absorbed  from  the  West. 

Count  Terauchi  will  be  Premier  of  Japan,  so 
far  as  human  forecast  can  be  made,  until  the 
end  of  the  war.  If  Viscount  Kato  and  the  oppo- 
sition of  which  he  is  the  head  v/ere  to  prove 


Back  to  Japan  223 

capable  of  ousting  Terauclii  from  the  Premier- 
ship, they  would  have  done  so  long  before  this. 
They  were  able,  owing  to  the  constitution  of 
the  Diet  and  the  arbitrary  nature  of  Terauchi's 
appointment  as  Premier,  to  make  him  go  to  the 
country  in  1917.  When  he  was  returned  to 
power  in  the  general  election  in  the  spring  of 
1917,  he  could  indeed  settle  himself  confidently 
in  his  seat.  The  press  of  Japan  has  been  against 
him  with  few  exceptions  since  the  day  he  took 
office.  He  has  played  the  game  with  the  Allies 
and  has  been  genuinely  anxious,  not  only  per- 
sonally, but  as  the  head  of  his  government,  to 
do  what  lay  in  his  power  to  get  Japan  more 
whole-heartedly  into  the  war. 

I  sought  in  Siberia  some  evidences,  however 
slight,  that  Japan  had  been  doing  otherwise 
than  playing  the  game  in  the  Russian  Far  East, 
in  spite  of  the  existence  of  conditions  that  con- 
stituted in  themselves  some  temptation.  None 
could  I  find. 

On  my  last  afternoon  in  Tokyo  I  spent  two 
very  delightful  hours  with  Viscount  Motono, 
Japan's  able  Foreign  Minister.  Matters  had 
not  yet  come  to  a  head  in  Russia,  but  looked 
very  bad.  Viscount  Motono  knows  Russia  well. 
He  is  profoundly  sjnupathetic  with  the  Rus- 
sians. 


224  Japan  or  Germany 

He  probably  realises  more  fully  than  most 
of  his  countrymen  would  do,  the  extent  to  which 
sending  Japanese  troops  to  Siberia  would  of- 
fend Russian  susceptibilities.  At  the  same  time, 
he  knows  the  disintegration  and  chaos  that  ex- 
ist in  Russia. 

The  policy  that  Japan  must  pursue,  the  policy 
that  Count  Terauchi  and  Viscount  Motono  and 
Japanese  statesmen  of  that  class  are  well  aware 
must  be  Japan's  policy  if  she  is  to  take  high 
place  among  the  nations  of  the  world,  is  open 
and  above-board  from  beginning  to  end. 

Nothing  would  hurt  Japan's  position  among 
the  nations  of  the  West  more  than  a  move  to- 
ward aggrandisement  of  territory  in  the  Rus- 
sian Far  East.  Japan  knows  that — or  at  least 
those  at  the  head  of  her  affairs  know  it.  In 
spite  of  the  fact  that  Japan  is  not  a  democracy 
and  that  none  of  her  statesmen  who  are  in  of- 
fice to-day  are  democratic,  in  spite  of  her  rec- 
ord in  China,  Japan  will  be  most  punctilious  in 
any  action  she  may  take  in  Siberia.  Her  troops 
there  will  be  very  carefully  watched  from  Tokyo 
and  no  opportunity  be  given  for  just  criticism 
of  their  deportment  or  lack  of  discipline.  Japan 
may  be  trusted  to  do  what  she  agrees  to  do. 

Japan  will  play  the  game.  Never  mind  what 
ideas  many  Japanese  have  held  before.    Never 


Back  to  Japan  225 

mind  what  ideas  some  of  them  hold  now.  Japan 
will  play  the  game  in  Siberia  beyond  question. 
To  do  so  will  be  the  strongest  move  she  can 
make  toward  the  strengthening  of  her  national 
security.  The  big  men  in  Japan  know  this,  and 
her  biggest  men  control  her  policies  and  poli- 
tics to-day. 

Furthermore,  it  is  Japan  ^s  best  opportunity 
for  increasing  the  scope  of  her  industrial  de- 
velopment in  a  way  that  other  nations  will  find 
difficulty  in  describing  as  illegitimate  or  objec- 
tionable. 

Last,  but  not  least,  it  will  afford  Japan  an 
opportunity  for  allaying  some  of  the  suspicions 
in  which  she  is  held.  It  will  allow  her  to  pur- 
sue her  policy  of  trying  to  make  Japan  and  the 
Japanese  popular  and  gain  her  economic  ends 
through  peaceful  persuasion  and  penetration, 
rather  than  the  sort  of  force  that  is  **made  in 
Germany." 

The  need  for  recognition  by  the  Allied  gov- 
ernments, and  by  America,  that  no  matter  what 
happens  in  Russia  Siberia  can  be  saved,  is  im- 
perative. Rumours  that  some  organisation  was 
to  be  effected  among  the  German  and  Austrian 
prisoners  in  Siberia  have  taken  such  form  as  a 
semi-official  statement  to  the  effect  that  a  Prus- 
sian General  had  been  started  from  Germany 


226  Japan  or  Germany 

to  organise  an  army  in  Siberia  from  the  prison 
camps.  The  number  of  Russian  troops  in  Si- 
beria must  have  reached,  at  the  beginning  of 
1918,  somewhere  near  350,000.  In  spite  of  the 
dissemination  of  Bolshevik  doctrines  among 
them,  a  campaign  of  education  would  bring  out 
a  great  deal  of  real  sound  patriotism  from  the 
soldier  element.  It  would  not  be  difficult  to  re- 
organise a  section  of  the  Russian  army  in  Si- 
beria. 

One  must  remember  that  these  men  have  been 
soaked  and  steeped  in  German  propaganda. 
Ideas  have  been  promulgated  among  them  which 
would  seem  absurd  to  us,  but  which  seem  per- 
fectly reasonable  to  them.  The  result  is  that 
on  simple  enough  questions  their  perspective  is 
all  wrong.  The  Russian  soldier  in  Siberia  is 
not  a  coward,  and  if  you  can  show  him  some- 
thing to  fight  for  there  is  plenty  of  fight  left 
in  him. 

The  taking  over  of  Vladivostok  and  the 
Trans-Siberian  Railway,  at  least  so  far  west 
as  Irkutsk,  by  the  Japanese  army,  would  pre- 
serve Siberia  from  German  encroachment.  If 
the  question  is  handled  rightly,  a  simultaneous 
reorganisation  of  the  Russian  army  in  Siberia 
might  be  carried  into  effect.  It  would  assist 
greatly  the  effort  to  get  the  Russians  into  a 


Back  to  Japan  227 

frame  of  mind  where  they  looked  with  less  hos- 
tility on  armed  assistance  from  the  Japanese. 
If  they  saw  that  the  Japanese  were  not  en- 
deavouring to  stifle  some  effort  on  the  part  of 
the  Russians  to  assist  in  the  protection  of  their 
own  country,  it  would  create  a  very  different 
atmosphere. 

Too  much  must  not  be  looked  for  from  the 
Japanese  military  group,  by  which  I  mean  the 
army  officers  who  would  be  in  actual  occupa- 
tion of  such  territory  as  might  be  occupied  by 
soldiers  of  Japan,  for  the  reason  that  they  are 
not  distinguished  by  their  tact.  The  Japanese 
army  officer  is  not  a  very  polite  person  when 
he  is  addressing  some  one  who  is  to  him  obvi- 
ously an  inferior — this  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
he  is  extremely  polite  to  an  equal.  The  cur- 
rent manner  of  a  Japanese  officer  in  carrying 
out  instructions  must  be  described  as  somewhat 
high-handed. 

On  the  other  hand,  Count  Terauchi  knows 
his  army  and  would  undoubtedly  take  ample 
precautions  to  see  that  not  only  officers  of  high 
rank  who  might  come  into  touch  with  the  Rus- 
sians in  Siberia  would  handle  the  situation  dip- 
lomatically, but  that  the  rank  and  file  of  the 
Japanese  army  would  cause  just  as  little  in- 
convenience and  friction  as  possible.    Where 


228  Japan  or  Germany 

there  is  this  determination  there  is  no  need  to 
anticipate  trouble.  The  effect  that  the  entrance 
of  Japan  into  actual  field  operations  would  have 
on  the  German  people  would  probably  be  neg- 
ligible. It  would  seem  to  the  Germans  impossi- 
ble that  a  nation  so  far  from  its  base  as  Japan 
would  be  when  operating  west  of  Irkutsk  would 
be  likely  to  prove  a  serious  menace  to  German 
military  or  political  operations  in  European 
Eussia.  The  material  for  the  entire  change  of 
the  efficiency  of  the  Trans-Siberian  Eailway  is, 
however,  available,  and  the  Trans-Siberian  line 
under  American  supervision  or  under  Japa- 
nese, for  that  matter,  would  prove  a  very  dif- 
ferent means  of  communication  than  formerly. 
Once  let  the  Japanese  army  take  hold  in  the 
Eussian  Far  East,  and  it  would  at  least  prove 
an  effective  menace  to  Germany  and  a  nucleus 
of  a  sort,  if  the  matter  is  handled  wisely,  for 
the  reorganisation  of  some  portions  of  the  Eus- 
sian army.  After  all,  the  Eussians  are  simple- 
minded  folk.  They  are  good  natured  and  kind- 
ly. They  have  been  engineered  into  a  dislike 
and  hatred  for  the  Japanese,  so  far  as  the  Si- 
berians are  concerned,  which  the  Eussiaji  of 
the  West  feels  in  much  less  degree. 

There  is  great  opportunity  for  an  educational 
campaign  which  would  primarily  let  Japan  save 


Back  to  Japan  229 

from  the  Germans  that  much  of  Russia  which 
she  can  effectively  and  practically  reach,  leav- 
ing the  extent  of  her  operations  to  the  future 
and  to  the  development  of  what  part  of  the 
work  she  first  embarks  upon. 

Once  given  a  rallying  point  and  a  line  of 
secure  defence,  recruiting  for  a  new  Eussian 
army,  an  army  with  new  heart,  new  life  and 
new  soul  in  its  individual  units,  would  be  a  less 
difficult  task  than  might  be  anticipated. 

I  know  men  who  could  go  to-morrow  to  regi- 
ments in  Siberia,  whose  record  has  been  one  of 
some  unrest,  and  gather  around  them  sixty  per 
cent,  if  not  a  greater  proportion  of  the  soldiers, 
who  would  follow  them  gladly  to  fight  against 
Germany  and  German  domination. 

The  sort  of  men  who  are  needed  in  Russia 
from  the  English-speaking  world  are  men  who 
have  sympathy  with  the  Russians  and  con- 
fidence that  in  the  end  Russia  will  win  through 
and  escape  disintegration  as  a  nation. 

Hope  is  a  big  factor  toward  effort.  Imagine 
the  position  of  some  young  Slav  in  the  Russian 
army,  who  feels  he  could  gather  around  him  a 
number  of  his  fellows  who  would  continue  to 
fight  against  Germany  if  they  had  a  chance. 
Think  of  the  amount  of  heart  and  hope  that  is 
taken  out  of  such  a  man  by  hearing  and  reading 


23^  Japan  or  Germany 

repeatedly  that  the  military  representatives  of 
the  Allies  have  stated  that  there  was  no  more 
fight  left  in  the  Russians.  What  the  Allies  say 
does  not  matter  so  much  if  it  is  said  at  home, 
for  the  reason  that  German  propaganda  sees 
to  it  that  the  spokesmen  of  the  Allies  are  so  ut- 
terly misrepresented  in  Russia.  What  the  rep- 
resentatives of  the  Allies  who  are  on  the  ground 
say  is  a  very  different  matter.  The  men  that 
could  talk  to  the  Russian  soldiers  and  talk  ef- 
fectively are  men  who  have  been  in  uniform 
and  fought  on  their  own  fronts, — and  perhaps 
been  wounded  there. 

I  had  good  evidence  of  this  in  Vladivostok. 
A  Y.  M.  C.  A.  representative  there  wore  a  khaki 
uniform  and  very  unwisely  obtained  permission 
to  wear  with  it  insignia  of  rank  as  an  officer.  He 
came  to  one  of  the  officers  among  the  Allied  rep- 
resentatives in  Vladivostok  and  said,  **You 
know  the  men  of  a  certain  artillery  regiment 
with  whom  I  would  like  to  get  in  touch.  Would 
you  put  me  in  the  way  of  doing  sof 

The  officer  saw  the  committee  of  this  regiment 
and  was  surprised  to  hear  them  say,  **We  do 
not  want  that  man  to  come  to  us  and  our  men 
do  not  want  him.  He  wears  an  officer's  uniform, 
but  he  is  not  in  the  American  army,  is  he!  Why 
should  he  wear  the  uniform  of  an  officer  when 


Back  to  Japan  231 

he  never  has  done  and  never  intends  to  do  any- 
fighting?  We  do  not  want  that  kind  of  man 
here/' 

The  officer  explained  the  situation  to  the  Y. 
M.  C.  A.  representative,  whose  action  had  been 
born  of  a  mistaken  idea  as  to  the  importance 
he  would  assume  in  the  community  if  he  wore 
the  insignia  of  the  rank  that  he  had  adopted. 
His  idea  was  that  it  would  impress  the  Russian 
soldier.  It  did  impress  him,  but  it  impressed 
him  the  wrong  way. 

Avoidance  of  such  little  mistakes  as  this  will 
make  all  the  difference  in  handling  the  situa- 
tion in  Siberia.  There  is  much  good  in  the 
country  and  in  the  people.  There  is  better  op- 
portunity, comparatively,  to  save  the  situation 
in  Siberia  than  in  Russia.  America  cannot  wash 
her  hands  of  her  responsibilities  toward  any 
part  of  Russia.  Help  can  come  more  easily 
from  us  than  from  any  one  else,  and  if  the  help 
is  put  forward  in  the  right  way,  American  help 
will  be  more  welcome  in  the  Russian  Far  East 
than  help  that  can  possibly  come  from  any  other 
source. 

If  Russia  cannot  save  Siberia  from  the  Hun 
and  Japan  can  do  so,  Japan  had  best  take  on 
the  job. 

Japan  stands  to  gain  much,  from  the  day  her 


232  Japan  or  Germany 

columns  march  forth  to  war  for  the  Allied 
cause.  Much  that  she  will  gain  may  be  ma- 
terial.   Some  of  it  may  be  moral  and  spiritual. 

One  thing  is  sure.  Her  national  security  will 
be  strengthened  in  direct  ratio  to  the  numbers 
of  her  brave  little  men  who  may  leave  their  lives 
in  the  Pri-Amur,* should  blood  be  shed  there,  or 
further  off  to  the  westward,  where  the  camps  of 
Armageddon  may  yet,  one  day,  echo  to  the 
tramp  of  the  legions  from  the  Land  of  the  Ris- 
ing Sun. 

But  of  greater  importance  than  the  national 
security  of  Japan  is  the  barrier  in  the  path  of 
German  plans  and  ambitions  that  will  be  thrown 
in  her  way  by  the  full  participation  of  Japan 
in  the  war. 

That  participation  will  bring  the  day  of  Peace 
nearer — the  day  of  a  Peace  of  the  right  sort — 
a  Peace  born  of  an  unequivocal  defeat  of  Ger- 
many on  the  field  of  battle. 

No  other  Peace  can  be  other  than  a  victory 
in  disguise  for  Germany.  No  other  Peace  can 
be  a  Peace  for  long. 


THE  END 


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APR    5    1939 


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